

M E M O I R S
OF THE MARSHAL
DUKE OF BERWICK.

WRITTEN BY HIMSELF.

*With a Summary Continuation from the Year
1716, to his Death in 1734.*

IN TWO VOLUMES.

*To this Work is prefixed a Sketch of an historical
Panegyric of the Marshal, by the President Mon-
tesquieu; and explanatory Notes, and original Letters
relative to the Campaign in Flanders, in 1708, are
subjoined.*

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH.

V O L. II.

L O N D O N :

PRINTED FOR T. CADELL, IN THE STRAND.

M.DCC.LXXIX.

M E M O I R S

OF THE MARSHAL

DUKE OF RICHMOND



MEMOIRS

OF THE

Marshal Duke of BERWICK.

Written by Himself.

ON my arrival at Versailles, I was appointed to command the army in Dauphiny, in the room of the Marshal de Tessé; but shortly after, this appointment was changed. 1708.

THE Elector of Bavaria, since the loss of his dominions by the battle of Hochstet in 1704, had resided in Flanders, of which province he was Vicar-General and perpetual Governor, and of consequence he commanded the army of the two Crowns in that part. The Duke of Burgundy earnestly soliciting permission to serve this year, the King thought he could not well refuse him, especially as the Duke de Vendosme, who

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had

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had the command in Flanders, seconded his wishes, expecting, no doubt, to be less liable to controul under a young Prince, without experience, than under the Elector, whose life had been dedicated to the service, and who, for four-and-twenty years, had been used to command in chief. The King therefore being resolved to send the Duke of Burgundy into Flanders, it became necessary to find some plausible pretext for engaging the Elector to transfer his operations to the Rhine.

M. DE CHAMILLART formed a grand plan, which he considered as practicable: the object was of no less magnitude than to penetrate into Germany with a formidable army, to cause an insurrection in Bavaria, and to reduce the whole country between Munich and Alsace, in order to establish an uninterrupted communication with France. Lieutenant-General St. Fremont was employed to make this proposition agreeable to the Elector, who accepted it without hesitation, upon which the Duke of Burgundy was named for Flanders, with

with the Duke de Vendosme under him; ^{1708.}
the Elector for the Rhine, and myself second in command; and the Marshal de Villars, who was then at the head of that army, was named for Dauphiny in my room, on account of the disgust that subsisted between the Elector and him.

I knew nothing of the business St. Fremont was charged with, till after his return from Compiègne, when the King ordered him to communicate it to me. After having examined it thoroughly, it appeared to me in every respect impracticable; and I thought it necessary to discuss the matter seriously with the King, that I might not draw any blame upon myself for want of success. I intreated his Majesty that, when I had the honour of laying my reasons before him, St. Fremont might be present, as being better acquainted than any other person both with the plan and the country. I carried St. Fremont therefore with me into the King's closet at Marli, and there we had a long conversation, in which I

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clearly demonstrated the absurdity of the project, as St. Fremont himself confessed. The King was so convinced of it, that he told me I was in the right, and that he left it to me to act in the manner I should judge most for his service. He added, with a smile, "Chamillart " thinks he knows much more than any " General, but he knows nothing of the " matter." This speech surprized me the more, as M. de Chamillart was the favourite Minister, and had all the King's confidence. I mentioned to nobody what had passed; but I collected from it, that the King was perfectly apprized of the inability of his Minister; yet, throughout this campaign, he was not the less led by his unaccountable ideas, as will be seen in the sequel.

I SET out in May for Strasburg, where the Elector arrived a few days after me. Our army was composed of seventy-five battalions, and one hundred and fifty squadrons; the enemy was more numerous; they shewed notwithstanding by their manœuvres, that it was their intention to keep on the defensive

five in that frontier. The situation of the country rendered this plan very easy to them; for by means of the lines of Etlingen, which extended from the Rhine to the mountains, they shut up our passage entirely; unless we chose to throw ourselves into the black forest, which was impracticable considering the difficulties of the country and the want of provisions. It is true, some persons were of opinion, that instead of following the lead of the enemy, we ought, by our manœuvres, to confine them to the banks of the Rhine; or, if they marched off, to oblige them to return for the defence of the empire; but it was not reasonable to imagine, that the Duke of Marlborough and Prince Eugene, who had concerted their plans in the winter, were ignorant enough not to see, as well as ourselves, that supposing we could force the lines of Etlingen, and make good our passage to the Neckar, there would still be nothing material for them to apprehend, so long as they did not lose a battle; for being stationed near Philipsburg, and having the com-

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1708. mand of the Rhine on both sides, it was not possible for us to penetrate further to secure any posts of consequence, or to establish a free communication with our own country, without being infinitely superior in number, and having taken great precautions to be supplied with carriages and other requisites for the service; so that we should have been obliged to return and take our quarters in Alsace. They would therefore have been well pleased to see us amuse ourselves with operations, which would have been of no other advantage but merely that of saving the reputation of the General; while Prince Eugene, in imitation of the Duke of Marlborough's conduct in 1704, would have made a sudden incursion into Flanders with a considerable force to crush the King's army and invade France on that side. Upon my representations therefore to the Elector, that Prince acknowledged, that we could not think of making our way into the empire at present, and consequently, while we were waiting in expectation of a favourable opportunity, must

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must endeavour to subsist at the expence ^{1708.} of the enemy's country, and attend to the preservation of our own.

THE Elector of Brunswick was Generalissimo of their forces, and Prince Eugene commanded under him.

As I knew that the Duke of Burgundy had great designs in Flanders, I thought it my duty principally to watch the motions of the enemy, in order to send him troops in proportion as detachments should be made by them. Accordingly, on the first notice that parties were flying off towards the Lower Rhine, we dispatched M. de St. Fre-mont to the Sarre, where we formed in different camps a body of thirty-five battalions and fifty-two squadrons. In the mean time the Elector of Brunswick kept close within his lines, and Prince Eugene repaired to Mentz.

WE had passed the Rhine at Strasburg and Fort Louis, and were at this time encamped at Leichtenaw; but upon advice of the march of Prince Eugene, we repassed the Rhine, and posted ourselves with part of the army on the

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Sarre: to induce the Elector to this step, (for he had no inclination to part with any troops or to remain with a small army) I represented to him, that the fortresses we had on that side were in danger, and also that the enemy might probably attempt to penetrate into France by Lorrain; but my true reason was, not to let Prince Eugene get the start of me in Flanders, which I knew was his intention.

WE left Lieutenant-General Count du Bourg in the lines at la Loutre, with thirty battalions and thirty-seven squadrons, to oppose the Elector of Brunswick. At last, after many marches and counter-marches, on both sides, during a month, we learned, that Prince Eugene had set out from Coblenz for Flanders; that he had embarked six-and-thirty battalions there which were to follow him, and that seventy squadrons had likewise taken the same route by land: upon this intelligence, having received orders from the King by a courier on the 7th of July, I parted with the Elector at Remich, on the Moselle,

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Moselle, and he returned to Alsace, not a little chagrined at seeing that he was to pass the rest of the campaign there in inactivity. 1768.

I TOOK with me thirty-four battalions, and sixty-five squadrons; and to make more expedition, I marched by brigades across the forest of Arden.

WE had learned at Remich, that our troops in Flanders had surprized Ghent; and Bruges had surrendered immediately after; so that our affairs in those parts bore a prosperous face: these events likewise determined Prince Eugene to hasten the march of his troops, in order by gaining a battle to repair the loss the allies had already sustained.

THE Duke of Burgundy was at first inclined to besiege Oudenarde, which would have been a right plan; but afterwards he changed his mind, and resolved to lay siege to Menin. For this purpose he sent the Intendant, M. de Bernieres, to Tournay and Lille, to make the necessary preparations. The Duke proposed to take post with his army between the Lys and the Scheld, opposite to

1708. to Oudenarde, and to intrench himself in that position, while the siege was carrying on behind him by detachments. At the same time I was to draw near to Mons, in order to be equally ready to protect the fortresses on the Maese and the Sambre, or to join the grand army, in case the enemy should make a junction to succour Menin. I arrived at Givet on the Maese the 11th, and went the same day to join St. Fremont's corps, which composed my van-guard, at Florenne. On the 12th, I went and encamped at Sart la Buissiere on the Sambre, where I learned that there had been an engagement on the 11th, near Oudenarde, the King's army having crossed the Scheld at Gavre, with an intention of encamping there according to the plan already described, the Duke of Marlborough had crossed at the same time at Oudenarde and attacked them.

M. de Bernieres, from whom I received the account, informed me that the enemy had had the advantage, and that our army was retreating towards Ghent in great disorder. Although I

had resolved to halt, where I was, the next day, on account of the long marches we had made, I thought it of consequence in the present conjuncture to push forward to Mons. I therefore caused the twenty squadrons that I had with me to march thither, and gave orders that the rest of my troops, as fast as they came up, should take the rout to Valenciennes. As for myself, I went post to Tournay, to have a nearer view of the situation of things. There I found a great number of straggling parties of the army, which were subsisted by M. de Bernieres. Upon a review of them, the whole number at Tournay, Lille, and Ypres, amounted to upwards of nine thousand men; the enemy had made as many prisoners. As it would be some days before my infantry could come up, and the frontier was entirely destitute of troops, I divided these parties among the three places abovementioned, and at the same time caused the few battalions, that were in the distant garrisons, to advance; for M. de Vendosme, in order to outnumber the enemy, had
carried

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carried all to the field, scarcely leaving men enough behind to guard the gates. I cannot absolutely blame him for this; yet, from the year 1706, it had always been found, that the loss of one battle was followed by that of all Flanders, for want of garrisons.

THE Duke of Burgundy's army had retreated to Lovendeghem, behind the canal which runs from Ghent to Bruges; and the enemy, after continuing some days in the neighbourhood of Oudenarde, came and encamped on the 14th at Pont Espierres, from whence they passed the Lys the next morning, forced the lines at Commynes, which were only guarded by a hundred men, and encamped at Werwicke.

I WENT on the 14th to Lille, and from thence, after giving all the necessary orders, to Douay on the 17th, to assemble my troops there. I took care to supply the fortresses with all sorts of stores, and as my infantry came up, I distributed it among them, in order, that which way soever the enemy should take, they might meet with opposition.

PRINCE

PRINCE Eugene was present in person 1708. at the battle of Oudenarde; but his troops, though they had the advantage of mine by several days march, did not nevertheless arrive so soon in Flanders. They were detained in the neighbourhood of Brussels and Louvain, to escort a grand convoy which was preparing.

I SENT advice of this to the Duke of Burgundy and M. de Vendosme; representing to them the necessity of beating the escort, or at least, of not suffering the convoy to pass; for this purpose I proposed that on a fixed day they should march out of Ghent with the greatest part of their army; that at the same time I would pass the Scheld at Condé, and that we should all join on the Dender, in order to attack the convoy, or oblige it to return. M. de Vendosme would by no means agree to my plan, alledging that he was well posted at Ghent, that, while he continued there, the enemy would not venture upon any thing of moment, and therefore he was resolved not to think of removing. Notwithstanding

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withstanding this, I knew that the enemy had determined to lay siege to Lille, which could not be done without bringing their artillery, and other necessaries from Brussels. Another more considerable convoy was preparing; and I proposed that measures should be taken for attacking it; but M. de Vendosme still adhered to his resolution. This however did not prevent me from making another proposal, the execution of which would have disconcerted all the projects of the enemy, as we should by that means have hindered the junction of Prince Eugene's army with that of the Duke of Marlborough. My design was, that the Duke of Burgundy should leave Ghent in the evening, and encamp the next morning on the heights of Oudenarde, towards Brussels, and that I should march at the same time from Mortagne to Pottes and Escanasse, where the left of the grand army should be posted. This situation would have united our whole forces, and absolutely separated those of the enemy; putting it at the same time out of the power of Marlborough

Marlborough to regain Brabant, or to ^{1708.}
draw any resources from thence, unless
he could force us behind the Scheld,
which was morally impossible, consi-
dering that we were one third stronger
than he. To this design there could be
but one objection made; which was,
that the Duke of Marlborough would
march to Bruges, where we could not
arrive so soon as he: to this I answered,
that our right being very near Ghent,
we might be there time enough to re-
lieve it; but that the worst, which could
happen, was the loss of Bruges; and
the preservation of the rest of our for-
tresses after the loss of a battle, ought to
be a sufficient consolation to us. To
conclude, nothing was done, all the
convoys passed, as did likewise the army
of Prince Eugene; after which the enemy
invested Lisle. I had placed there twen-
ty-three battalions, and three regiments
of dragoons. Marshal Boufflers had
shut himself up in the place with Lieu-
tenant-Generals de Surville, de la Tre-
sèliere and de Lée.

WHEN

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WHEN I found they were resolved not to stir, I persuaded them to send me Lieutenant-General Cheyladet with forty-one squadrons, to enable me the better to cover the country that belonged to us, and to disturb the operations of the enemy.

I HAD proposed to the court, as well as to the Duke of Burgundy and M. de Vendosme, to fix upon some enterprize of importance, sufficient either to oblige the enemy to raise the siege, in order to prevent the execution of it, or to indemnify us for the loss of Lisle, in case they should not choose to molest us. My suggestion was, that we should march to Brussels, and by making ourselves masters of all Brabant, establish a free and secure communication with Ghent and Bruges. This was not at all relished by M. de Vendosme, who was for attacking the enemy at the siege; but did not choose to move towards them till their batteries were opened; for he still maintained, that the enemy would not dare to besiege the place, and

that the whole was nothing but a feint to dislodge him from Ghent. 1708.

WHATEVER reason I might have to be disgusted at the neglect with which M. de Vendosme received my advice, the desire of preventing those misfortunes, which the resolution he had taken threatened to bring upon us, induced me to hazard one proposal more. I could not conceive, as the enemy were at this time equal to us in strength, that it would be possible for us to attack them, after we had given them time to choose their ground, or at least to reconnoitre the situation they intended to occupy. In times, when armies were small, it was possible, by a stolen march, to fall suddenly upon a weak quarter, and relieve a place besieged; but this could not be done now, with an army before us of a hundred thousand men, sufficient to shut up the avenues of a whole country, and to be encamped on all sides, in two or three lines.

THE Duke of Marlborough was at this time encamped with his army on the Ronne, beyond the Scheld. Prince

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Eugene was set down before Lille, with sixty battalions, and fourscore squadrons. This disposition of the enemy appeared to me favourable for the project I had to propose; which was, that the Duke of Burgundy should cross the Scheld at Ghent, and march strait to the Duke of Marlborough, as if he intended to bring him to an action; that I should at the same time draw off from the Scarpe, behind which I was encamped with a hundred squadrons, and, after collecting forty battalions from the garisons in the neighbourhood, which might be done without a possibility of the enemy getting intelligence of it, should march without delay and attack Prince Eugene's lines, which were not yet finished.

THE court was so pleased with this plan, that I received orders to carry it into execution, if I thought proper; and I had already taken my measures so well, that I should have come upon Prince Eugene with my army, before he could have known that I had one: but M. de Vendosme, who was determined not to recede from his opinion of marching all together,

together, prevailed upon the Duke of Burgundy to send me a peremptory order to join him forthwith, notwithstanding any order I might have received from the King. I had it in my power indeed not to obey this; but the fear of some mischief happening to the Duke of Burgundy, which would inevitably have been laid to my charge, and the reflection, that I was not absolutely certain of beating Prince Eugene, induced me to proceed to join the grand army at the rendezvous appointed in my instructions.

I ACCORDINGLY assembled thirty-five battalions, and ninety-six squadrons at Mons, from whence I set out on the 28th of August for Herinnes beyond Enghien. The Duke of Burgundy arrived the same day at Ninove, which secured our junction, as we were both of us covered by the rivulet of Viane. The court had been apprehensive, that we should meet with great difficulties, and that the Duke of Marlborough would advance to attack me, as soon as I had passed the Haine, but the Duke had settled his plan, and was not disposed to risque an action, ex-

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cept in those posts, which he had reconnoitred round Lisle; he would not even have advanced to the Ronne, but for the convenience of foraging, and for the better opportunity of observing us, and obtaining intelligence from Brussels. As soon as he saw that we had effected our junction, he repassed * the Scheld, and retired into the province of la Marque, near Lisle.

THE night I arrived at the Duke of Burgundy's camp, I took the word from M. de Vendosme, the King having given me orders for that purpose in writing; after which I continued without any other employment, but that of attending the Prince. I had done every thing in my power to avoid coming into Flanders, because I was of opinion, that a Marshal of France ought not to be under the orders of any person, but a Prince of the blood, and was desirous, that the establishment of such a precedent should not be imputed to me;

* See all the letters at the end of the volume, relating to this campaign of 1708. They are very curious and instructive to military men, and contain a full justification of the Marshal of Berwick's conduct.

but

but the King was positively determined, ^{1708.}
that I should march into Flanders; and
as to the difficulty of taking the word, he
insisted that I should take it once in obe-
dience to his commands: he was even so
piqued at my refusal, that he had a mind
to send the three oldest Marshals of France
from Paris, to take the word from M. de
Vendosme; but was dissuaded by M. de
Chamillart, and Madame Maintenon.
One should imagine, that M. de Ven-
dosme ought to have been thoroughly
satisfied with the King's decision, and that
I was the only person, who had reason to
be discontented: yet he never forgave me
for having ventured to bring the affair
into question, and omitted no opportu-
nity of endeavouring to mortify me.
The 30th of August our army, consisting
of one hundred-and-forty battalions, and
two hundred-and-fifty squadrons, mar-
ched to Lessines, the next day to Brac,
the 1st of September to the neighbour-
hood of Tournay, and on the 2d we crof-
sed the Scheld.

THE point then to be determined was,
what rout we should take to attack the
C 3 enemy.

1708. enemy. I propos'd, that we should go and encamp at three quarters of a league from Pont-à-Tressin, our left nearly towards Cysoing, and our right towards the morasses of Willem, in order to discover if it were practicable to attempt the passage of the Marque in that place, and to make roads on our right and left, to communicate with Pont-à-Marque, or towards the lower Marque, and thus endeavour to gain some marches upon the enemy. M. de Vendosme thought it more adviseable to proceed immediately towards Douay, in order to get the heavy cannon he had ordered there, with which he expected to be able to ruin, and lay open the intrenchments of the enemy. Accordingly we put ourselves in motion on the 3d, and took the road to Cysoing, from which place M. de Vendosme assured us, we might proceed up the Marque through a fine plain; but when he had got within a league and a half of Tournay, all the people of the country and the peasants informed us, that the road was very difficult, being intersected with woods and morasses: this intelligence obliged the Duke of Burgundy

Burgundy to represent to M. de Vendosme, that it would be better to pursue the road to Orchies, than to thrust ourselves into so close a country, and where the enemy would be so near us, that they might fall upon our rear by Pont-à-Tressin and at Bouvines. At first M. de Vendosme fell into a passion, and made some sharp reflections upon me, to which, out of respect for the Duke of Burgundy, I made no answer; but afterwards, when he had conversed with the people of the country himself, he changed his order of march, and we took the road to Orchies, where we encamped that night.

SOME persons have since thought fit to assert, that M. de Vendosme meant to attack the enemy by Pont-à-Tressin, and at Bouvines, and that I prevented his design: but I declare, and can prove, that, in the dispute we had together, the only point in question was, what road we should take to Pont-à-Marque, to which place M. de Vendosme had ordered his march; for as to myself, my opinion had always been, that we should go strait to Pont-à-Tressin.

THE INTELLIGENCE OF THE DUKE OF BURGUNDY

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THE next day, which was the 4th, we marched to Mons in Peule: on our arrival, we discovered the army of the enemy coming into the plain between Seclin and Lille, and extending its right towards Noyelles; its left stretched along the morasses of Bretain, within two leagues of Mons in Peule. It was resolved to encamp that night on the spot where we were, and only to send some brigades of infantry to take possession of Pont-à-Marque, at the distance of a short league from the enemy's camp. Lieutenant-General d'Artignan marched to the place, and the enemy's parties, that were posted there, retired on his approach. We likewise caused the castles of Attiches and Lasseffoir to be occupied.

ON the 5th, we went upon the heights of Avelin and Attiches, to reconnoitre the situation of the enemy. We were divided in our opinions: M. de Vendosme thought it best to attack them; I thought otherwise, because the enemy were posted in a fine plain, where they could move without difficulty, and we had no way to get at them but by defiling through

through a wood and a number of inclosures, so that they might charge us as we came out, before we could have an opportunity of forming; beside which, the situation of the ground was such, that even if they should suffer us to form, we could not advance without being attacked on both flanks. The reason of this was evident, for the ground between the upper Duele and the morasses of la Marque, through which we were obliged to pass, grew wider towards the enemy. 1708.

NOTWITHSTANDING this, M. de Vendosme remaining firm in his opinion, though he agreed, that it was impossible to advance to the enemy without first making roads for the columns to pass, ordered this work to be set about immediately; a great number of men were accordingly employed, yet the roads were not finished till the 7th in the evening; so that, the enemy having begun on the 5th to intrench themselves, it may easily be judged that we should have reaped no great advantage, their intrenchments being completed, and very high
by

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by the 7th. The right was close to the morasses of the Deule, near Noyelles. Their center at the two villages of Ennetieres, which projected forward, and their left extending beyond Fretain.

It is to be observed, that, when M. de Vendosme came on the 4th to Mons in Peule, he expressed no intention of attacking the enemy, and indeed it was not possible that day; for the country being very much intersected, the march had been extremely slow, and the troops did not all come up till it was night.

WE examined the position of the enemy again, and my opinion, in which I was seconded by most of the General Officers, was, that we could not attack them in their present post without an almost certain loss. M. de Vendosme still maintained, that there was no difficulty in it, and engaged with his heavy cannon to drive the enemy out of their intrenchments; not considering that the ground they occupied was much higher than ours. The Duke of Burgundy was unwilling to take upon himself the decision of a point of such delicacy

licacy and importance; he resolved there-
fore to dispatch a courier to the King
for orders: M. de Vendosme wrote at
the same time. The answer was, that
we should attack the enemy, and that
M. de Chamillart was setting off for the
army to explain more fully the King's
intentions. Thus far there had been lit-
tle, if any, time lost; for the courier
returned the 8th in the morning, and
M. de Chamillart arrived the next day.
A council was immediately held, at
which the Duke of Burgundy, the Duke
of Berry, who served as volunteer, M.
de Vendosme, M. de Chamillart and my-
self assisted. The Minister declared, that
it was the King's pleasure we should
attack the enemy at all events. We
therefore turned our whole thoughts
to carry it into execution; and for that
purpose having passed the hollows and
woods, we encamped on the other side
of the Marque, at the distance of a
quarter of a league from the enemy's
camp, our right to Ennevelin and our
left to Phalempin, both flanks entirely
unsupported and uncovered. We re-
connoitred

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connoitred the intrenchments the same evening, and it was thought necessary to take another view of them the next morning. We advanced within musket shot; our cannon in the mean time played the whole day upon the villages of Enneteires, without any other effect but that of obliging the enemy to withdraw what troops they had there, except some small posts.

THE report we made of the goodness of the situation and intrenchments of the enemy, the unanimous opinion of almost the whole army, and the personal observation of M. de Chamillart, joined to an acknowledgment from M. de Vendosme, that the affair was become impracticable; all these circumstances concurring, induced M. de Chamillart to suspend the resolution till the return of a courier, which he dispatched to the King. The answer was conformable to our opinions; in consequence of which we determined to draw near the Scheld, in order to prevent the passing of any more convoys; for there was not the least doubt, that
without

without fresh supplies, the enemy would be in want of every thing before they could make themselves masters of Lisle. We staid however three days at Pont-à-Marque, the reason of which I never could learn. During our stay here, two convoys from Brussels passed without interruption, notwithstanding that we were informed of their setting out. When we mentioned this, we were told, that it was not our business to stop them, and that the King would not have us to attend to any thing but bringing the enemy to an engagement. 1708.

THE Duke of Marlborough and Prince Eugene, seeing how ill our army was posted, resolved, during the night, to level their intrenchments and attack us; but fortunately the Deputies of the States General would not give their consent, alledging, that as they expected to take Lisle without a battle, the event ought not to be hazarded, especially being at such a distance from their own country, that in case of ill success it would be very difficult to make good their retreat. Had not this design been over-ruled,

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1708.

over-ruled, I am persuaded we should have been totally defeated, for our flanks were quite exposed, and we had not ground enough to act upon.

WE decamped on the 14th of September, and, having made our retreat in good order, encamped the same day at Bersée. M. de Chamillart returned to Court. The next day we marched to Orcq, near Tournay, and on the 16th in the morning passed the Scheld. Lieutenant-General de Chemeraut was detached with twenty-three battalions and forty squadrons to cover Oudenarde: the rest of the army formed a chain from Berchem, Escanaffe, Pottes, and Herinnes, as far as the convent of Saulchoi, where we had our head quarters. Fearing that the enemy might draw supplies from Ostend, every other road being shut up, the Governor was ordered to lay the country on the banks of the canal from Plassendal to Nieuport under water, by which means the conveyance would be rendered very difficult.

THE

THE Count de Bergueick, who was ^{1708.}superintendant of the King of Spain's revenue in Flanders, and had the supreme direction of all his Catholic Majesty's affairs in that country, seeing that the resolution was taken of returning behind the Scheld, had formed a plan for surprizing Brussels, or if that could not be effected, for taking it by storm. He reckoned that it might be carried in two days, the garrison being very weak. For this purpose, the day after our arrival at Saulchoi, ten Spanish and twelve French battalions were detached, with some cavalry, under the command of Lieutenant-General Count la Motte. He drew near to Brussels; but as the enemy, who had notice of our design, had thrown into the city some of the troops that remained in garrison in Brabant; Bergueick thought the business would grow too serious if an open attack were made, and that it would divert us from our principal object, which was intercepting all the supplies; particularly as intelligence had been received of a very considerable convey

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voy which was getting ready at Sas-Van-Ghent, Sluys and Ostend: he therefore caused Count la Motte to return with his troops behind the canal between Ghent and Bruges. The Duke de Vendosme, who had an inclination to put himself at the head of this corps, chose that they should proceed with the plan of besieging Brussels, and it was not till two days after, that he could be persuaded to give it up. This occasioned a delay of two days in the march of Count la Motte's troops, and gave time for four or five thousand men, just disembarked at Ostend, to seize and fortify the post of Lessinghe.

THE Count de Bergueick, who came afterwards to the army, pressed me so strongly to make a tour by Ghent and Bruges, that I agreed to it, thinking that I should be more capable of giving advice after I had visited the country. I set out on the 24th of September, and on my arrival at Ghent, I learned that the enemy were sending off a large convoy from Ostend to their army before Lille; upon which I wrote to expedite the

the march of the troops which were on their return from Brussels, and took upon myself to order two regiments of dragoons from M. de Chameraut's camp, to strengthen la Motte's corps. I likewise caused the battalions that were already arrived to march the same night. On the 25th I went to Bruges. The 26th, eleven battalions, and part of the horse and dragoons arrived there; the rest were to come in that night. The Count la Motte, after consulting with me, (for I had no command) resolved to march the next morning towards the canal of Leffinghe, and to send forward all his grenadiers to seize Oudenburgh. His main body consisted of thirty-four battalions and sixty-three squadrons, forty-two of which were of dragoons. The same night he had intelligence that the Duke of Marlborough was marching with great expedition to Rouffelaere, at the head of a very considerable body of troops, to facilitate and secure the march of the convoy. Upon this information, which had the greater appearance of probability, as the

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continuing or raising of the siege of Lille seemed to depend on the safe arrival of this convoy, I advised Count la Motte to advance with his main body half way to Oudenburgh, and to possess himself immediately of that place; then to wait for fuller information by the return of his parties, upon which he might take his final resolutions for executing the orders sent him by the Duke de Vendôme, which were to attack the enemy at all events. The Count began his march on the 27th, and I went back to Ghent, from whence I rejoined the Duke of Burgundy next day. The Count de Bergueick had written to the Duke from Bruges, desiring that I might be ordered to take the command of Count la Motte's troops; but by the return I received a letter, directing me to join the Duke immediately.

THE detachment sent by Count la Motte to seize upon Oudenburgh, was prevented by six hundred of the enemy, and our people did not attack them. In the mean time, the convoy, which had left

left Ostend without their having intelligence of it, (though Plaffendal was not above a league distant) had got to Lef-finghe, and from thence to Slype, continuing its route within the Moerdyck. The Count la Motte having proceeded with his troops to the said Moerdyck, learned there, that the convoy was already passed; upon which he marched strait to Wynendale, in hopes of coming up with it. There he found eighteen battalions and five hundred horse of the enemy, posted in a narrow pass between two woods. He immediately put his troops in order of battle, his infantry in four lines, his dragoons behind them in three, and his horse still further in the rear in two lines. After a cannonade of half an hour, he marched his infantry to the attack; but upon the first fire they received from some of the enemy's battalions, that lined the woods on the right and left, they gave way, and it was not possible to bring them up afterwards. The dragoons moved a little forward to give the infantry time to rally, and received a very heavy

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fire, which killed a great number of them. The convoy was all this time proceeding by the rear; and night coming on, Count la Motte thought proper to retire towards Bruges, fearing that the Duke of Marlborough should advance upon him before morning with superior forces.

NEVER did military man take his measures so ill; for instead of attacking the enemy by the same front they occupied, if he had only opposed part of his troops to them, and gone round one of the woods with the rest, they would have been defeated, and the convoy taken.

NEITHER the Duke of Burgundy nor the Duke de Vendosme could be blamed for this; for notwithstanding the delay occasioned by the affair of Brussels, troops had arrived in time, and were sufficiently numerous, if Count la Motte had known how to make use of them.

ALL the faults he committed were enormous; first, in not having seen himself whether the inundation had been made according to the orders given; secondly,

secondly, after having commanded six years in the country, not to have had confidential people to give him notice the very moment the convoy set out from Ostend; thirdly, in having made so ridiculous a disposition to attack an enemy who had not half his numbers; but the Court was principally to blame for having placed him in a post of such importance; and indeed this is most frequently the cause of the misfortunes that happen in war; sufficient attention is not paid to employ capable and experienced persons, and the preference is usually given to those who have most credit and favour. 1708.

THE Duke de Vendosme, chagrined at what had just happened, set out himself for Bruges, on the 2d of October, in order to dispose every thing in such a manner, that no convoys should pass for the future. As soon as he arrived, he assembled all the troops that were there, amounting to fifty-one battalions and sixty-three squadrons, and encamped with his right at Moerdyck, and his left at the canal which goes from Bruges

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to Plaffendal, having his head quarters at Oudenburgh, behind the center of the line; he sent orders to Nieuport to have the waters let out, which rose to such a height, that the borders of the Dyke which goes from Lessinghe through Steene to Ostend were overflowed.

THE Duke of Marlborough knowing the situation of the Duke de Vendosme's camp, marched on the 7th from the camp at Roncq with sixty battalions and one hundred squadrons to attack him. He arrived the same day at Rouffelaere, from whence he marched the day after to Thorout. It was with much difficulty that the Duke de Vendosme would suffer himself to be persuaded by the General Officers to move out of the hole in which he had put himself; for in case of ill success, it was impossible that a single man should escape, and he did not take his resolution till these gentlemen had purposely let out the waters, and they were even beginning to overflow his camp.

THE Duke of Marlborough, informed of the Duke de Vendosme's retreat, returned

turned to Rouffelaere; he caused Oudenburgh, and the dyke of Lessinghe to be examined, to see whether he could not pass another convoy; but as the Duke de Vendosme had placed, in the new Polder, fifteen battalions and two regiments of dragoons, under the fire of which it was necessary to pass, to go by the dyke of Lessinghe, he ordered some boats to be got together, that he might convey through the inundation, the powder and other ammunition necessary for the continuation of their siege. The Duke de Vendosme collected also a number of boats, with which he composed a little fleet: M. de Langeron, Lieutenant-General of marines, coming out at the same time from Nieuport with a number of sloops and boats, the enemy were at last prevented from having any access by means of the inundations; but it was not till after they had conveyed a hundred and fifty thousand weight of powder, some money, brandy and salt, of which they were in great want.

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THE Duke de Vendosme judging that the only way to be quiet on that side, was to make himself master of the post of Lessinghe, sent thither Lieutenant-General de Puyguion. Trenches were opened upon the dyke, and a battery of cannon raised ; but as the dyke was very narrow, it would have been extremely difficult to drive the enemy from the village, the head of which they had strongly intrenched ; so that Count la Motte, who had also gone there from Bruges, with a few troops, made a disposition to attack it on all sides. On the 25th of October, the grenadiers and detachments passed across the inundations and watergangs, forced the back of the village, and took all the soldiers that were in it, to the number of twelve hundred English and Dutch, and sixty officers. Four battalions were placed at Lessinghe, with orders to fortify themselves strongly, that they might maintain themselves during the winter in that post, which was absolutely necessary for the communication with Bruges.

WHILE

WHILE we were preparing for the 1708. attack of Leffinghe, Lieutenant-General d'Albergotti had one day pressed the Duke of Burgundy strongly to pass the Scheld and the Lys with his whole army, in order to join the Duke de Vendosme at Deynse, and then march together to attack the Duke of Marlborough at Rouffelaere. I did not like this proposal for many reasons. We had two rivers to cross in sight of Oudenarde, and then nine long leagues to march, all of this to be done without Marlborough being apprized of it, which was impossible to be imagined: if he therefore waited for us, and kept his ground, it was certain that his post was good; and if it were not, he had nothing to do, but to fall back behind the Lys, by which he would prevent our return by that river, and oblige us to make the circuit by Ghent, in order to get back behind the Scheld. He might also during this march find some means of transporting more convoys from Brussels; not chusing, however, that my opinion only should prevent

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vent the execution of this project, if it were a good one, I intreated the Duke of Burgundy to write to M. de Vendosme about it. His answer was, that the proposal was good for nothing, alledging nearly the same reasons as I had ; and for fear the Duke of Burgundy should be inclined to attempt it, he dispatched a courier to the Court, and obtained a formal prohibition from the King, to forbid the execution of this project. A few days after, Albergotti was sent to Bruges with some battalions of reinforcement; he did not fail to make the same proposal to the Duke de Vendosme, who then approved of it, and wrote to the Duke of Burgundy about it. The Duke answered, that as he did not give him any reasons to invalidate those he had before alledged, he did not think himself authorised now to alter his sentiments. The next day a courier arrived from Court, with orders that we should do every thing the Duke de Vendosme proposed; so that all the dispositions were immediately made for marching, and the Duke de Ven-

Vendosme was informed, that the Duke ^{1708.} of Burgundy would be at Deynse the 27th. The Duke de Vendosme wrote back, to beg of him not to arrive there till the 30th, that the affair of Lessinghe being finished, he might bring all his troops with him; but during this interval, we learned that on the 22d, Marshal Boufflers had beat the chamed for the city of Lisle, and had retired into the citadel; this put an end to the project, and we were obliged to wait for fresh orders from Court, to determine our further proceedings.

SINCE our return from the neighbourhood of Tournay, we had been continually writing to know the King's intentions, thinking it not right to be at a loss how to act in case that the place should surrender; but notwithstanding the different plans we sent, we never got any other answer, but that it was impossible to think Lisle should be lost, and that it depended entirely upon us to prevent it, or at least to render the taking of it useless to the enemy.

THE

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THE Duke of Burgundy and I were of opinion, that it was impossible to shut up the passage both of the canal and the Scheld from the enemy, and therefore that we must only think of maintaining that of the canal, in order to preserve Ghent and Bruges. For this purpose, we wanted to post behind the canal a number of troops sufficient to defend it, and to march with the rest of the army into Artois, to cover France, and prevent the enemy from continuing to live at our expence. We were confirmed in this opinion by the news we had, that they had placed thirteen battalions and thirty squadrons at la Bassée; that they were hard at work there to put it in a state of defence, and that besides, they had advanced a considerable body of troops to Lens.

THE Duke of Burgundy, convinced that there was no longer any time to lose before we determined, sent M. de Contade, Adjutant-General of the army, to Bruges, to represent to the Duke de Vendosme the inconveniences of our situation, and propose our idea to him; but

but the Duke de Vendosme would neither listen to our messenger, nor read the memorial he brought with him, so that he was obliged to return. The only answer he brought us, was, that the Duke de Vendosme would be with us at Saulchoi, on the first of November, and he should then see what was to be done, in consequence of the conferences we were to have with M. de Chamillart. The King knowing that our opinions were divided, sent him again to the army, to oblige us to keep the Scheld, and had even ordered him, in case he should find us on our march, to execute our project, to make us instantly return to the place from whence we came. M. de Chamillart arrived on the 31st of October, and the Duke de Vendosme the next day.

ON the 2d of November, a council was held, in which it was debated what step we were to take. The Duke de Vendosme still insisted that we ought to march to the Duke of Marlborough, and give him battle; or, if that could not be done, we must block up every road by which
the

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the enemy could return, in order to reduce them to the alternative of being starved to death, or of suing for peace. I maintained, as it was not possible to prevent the enemy from forcing a passage in the same place, on account of the prodigious extent of country we should be obliged to cover, that it was necessary to carry into execution what we had before proposed, in order to keep something. I also represented, if we persisted in the resolution of remaining in the situation we were then in, that we should meet with some fatal accident.

M. DE CHAMILLART, in whom the power of deciding was invested, determined that we should remain behind the Scheld and the canal, till after the citadel of Lisle was taken; after which we should see what was to be done: that in order to defend the Scheld more easily, dykes should be made to cause the river to swell, and overflow its banks from Ghent to Tournay. It was in vain that M. de Chamlay, whom the King had sent with his Minister, and

and I, represented that the thing was impossible; Chamillart concluded that it was easy, and they immediately set about it; but they could never succeed any further than to form here and there a few sheets of water. 1708.

M. DE CHAMILLART left us a few days after; and as he had himself been witness of M. de Vendosme's warmth with regard to me, he obtained permission for me to return into Alsace: I had solicited him very strongly for this, more especially as the Duke of Vendosme's jealousy towards me, could not but prove very prejudicial to the service. I received my orders on the 14th of November; I set out on the 16th, and on the 22d I arrived at Strasburgh: my orders were not to separate the army on the Rhine, till the campaign in Flanders was at an end.

WHILE I was at Saulchoi, I received a private letter from the Duke of Marlborough, signifying that the present occasion was a very favourable one, to set on foot a negotiation for peace; that the proposal must be made to the deputies

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of the States General, to Prince Eugene and to him; that they would undoubtedly communicate with him upon it; and that he would do all in his power to have it accepted. Nothing could be more advantageous than this advice of the Duke of Marlborough: it opened to us an honourable way of putting an end to a burthensome war. I mentioned it to the Duke of Burgundy, and to M. de Chamillart, who immediately dispatched a courier to the King, to receive his orders with respect to the answer which was to be given. The King sent them to M. de Chamillart, who, through excess of policy, had taken it into his head, that this proposal of Marlborough's proceeded only from the bad situation the allied army was in.

THIS reasoning I own was beyond my penetration; and by the manner in which Marlborough had written to me *, I was persuaded that apprehension had no share in the matter, and that he had done it only from a desire of putting an end to a

* See Note, No. II.

war, which all Europe began to be tired of. There was not the least appearance of duplicity in what he wrote, and he addressed himself to me with no other view than that the negotiation might pass through my hands, thinking it might be of use to me. M. de Chamillart dictated to me the answer I was to make, and I thought it such an extraordinary one, that I sent it in French, to shew the Duke of Marlborough, that it did not come from me: he was indeed so much offended at it, that no use could be made of this opening to bring about a peace. I am even convinced, that this was the principal cause of the aversion, which the Duke of Marlborough shewed ever after for pacific measures. 1708.

As soon as I had quitted Saulchoi, the Elector of Bavaria, who had been returned to Mons about six weeks, by the advice of the Count de Bergueick, formed a design of taking Brussels. Accordingly, having assembled a body of troops, he marched and laid siege to it. The Duke of Marlborough and Prince Eugene, finding themselves masters of the city of Lisle, and thinking that they did not

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want all their army for the siege of the citadel, the circumference of which was small and easily invested, resolved upon succouring Bruffels. They therefore marched with the main body of their army along the Scheld, which they passed in the night, partly at Oudenarde, and partly over some bridges they had laid, without meeting with any resistance, and even without our troops, who were on the borders of the river, being apprized of it; so that in the morning, all the several corps who were distributed there, seeing the enemy march up to them, fell back in great disorder, upon the head quarters at Saulchoi. The enemy continued their march with all speed to Bruffels, and the Elector was obliged to raise the siege so precipitately, that he left behind him his cannon, his ammunition and provisions, and all his sick and wounded. The Duke of Burgundy, with the Duke de Vendosme, retired under Doway. The enemy having executed their design, returned towards Lille.

THE

DUKE OF BERWICK.

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THE Duke de Vendosme, was so convinced that the enemy could not force any passage, either on the Scheld or the canal, that he had written to court the evening before this disaster, that they might make themselves perfectly easy, and he would be responsible for the event. The King being informed next day that the contrary had happened, and beside, wearied out with all the bad manœuvres of this campaign, was so incensed that he sent orders to the Duke of Burgundy and the Duke de Vendosme, to separate the army immediately, and to return in person to Versailles. The Duke de Vendosme, who was sensible of the importance of preserving Ghent, represented to his Majesty, that if he would allow him to go and encamp behind the canal, with the main body of the army, the enemy would be much embarrassed to fill their magazines at Lisle, because as they could do it no other way than by land, from Brussels, they stood in need of almost all their army to escort the convoys, on account of the neighbourhood of Ghent; beside, that this would

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employ them the whole winter, which, together with the badness of the season and of the roads, would ruin all their troops, without their being able perhaps to convoy all the stores they wanted. Notwithstanding all the Duke de Vendosme could offer, the King still insisted on the order he had given; and the army was sent into winter quarters, though the citadel of Lisle was not yet taken. It is astonishing, that the King should have agreed to all the Duke de Vendosme's extraordinary proposals during the campaign, and should then have persisted in rejecting the only reasonable one he had made.

As soon as Marshal Boufflers had capitulated for the citadel of Lisle, the enemy, who were apprized of the difficulties they should have in conveying the necessary provisions into the town by land, resolved to open to themselves the navigation of the rivers, in order that they might convey whatever they pleased, without trouble, and without expence. For this purpose they marched straight to Ghent; a city, which, from its situation,

tion, was the key of all the rivers, and all the canals. Count la Motte was there with thirty-seven battalions; in four days after the opening of the trenches, he beat a parley and surrendered, though there were yet no batteries raised against the body of the place, and the covered way had not been attacked. He alledged in excuse, the fear of being obliged to surrender prisoners of war, and by that means of losing a garrison which would be wanted the following campaign, in forming the army. Had he not sacrificed every thing to this false political reasoning, the enemy would have been obliged to raise the siege; for the great frost set in the same evening that he surrendered, with so much violence, that it would have been impossible to open the ground, or to remain in camp.

THUS ended this campaign, which was so much the more unfortunate, because it ought not to have been so: it was necessary, in order to make it such, that we should commit absurdity upon absurdity; and notwithstanding all this, if the last had

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not been committed, we should have had a good game to play next year.

MARSHAL BOUFFLERS acquired much glory by his defence of Lisle: it was at his own particular desire that he had leave to throw himself into the capital of his government: accordingly, on his return to court, the King created him a peer of France, gave him the appointments of premier Gentil homme de la chambre, and the reversion of his government to his son.

I CANNOT avoid taking notice here, that in four month's time, I commanded the King's troops in Spain, upon the Rhine, upon the Moselle, and in Flanders, without reckoning the commission that was made out for me, for Dauphiny.

I HAVE not said any thing of *****'s † enterprize in Scotland the beginning of this year, because I had no share in it; and even knew nothing of it till after it was

† The Pretender, mentioned by the author in this place, and several others, under the title forfeited by his father,

public.

public. At the solicitation of the greatest part of the nobility in Scotland, the King resolved to send six thousand men with that Prince. He had embarked at Dunkirk, but contrary winds having detained him in that port, the English had time to send out a fleet, which followed him so close, that they came up with him off the Frith of Forth: as he could not land in their fight, the fleet dispersed, some of the ships were taken, and the Prince returned to Dunkirk. 1708.

THIS affair had been very ill concerted on the part of France, and that on account of the misunderstanding and jealousy between M. de Chamillart, minister for the war department, and M. de Pontchartrain, minister for the navy. It is also said, that if the Chevalier de Fourbin, who commanded the Squadron, would have risked the loss of his ships, the young * * * * † might have landed; for he had nothing more to do but to enter the Frith of Forth, and run aground there, by which means the troops might

† Pretender.

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have landed: the English indeed might possibly have burned the ships, before all the military stores and provisions they had on board, could have been cleared. This consideration ought not to have prevented him; for the material point was, that the troops should land with the young * * * * †: all Scotland expected him with impatience, and was ready to take arms in his favour: what is more, England was at that time entirely unprovided with troops, so that he might have advanced, without resistance, into the north, where numbers of considerable persons had promised to join him. It is even probable that his sister, Queen Ann, apprehending a civil war, would have endeavoured to come to some terms with him, by which means he would have been sure of ascending the throne of his ancestors. The consternation was so great at London, that the bank was like to break, every man hastening to withdraw his money; but the news of the ill success of the enterprize

† Pretender.

soon

soon restored the credit of the govern-^{1708.}
ment. The only person that profited by
this expedition, was the Count de Gacé.
M. de Chamillart, his intimate friend,
had caused him to be appointed to com-
mand the French troops, and he received,
while he was on board, the brevet of
Marshal of France. The Scotch had
asked with earnestness for me; but the
King refused, saying he wanted me else-
where; this was the effect of Chamil-
lart's intrigue for the Count de Gacé.

**** † afterwards served the campaign
incognito, with the Duke of Burgundy,
and was present at the battle of Oude-
narde, where he shewed much courage
and coolness, and by his affability ac-
quired the friendship of every body; for
we are naturally prejudiced in favour of
the unfortunate, especially when they
are so without any fault of theirs, and
when in other respects they behave them-
selves well.

In the month of March, the King made^{1709.}
new appointments to the armies. He

† The Pretender.

named

1709. named the Dauphin to the command of that in Flanders, with the Marshal de Villars under him: that of the Rhine was given to the Duke of Burgundy, and the Marshal d'Harcourt under him; and that on the frontiers of Piedmont, composed of eighty-four battalions and thirty squadrons, fell to my share.

I SET out on the 22d of April, and arrived at Grenoble on the 26th. My first attention was to examine the state of the magazines, and I found that, far from having a sufficiency for the whole campaign, there was not enough for the daily subsistence of the troops till the end of May; upon which I dispatched a courier to court, to represent the dangers we should be exposed to for want of provisions, the impossibility of collecting an army, and consequently of opposing the designs of the enemy, whose preparations were very great on the side of Susa; and therefore it was necessary to remedy this inconvenience immediately, or else I should be exposed to the disagreeable necessity of putting only into each fortress, a number of troops proportioned

proportioned to the provisions, and sending the rest back to France. 1709.

As I received no other answer, but that the contractors should be spoken to, and that it was hoped they would find means not to let us want, I thought, as the court seemed to abandon us, notwithstanding the importance of the matter, that it was necessary for me to endeavour myself to find out some expedient for defending this frontier, which was the weakest in the kingdom, and by which the enemy might penetrate into France in one campaign. I wrote therefore to all the Intendants both in the neighbourhood and at a distance; I laid before them our wretched situation, shewed them the consequences of it, and intreated them to assist us without loss of time. I went into Languedoc myself, from whence, with the assistance of M. de Basville, the Intendant, I procured some corn. I sent Major-General de Mauroy into Franche Comté, Burgundy and Champaign; he brought me some corn from these places, which he got conveyed by the Saone. I levied also some taxes in Savoy, Dauphiny

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phiny and Provence, which I collected very speedily, by means of the officers to whom I had intrusted this commission. M. le Gendre, Intendant of Montauban, though he had received no orders, nor had any fund for the purpose, sent us twenty thousand quintals on his own credit. At length we managed so as to collect a sufficient quantity of corn for part of the campaign, in expectation of the harvest; but as, on account of the distance, it required a great deal of time to convey our stores to the different depôts, we could only subsist from one day to another, always at the risk of being in want, if the least accident should happen to our carriages. The want of money was another great difficulty: we did not get the least assistance in this respect from court; every thing that could be collected there was immediately sent off into Flanders. This obliged me to make use of my authority, to take all the money I could find in the hands of the receivers. M. Desmaretz, Comptroller General of the Finances, wrote to me, to represent that this was against all kind of order; but I answered him,

him, that it was still more so, to suffer an army to perish, which was defending the entrance of France against the enemy, and I heard no more of him. I also stopped a carriage with a hundred thousand crowns, which was going from Marseilles to Paris: M. de Trudaine, Intendant at Lyons, found means to borrow one hundred thousand crowns more, and by this means our circumstances became tolerably easy.

AFTER having put every thing in the best train I could, I visited the frontiers.

I BEGAN by the upper Dauphiny, from whence I went into Provence, then I came back into Savoy, after that into the Tarentese, from whence I returned by the valley of Morienne to Briançon.

THE knowledge I had now acquired of the country, determined me upon a method of defending the frontier by a chain of posts from Antibes, to the Lake of Geneva. This extent was more than sixty leagues across the Alps.

THE defence was difficult, considering that an enemy having possession of the plain of Piedmont, and whose plan was already

1709. already formed, might on a sudden march with all their forces, on which side they pleased; while we, uncertain of their intentions, were obliged to separate ourselves, in order to attend to all sides; so that it was very probable they might penetrate in some part; in which case they would be able to proceed as they pleased. I thought upon a new disposition, by which I found myself at hand for every thing, and able to reach any part with all the army, or at least with a sufficient force to bar the passage of the enemy.

I ACCORDINGLY formed to myself the idea of a line, the center of which was advanced, and the right, and left falling back, so that I was always on the string, and the enemy were necessarily obliged to make the bow.

I CHOSE Briançon, for the fixed point or center, where I intended to place the main body of my troops, and from whence they were to file off either to the right or to the left, according to the motions of the enemy. My line upon the right, stretched through the valley of Barcelonnette,

nette, by the pass of Cayolle, into the valley of Entraunas, where the Var takes its source, and continued following the direction of the river, to its opening into the Mediterranean, between St. Laurent and Antibes. To secure my communication on that side, I had an intrenched camp made at Tournos in the valley of Barcelonette, which I intended should serve me as a magazine and reservoir of troops, in case the enemy should direct their march towards Coni, or the pass of Tenda. The entrance of the valley of Barcelonette was very easy, and from thence the enemy might, without going through any pass, march on to Seine, or along the Durance, and thus penetrate at once into the middle of our country; so that I was very glad to be certain of shutting this entrance against them, by taking proper care to strengthen the post of Tournos, through which they must necessarily pass, in order to march forward.

My line upon the left went by the pass of Galubier, fell upon Valloire, from thence to St. Jean de Morienne, and
after

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after that under cover of the Arc, to the place where it discharges itself into the Isere, which I also followed as far as Montmellian, and fort Barraux, where I designed an intrenched camp. I did not expect to preserve the Tarentese, nor the rest of Savoy, because my line would then have been too straight, and the enemy might easily, by counter-marches, have penetrated it in some part; but, by putting my line back, I had always time enough to get before them. In order to secure the necessary communications, I kept my principal attention on Valloire, an excellent post which covered the Galubier, prevented the enemy from descending by the valley of Morienne any lower than S. Michel, and consequently by throwing them back of course, into the Tarentese, if they meant to go into Savoy, gave me sufficient time to get there before them, and take my post. I was very certain, that while I should leave the enemy no other communication with Piedmont, but by the little Mount St. Bernard, they could not winter in Savoy, because their pro-

visions would come from too great a distance, and because we could easily, when the snow had stopped up the passages, fall upon them, with such a number of troops, as it might please the King to spare us from the other frontiers;

As all my system depended upon preserving the central point of my line, I thought it necessary to attend particularly to the security of that; so that Briançon, being a very bad town, commanded on all sides, and upon which I knew the Duke of Savoy had always an eye, I caused an intrenched camp to be made on the eminences, called the *Heads*, above the town. This was done with so much diligence, that in a month's time it was in a state of defence: I also took possession of the Randouillet, another eminence which commanded the *Heads*: and at length, by dint of labour, I made so excellent a post of it, that twelve battalions would have been sufficient to defend it against a whole army; it was bastioned all over, had a covered way, out-works, and fifty pieces of cannon. I also built some houses upon it, and had

1709. some spring water brought up to them, for it was not without difficulty that it could be fetched up from the Durance, though at the foot of the camp. All these dispositions being made, I encamped in the vale of Monneftier, two leagues from Briançon, with the main body of my infantry. I put five battalions into the valley of Quieras, twelve in the camp of Tournos, and nine in Provence. I posted four battalions at Valloire, and four at la Gondrana, near St. Jean de Morienne. I also detached seven into the Tarentese, with all my cavalry, under the command of Lieutenant-General de Thouy, whom I ordered to keep up a good countenance, but to fall back on Conflans, and from thence on Montmélian, if the enemy should advance upon him with superior force.

I HAVE entered into a more minute detail, because the disposition was singular, and could not have been comprehended without the particulars I have given. It appears at first extraordinary, and very difficult; but I can affirm, that by following the idea I formed to myself

self of it, it is the easiest. It only re- ^{1709.}
quires to be well informed of the ene-
my's motions, and to make the chain of
communication properly; both of these
are very easy; for by my position, the
approach of the enemy was to be seen
at such a distance, that we might always
come up in time, even if they had stolen
some marches upon us.

It is to be observed, that in a war,
carried on among mountains, when one
is master of the heights, the enemy is
necessarily stopped; and this is what I
had made my principal object in the
line I had laid down for myself.

As a proof that I thought my plan of
defence a good one, I sent away, the
next campaign, of my own accord, twen-
ty battalions out of the eighty-four I
had, that the King might augment his
other armies with them.

In the month of May, there was an
insurrection, occasioned by some fanatics.
The Duke de Roquelaure, Lieutenant-
General, who commanded in Langue-
doc, applied to me for assistance. I im-
mediately sent him four battalions, which

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attacked the rebels, and defeated them; so that tranquillity was restored immediately after.

TOWARDS the 12th of June, we received information of a change in the Ministry: M. Voisin was made Secretary of State for the war department, in the room of M. de Chamillart. The cause of the latter's disgrace proceeded from the universal clamours raised against him, so that the King, considering the general confusion of affairs, did not think it right to keep him in office any longer, notwithstanding the personal friendship he had for him. It must be acknowledged, that he was a good kind of man, who meant very well; but he had so little genius, that it was surprising how the King, who was endued with great penetration, could chuse him for his minister, or at least keep him in office for so long a time, at the risque of the injury his affairs suffered daily from it. He had a wonderful opinion of his own capacity, and always said, when any one began to speak to him, *I know*, though the point in question was

was quite a different thing from what ^{1709.} he imagined. He thought himself a General; and indeed sent word once to the Marshal de Teflé, that if he were at the head of five or six thousand horse, he should not be at a loss to make great manœuvres. The first thing that introduced him to the King, was the billiard table; he was one of the best players in the kingdom, and as the King liked to play, this gave him occasion to come often to Court, to make one of the party. By this means, he obtained the office of Intendant of the Finances, and having insinuated himself into the good graces of Madame de Maintenon, was appointed Comptroller-General, when M. de Pontchartrain was made Chancellor. A little time after, M. de Barbesieux, Secretary of State for the war department, dying, that office also was given to him. It is not surprizing that he could not properly fill these two posts, since Messrs. Colbert and de Louvois, two of the greatest Ministers France ever had, found each of them sufficient employment in one of them. In 1708,

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having got quite out of his depth, he intreated his Majesty's leave to resign the finances, which were given to M. Desmaretz; and at length, the King seeing that there was no possibility of keeping him any longer in place, without risking the loss of every thing, granted him a considerable pension, and gave his office to M. Voisin. It had been granted in reversion to the Marquis de Cany, M. de Chamillart's son; but he was also obliged to give it up. The Marquis bought the regiment of marines, which served in Dauphiny under me, and joined it as soon as possible. He has always served with distinction; beloved by the officers of his regiment, who did not use to care for their Colonel; he gained the esteem of every one by his bravery, affability and politeness; in a word, he never appeared as if he had ever been Secretary of State; and accordingly his behaviour drew upon him every kind of respect. He died of the small-pox in 1716.

THE beginning of M. Voisin's fortune was, that being Intendant of Maubeuge, during

during the sieges of Mons and Namur, ^{1709.} he had an opportunity of being known to Madame de Maintenon, who had a great regard for his wife; this, joined to his probity and his industry, was the reason why Madame de Maintenon intrusted him with the management of the convent of St. Cyr, and got him appointed Counsellor of State. In 1714, the Chancellor Pontchartrain having asked leave to retire, merely that he might prepare himself for another world, M. Voisin was made Chancellor, and still continued to the last to keep his post of Minister of the war department, and his direction of St. Cyr. He died of an apoplexy in the year 1717. He was a sensible man, capable of entering into all the minutest particulars of business, but little versed in political matters. He was very harsh in his answers, but very upright, and very assiduous in looking out for men of merit, in order to employ them. He was always intent upon business, having no other passion. Many persons who knew him thoroughly, thought that he was the fittest man

1709. in the kingdom to be Comptroller-General of Finances.

MARSHAL Villeroy, who could not bear Chamillart, dispatched a courier to me to give me notice of this change.

TOWARDS the beginning of July, the enemy having assembled the main body of their infantry in the neighbourhood of Susa, set to work to put the roads of Mount Senis in order; they passed the Alps on the 11th, and encamped in Upper Morienne, between Lannebourg and Termignon; upon which I detached Lieutenant-General M. de Cilly, with two brigades of infantry, to reinforce Major-General the Marquis of Broglio, who was there already with one brigade.

I also ordered all the grenadier companies of these troops to advance to la Sourdiere, an excellent post upon the river Arc, between S. Michel and S. André, in order to bar the passages to the left of the Arc. I drew all the troops which I had extended to my right, near to Briançon,

COUNT

COUNT Thaun, Field-Marshal of the Emperor, who was commander in chief of the enemy's army, advanced afterwards between Offois and Bourget, and from thence to S. André. A small corps drew near at the same time to the little mount S. Bernard, by the valleys of Aosta; and M. de Rebender, General of the Duke of Savoy's troops, came to encamp at Oulx, with eighteen battalions and some squadrons: the main body of their cavalry remained in the plain, near Orbassan.

I WOULD not make any other motion till I had seen more clearly into the designs of the enemy, being very sure of coming up always in time, on which ever side they should march.

COUNT Thaun, seeing us resolved not to quit the posts we occupied, judged that he could not advance further into the Morienne, nor contrive any method to displace us from about Briançon; which was his principal object. He therefore determined to take the road of the Tarentese, to penetrate into Savoy. For this purpose, he sent forward a body
of

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of six thousand men by the pass of the Vanoise, and at the same time M. de Shulembourg came down the little mount S. Bernard.

As soon as I saw that Marshal Thaur was determined, I extended my troops by the lower Morienne, to the river Isere, in order to cross it on the bridge of boats I had laid over it at Fretterive, to oppose the enemy on the other side, and to succour M. de Thour. The instructions I had given in writing to this General, were, to fall back behind the river Arly, in case the enemy should advance with a superior force, and if he were driven from thence, to retire to Fretterive, throwing three battalions into the mountains of Tamie, and five squadrons of dragoons towards Haverge and Annecy, in order the better to observe the motions of the enemy, and to harass their rear, if they should continue their course along the Isere.

M. DE THOUR, in consequence of my orders, withdrew his troops from the head of the Tarentese, and then evacuated Moustiers; but when he came near
Conflans,

Conflans, instead of putting himself behind the Arly, he posted himself in the plain between La Roche Sevin and Conflans. The enemy attacked him there on the 28th of July, and he was defeated; as much by superior force as from the bad disposition he had made, having placed his infantry in a plain, and his cavalry in a morass; he had the good fortune, however, to lose no more than two hundred horse, and about three or four hundred foot; he then retreated to Fretterive, where I arrived at the same time with the van of the army. I found he had forgotten to occupy the pass of Tamie, so that, from Conflans, the enemy might, by that pass, gain the heights which commanded the plain of Fretterive; I therefore fell back to the camp of Franchin, placing my right to the town of Montmellian, and my left to the mountain, to prevent the enemy from coming there. I sent M. de Berenger, a Colonel of infantry, with four hundred men to occupy the Bauges: two days after, I sent M. de Maulevrier, a Brigadier, to join him with a reinforcement

1709. ment of twelve hundred men. M. de Prades retreated towards Taverge with two regiments of dragoons.

THE enemy encamped on our side of the Arly, in the plain of l'Hopital, occupying the pass of Tamie, and then brought up all their cavalry, to the number of seventy squadrons.

It will be curious and even useful for the sequel, to explain the position of my troops, more especially since it was as singular, as new and advantageous. My principal attention was, not only to cover Fort Barraux, but also to preserve, at the same time, a safe communication with the upper Dauphiny, for fear the enemy, by counter-marches, should find means to put themselves between me and Briançon, which I could no longer succour if once they were posted. The business was therefore to guard an extent of five-and-twenty leagues of mountains; for such was the distance between Briançon, and Mountmellian. I left M. de Dillon with twenty-two battalions, for the defence of the camp at the *Heads*, Quieras, and the vale of Monnestier; three bat-
talions

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talions at Valloire, for the security of the
 pass of the Galubier, which was the essen- 1709.
 tial point for our communication. I placed
 three battalions at S. Jean de Morienne,
 four at S. Estienne de Cuine, fifteen at
 Aggubelle, five at Aiguebellette, and as
 many squadrons near the mouth of the
 Arc in the Isere, and I placed myself at
 Francin, with nineteen battalions, and
 twenty squadrons. From Valloire to
 the bridge at Montmellian, all these se-
 veral corps were covered by the Arc, and
 the Isere, and had orders continually to
 keep parties upon the heights, to observe
 the motions of the enemy in the Ta-
 rentese, or on the side of Conflans:
 they were to march by their right, or by
 their left, according as they should see
 what the enemy did, and without waiting
 for my orders, that they might come up
 with a proper force, on which-ever side
 the enemy should attempt to penetrate
 our line. Nothing was more simple
 than all our manœuvres, and unless we
 were asleep, the enemy could not get
 before us in any part, because we could
 see all their motions, and they had
 always

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always a circle to make, while we went by the shortest cut: I had directed roads to be made every where, in order that our posts might communicate more speedily.

THE enemy pushed on some detachments by Faverge, and near Lake Annecy, to penetrate into the Bauges, without which they could not dislodge us from Montmellian, but the good countenance our troops kept up, prevented them even from attempting it: nevertheless, not to remain inactive, and to endeavour by one last effort to displace us, they advanced all their cavalry towards the Rhone. They had an additional motive for this step, which was to be at hand to succour the Baron de Mercy, who had entered into upper Alsace, with a body of troops; and if he should succeed, they took it for granted, that, by the communication they might establish with the Imperial troops in Franche-Comté and Alsace, they should be able to winter in Savoy, and by that means, to push forward in the ensuing campaign.

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For these reasons therefore, the enemy first attacked the castle of Annecy, in which we had only sixty men; they soon made themselves masters of it, and advanced afterwards to the Rhone.

M. DE PRADES, who had then eight squadrons of dragoons, retired to Seisfel; and I sent him six hundred foot to assist him in defending the Rhone, in conjunction with the militia of Bugey and Bresse, which I had assembled. I posted eleven companies of grenadiers at Chanaz, to be at hand to join M. de Prades: I put five at Bourget, with five hundred infantry; and I sent Lieutenant-General M. de Cilly, to encamp at Chambery, with sixteen squadrons and five battalions: in this manner I faced them on all sides.

THE enemy did not dare to weaken themselves too much at Conflans, for fear I should march up there; for that post was necessary for them, to preserve the communication with their country, and if I had happened to get possession of it, they would have had no other retreat into

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into Piedmont, than by passing through Switzerland.

WHILE we were quietly looking at each other, General Rebender, had an inclination to strike some great stroke: for this purpose he marched from his camp near Exilles, and advanced to Mount Genevre, with a design to put the Val de Praz, and especially the town of Vachette, which was no more than half a league from Briançon, under contribution. M. Dillon, who commanded on that side, perceiving that Rebender was come down from Mount Genevre, towards Vachette, marched thither with two battalions, and six companies of grenadiers, which he posted behind the town. As soon as the enemy (after having ranged themselves in order of battle), had put themselves in motion to attack a bad intrenchment of palisades, which we had thrown up there, M. Dillon rushed upon them by the right and left of the town, and charged them with so much bravery, that he beat them, killed seven or eight hundred on the spot, and took four hundred prisoners. Re-

bender retreated as fast as possible towards Exilles, and did not shew his face again during the rest of the campaign. 1709.

WE learned, a few days after, that Count Mercy had been attacked in upper Alsace by Count du Bourg, and entirely defeated. The victory was very complete: the enemy had two thousand men killed, and as many taken prisoners. This success determined Count Thaun to return into Piedmont, perceiving that there was no longer any probability of succeeding in any of his projects; he accordingly moved off his army at the end of September, partly by the pass of the little Mount S. Bernard, partly by Mount Senis. I marched back at the same time by my right, and returned to Briançon, where we had only to wait till the bad weather was set in, in order to be able to send our troops into winter quarters without apprehensions for the frontier.

WHILE I was encamped about Briançon, I received orders to repair with all expedition to the army in Flanders. Some time before, there had been a very

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1709. bloody action at Malplaquet, where Marshal Villars received so considerable a wound on the knee, that he was disabled from serving the rest of the campaign. Marshal Boufflers, who had been present at the battle as volunteer, (though he was an older officer than Marshal Villars), then took the command of the army. The point was to save Mons, which the enemy laid siege to, in consequence of their victory. I set out on the 11th of October from Briançon; passed by Versailles, where I received the King's orders, and arrived on the 18th at the army near Quesnoy: Marshal Boufflers and I, visited the approaches of the enemy's camp, to see if we could not find means to attempt the relief of Mons: but beside that the matter was almost impracticable, from the position of the enemy, whose right was at the Haine, their left at the Sambre, and their front covered with woods and rivulets, we had another insuperable difficulty, which was that of subsistence. It was a distance of seven leagues from our camp to that of the enemy; so that two days were required

to get there. The Superintendants of ^{1709.} provisions, far from being able to give us bread before-hand, had it not even in their power to distribute in the evening the bread that was due in the morning. This determined us to turn our thoughts, only to prevent the enemy from making any other conquests; and for this purpose I repaired to Maubeuge with fifty battalions, and one hundred squadrons. Marshal Boufflers remained in camp between Valenciennes, and the Quesnoy with the rest of the army, in order to cover those two places. On my part I worked at an intrenched camp upon the heights, on the other side of the Sambre; and in a few days I made it so strong, that I could not easily be attacked in it. Mons capitulated on the 20th of October, and the enemy separated their army at the latter end of the month. We did the same, after which I returned to court.

THIS winter the King erected the territory of Warty into a Dukedom and Peerage, for me and my heirs male of

1709. the second bed. I had the name of Warty changed into that of Fitz-James.

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No alteration was made in the command of the armies; but as the campaign in Dauphiny always began very late, the King, at the request of Marshal Villars, ordered me to go into Flanders to relieve Douay, which was besieged by the enemy. Marshal Montesquieu, who had commanded in that country during the winter, might easily have hindered that siege; but he was so little apprized of the motions of the enemy, that he did not know they had assembled their army, till after they had passed the upper Deule; and instead of intrenching himself under Douay, (which was a very easy matter), he suffered himself to be surprized at Vitry, and had only time to retire in disorder towards Arleux, and from thence to Cambray.

As early as the month of March, M. Voisin had proposed to me, from the King, to command the army in Flanders, till the wound Marshal Villars had received, should allow him to go there. I had consented, upon condition that I should

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should set out immediately, in order to take the proper measures to choose my post, to secure it, and to collect the army, on the first intelligence of the enemy being in motion; for I was convinced, that with these precautions, it was very possible to preserve Douay, and all the fortresses between that and the Sambre; but I affirmed at the same time, that if once the enemy were posted there, it would be impossible to relieve either of them, because such large armies block up a whole country. After this conversation with M. Voisin, he spoke no more to me upon the subject; and I believe that this was owing partly to the jealousy of Marshal Villars, who was not desirous that I should be by myself at the head of the army, and partly to the false intelligence which the court received from Flanders, that the enemy would not be able to take the field till the month of June.

I SET out therefore in the month of May, and repaired to Cambray, where Marshal Villars was assembling the army. We marched to Arras, and from thence

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having crossed the Scarpe, we advanced upon the enemy, whom we found well intrenched; their right was at the morasses of Lens, and their left at the Scarpe, opposite to Vitry. After having reconnoitred them, we agreed that it was not possible to attack them. It would have been equally impracticable to pass the rivulet of Lens, and the upper Deule, especially as that would have taken up a great deal of time; and the enemy being behind the Scarpe, much less should we have been able to force them. On the side of Vitry they were likewise so well secured with inundations and double intrenchments, that we could not prudently think of attacking them. It was therefore resolved, that we should only attend, to endeavour to prevent them from making any other conquests after the taking of Douay; and in the mean time we drew near to St. Eloy, for the convenience of forage. As there were therefore no thoughts of coming to an action soon, I received orders to go with speed to my own proper post in Dauphiny, where the enemy

enemy were beginning to put themselves in motion, 1710.

I ARRIVED at Chambery on the 22d of June, and at Briançon on the 27th.

I RECEIVED intelligence that the Duke of Savoy's army was assembling in the plain of Piedmont, about the neighbourhood of Orbassan; that there were a a body of troops on the side of the vale of Stura; that they were conveying quantities of ammunition and provisions to Coni and Dement; and besides, that there were very large magazines at Susa. I therefore thought it necessary to prepare myself to oppose the designs of the enemy on the side of the Var, or of Barcelonette, having at the same time an eye to the upper Dauphiny and Savoy. In this view, I made the following distribution of my troops.

I GAVE Lieutenant-General M. d'Artagnan six battalions, and two regiments of dragoons for the defence of the Var; I posted two regiments of dragoons at Seine; ten battalions at the camp of Tournos in Barcelonette; twelve battalions at Guillestre, where I fixed the

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head quarters; seven battalions at the camp of Rouffe, in Quieras; nineteen battalions at Briançon; seven at St. Michel in Morienne; and two battalions and twenty-seven squadrons in the Tarentese.

In this position, I was equally at hand, whether it became necessary to push troops on by my right to the Var, (for which purpose I had had roads made as far as Broc, which we could have reached from Tournos in five days march); or whether it was proper to defend the valley of Barcelonette, or turn by my left into Quieras, to Briançon, or in the Morienne, if the enemy should advance towards Mount Genevre, or should pass Mount Senis.

THE only place I was apprehensive for, was Monaco, because that being out of the line I had formed, I could not hinder it from being besieged: moreover, the situation of the country made it scarce possible to relieve it, in as much as the enemy could lay siege to it with twenty battalions, and observe us with fifty.

THE

THE army of the enemy was composed of seventy battalions, and seventy squadrons, exclusive of the garrisons; ours consisted of seventy battalions, including all the garrisons, and thirty-one squadrons. 1710.

TOWARDS the 10th of July, the main body of the enemy's army began to file off on the side of Coni and Demont. I contented myself with pushing on some battalions to Colmars, and encamping on the pass of Waars. I drew the battalions that were in the Morienne, nearer to Briançon, and sent twelve squadrons to Grenoble, and ten to Monestiers, in order that they might have a less way to get to the Var, and at the same time not to be at any distance from Savoy.

THE enemy, to keep me in suspense, with regard to their real design, and to alarm me on all sides, made M. de Re-bender advance to Oulx, and then to Salabertran, with twelve battalions. M. de Shulembourg appeared at the same time in the valley of Aoosta, with four battalions, and some cavalry; upon which I marched to Guillestre, and pushed on
some

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some battalions towards Briançon and the Morienne.

AT length, on the 21st of July, Count Thaun, with the main body of his army, advanced by the pass of Argentera, and entered the valley of Barcelonette. Upon this, I marched from Guillestre, and placed myself at the castle of Waars, an excellent post on the mountain of the same name, which entirely stopped up the passage into Dauphiny, strengthened the camp of Tournos, which was only two small leagues distance from it, and might be securely defended with twelve battalions. My right was placed towards the ruins of the old castle, and covered by the river of Waars, which, running through impracticable precipices till it comes near Guillestre, secured my communication with that little town, from whence I drew my provisions. My left was at the great mountain, which separates the vale of Secrins from that of Waars.

I DISPATCHED Lieutenant-General de Chamarande, with some troops, to reinforce the camp of Tournos, so that there

there were fifteen battalions there. I ^{1710.} encamped a brigade of infantry, with two regiments of horse and dragoons, at the pass of Waars, the better to observe the motions of the enemy.

COUNT Thaun attacked the castle of Arche, which was situated in a small plain, at the opening of the pass of Argentera: he made himself master of it in two days; and on the 26th came to encamp at Fogliosa. On the 27th he advanced some considerable detachments upon S. Paul and Castellet; upon which the troops I had left at the pass of Waars fell back upon me. The enemy afterwards occupied Castellet, and the heights bordering on the pass of Waars opposite to my camp; they had also sent forward some troops, and several *barbets* *, into the valley of S. Pierre, and of the Castle Dauphin; this obliged me to leave a brigade of infantry at Guillestre, as much to prevent our being disturbed in our communication with Briançon and Quieras, as to reinforce the camp of Rouffe in Quieras, if it were necessary;

* A kind of provincial troops, called by that name, in Savoy,

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on to join me, the distance between the castle of Waars and Guillestre being only two leagues. I also posted two battalions and eleven squadrons near Mount Dauphin; I ordered M. d'Artagnan to march from Provence to Colmars, with three battalions and two regiments of dragoons, in order to keep our communication open with the camp of Tournos on that side, as I did on mine.

GENERAL Rebender, to keep us in alarm, and endeavour to dislodge us, advanced on the 29th of July to Mount Genevre; but as we did not make any motion in consequence of this, and as M. Dillon, whom I had left at the camp of Briançon, harrassed him very much by his parties, he soon retired to Sezane, where he was joined by the Baron de St. Remi, with a few battalions.

At the same time that the enemy were making all these different movements, I received an express from the Duke de Roquelaure, Commandant in Languedoc, to inform me that two thousand men had landed at Cette, of which they had taken possession; that they had afterwards advanced to Agde, and that

it

it was to be feared, the malcontents would join them, if they were not speedily driven away; so that he desired me to send him some troops with dispatch. I had so much upon my hands on all sides, that I could not comply with his request; and besides, as I had discovered the real projects of the enemy, I was sure that by keeping Count Thaun upon this frontier, I should prevent the descent from having the designed effect. The following is the account of the matter, as I sent it to the King, which I received by advice from different places, as well as from intercepted letters, and from the avowal of those who were concerned in it.

THE enemy expected to make themselves masters of the valley of Barcelonnette; after which they would have brought down all their cavalry, which they had left on purpose near Coni: they would then have extended themselves by their left, upon the Durance, and after having passed that river, would have encamped at Gap, preserving their communication with Piedmont,

1710. by means of troops they would have posted at the pass of S. Pons, of l'Echallette, of the Orres, and of Parpaillon; at the same time the malecontents, and the new converts of Dauphiny, were to rise and assemble about Die, whither they had caused several refugees and a number of arms to be conveyed.

THE descent at Cette was to have been made at the same time that the enemy entered into Dauphiny; and the new converts, supported by the troops, were to rise in Dauphiny and Languedoc.

THE insurgents were to form a chain along the Drome, by the valley of Crest, and from thence by the Vivarez. The enemy, in this situation, would, without striking a stroke, have seized upon Sisteron, Seine, and Digne, by their rear, and would thus have cut off our communication with Provence.

SOME troops which I sent into the Diois, were the cause that no one dared to stir, and the position I had taken rendered the execution of the enemy's project impracticable; but at the same time I could not succour the Duke de Roquelaure.

Roquelaure. The Duke de Noailles, ¹⁷¹⁰ who commanded in Rouffillon and Lampredan, being less occupied and nearer, took all the best and most active troops he had, and went with extreme diligence into Languedoc; so that M. de Seissan, who commanded the enemy, finding no insurrection in the province, and fearing he should be demolished, returned quickly to his ships.

COUNT Thaurin seeing no possibility of executing his project, and being otherwise much incommoded with the multiplicity of guards and escorts of convoys, resolved to return into Piedmont; but being apprehensive that as soon as he should have got beyond the pass of Argentera, we should fall upon General Rebender with all our forces; he detached on the 12th of August eight battalions to reinforce him. His troops passed by the vale of Maurin, by the pass of Loup, from thence into the valley of the Castle Dauphin, and then having proceeded by the pass d'ell Agnello, they entered into the head of the valley of Quieras. This made me, at first,

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first, apprehensive that they intended to attack the camp of Rouffe, in Quieras, where I had left Major-General M. de Cadrieu with seven battalions. The preservation of this post was of great consequence, in as much as I considered Quieras as the covered way of Briançon; if the enemy had taken possession of it, we could not have kept up our communication between Embrun and Briançon without danger, or a considerable escort.

THE camp of Rouffe, above the castle of Quieras, though of a great extent, was easy to be maintained; and I was sure, that if those who commanded there did not lose their senses, we should always have time enough to get there with a sufficient force; the right was upon a craggy perpendicular eminence, the front on a very high rising ground, with a rivulet before it, and the left was supported by the great mountain near the pass of Issoire; one could get at it by the rear without even being seen by the enemy. From Briançon, by the pass of Hayes, one could get there

there in five hours march; and one might ^{1710.} reach it from Guillestre in the same space of time along the rapid stream of Guill. Moreover, between this last pass and that of Hayes, there were two other passes to penetrate into Quieras.

To prevent any enterprize on the part of the enemy, I caused five battalions to march to the pass of Furfande, and I posted as many near Guillestre.

ON the 14th of August the army of the enemy decamped from Fogliosa, taking the road of the valley of Stura, by which they came. I immediately advanced to S. Paul, upon the Ubaia, with twelve battalions, and I pushed on to Barcelonette two brigades from the camp of Tournos, in order to be more at hand to reach the Var, if the enemy should clear the pass of Tenda, and should come down into the county of Nice; but at length, in a few days, I was informed, that the enemy had drawn near to Pignerol, and that the corps which had entered the upper part of the valley of Quieras, had con-

distress he was in; had asked for me to be his General; but the King would not withdraw me from the command of the frontier of Italy. Upon this occasion, I thought it my duty, from the knowledge I had of the kingdom of Spain, to give my advice; which was contrary to the Duke de Noailles's proposal. I represented, therefore, what I thought was proper to be done, and reasoned in the following manner. Nothing could be more for the advantage of the Archduke, than the project of a diversion in Catalonia, by the Roussillon, inasmuch as Count Staremberg, the General of that Prince, would be very well pleased to see the French army busied in a siege, in order that he might have time to drive the King of Spain intirely out of Castile, and to give assistance to the army of Portugal; after which, he would return with all his forces reunited, to carry on the war against us as usual in Catalonia. I insisted therefore that the only way of saving his Catholic Majesty, was to enter, as soon as possible, with an army

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1710. by Navarre; which would be making a real and effectual diversion. For if Count Staremburg did not return upon the Ebro to make head against us, we should retake Arragon in as short a time as we had lost it; and at the worst, we should remain masters of all the country on this side the Ebro, from Miranda-di-Ebro, to Lerida. If Staremburg should return upon the Ebro, his junction with Portugal became almost impossible; and the King of Spain might easily support himself on the other side of the Tagus, and even return to Madrid, to form a new army there during the winter; and in the spring, to act in concert with the army of France, which will be in Navarre, to expel the enemy from Arragon. Moreover, the Spaniards, when they should perceive that his Catholic Majesty was supported in earnest, would be encouraged to persist in their fidelity, and to support their King.

THE proposal I made was not only more for the interest of the King of Spain, but France also derived a certain advantage

advantage from it; for it could not be doubted, that if the enemy reduced Spain, they would return through that kingdom, to fall upon our frontier with all their forces. It was therefore much better for us to carry on the war on the Ebro, in Arragon, or in Navarre, than upon the Bidassoa, at the gates of Bayonne, or in the Roussillon.

1710.

I WISHED therefore that the Duke de Noailles should march immediately to Pampeluna with all his troops; and as the latter season was advancing, I would have detached ten battalions and twenty squadrons from my army to join him. My advice was not followed, and the troops remained inactive, while preparations were making for the siege of Gironne, to which the Court had consented upon the representations of the Duke de Noailles.

IN the month of October, I received orders to send thirty-four battalions and thirty-one squadrons into Roussillon. Nevertheless the Duke de Noailles could not be ready to put himself in motion till the end of December; and he was

1710. very near failing in his enterprize, on account of the continual rains that distressed him. Fortunately for him, the face of the King of Spain's affairs was now changed. The Duke de Vendosme commanded the troops; Philip V. having asked for that General, upon his Majesty's refusing to send me. The King of Spain had found means to collect an army; he had marched up to the enemy, and had given them battle at Villa Viciosa. Though Staremberg had had the advantage in that action, yet the loss he had sustained the evening before, of the English troops in Brihuega, amounting to four thousand men, joined to the total want of provisions, obliged him to retire with such precipitation, and in so much disorder, that when he entered Catalonia, his army was reduced to five or six thousand men, infantry and cavalry*; so that he could not think of succouring Gironne, and the Duke de Noailles made himself master of it.

* See Note No. III.

I HAD had, during the campaign, some private negotiations with the Court of Turin; perhaps the reader may be curious to know them. About the middle of August, while I was at Barcelonette, after Count Thaun's retreat, Major-General Guerchois, who usually commanded in that valley, told me, that one Arnaud, a monk, whom the Duke of Savoy employed in many affairs, had spoken to a man named Laurent, an attorney, in the valley, upon the subject of the war between the King and his Royal Highness. He had given him to understand, that it might be easy to hit upon terms of accommodation, and allowed him to make use of his name upon the occasion. I told M. le Guerchois, that M. Laurent might go to Father Arnaud, and assure him, in general terms, that, on our part, we should be always inclined to listen to proposals of peace. I thought all this was mere matter of conversation; but, on the 5th of September, M. Laurent came to me near Briançon, and brought me a letter from Father Arnaud, which signified that

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1710. his Royal Highness would readily listen to any proposals that should be made to him, provided they were consistent with the security of his dominions, and he could be indemnified for the towns that had been demolished. For this purpose he required that we should give up to him Briançon or Fort Barraux, Antibes and Monaco. Before I gave any answer, I wrote to Court, and received the necessary instructions and powers; after which, I sent the following memorial to Father Arnaud.

“ THE King is so much inclined to
“ treat with his Royal Highness, that
“ he has charged me to enter upon the
“ negociation, for which he has sent
“ me the necessary powers. Therefore,
“ to cut matters short, and come to a
“ speedy conclusion, I take the liber-
“ ty to propose to his Royal Highness,
“ that he would be pleased to order
“ some confidential person to converse
“ with me on the subject, that when
“ I am informed of the real intentions
“ of his Royal Highness, I may be
“ able to make suitable proposals. In
“ case

“ case his Royal Highness should not
“ think proper to send any person to
“ me, I intreat that he would be
“ pleased to signify to me, by whom,
“ and in what manner, he wishes I
“ should treat the point in question.
“ As for myself, I shall consider it as
“ the greatest happiness of my life, to
“ be able to contribute to a perfect re-
“ conciliation between his Majesty and
“ a Prince, to whom I have the ho-
“ nour of being so nearly related, and
“ for whom I entertain an infinite re-
“ spect.”

I WAITED near three weeks without having any answer; but at length, on the fourth of October, M. Laurent came and told me, that Father Arnaud had represented strongly to him, that his Royal Highness could not enter into any negociation with France, unless he were certain of reaping considerable advantages from it. He also gave me to understand, that it would be proper a league should be made with the Venetians, and the other Princes of Italy. He offered his mediation for a

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general peace; he proposed, in consequence of the treaty, to stand neuter, or not to make it publicly appear that he was upon good terms with France, but to remain apparently united with the allies, and only to prevent them from undertaking any thing on our frontier. All this appeared to me to come from a man who was only sounding us, and endeavouring to discover what we would offer him, that he might make a merit of it with the allies. The victory which the Archduke had just gained at that time in Spain, did not, perhaps, contribute a little to keep him in suspense; for it might naturally be supposed, that the Archduke was totally master of Spain, and consequently that the war was at an end in that country. And indeed, had it not been for the unparalleled fidelity of the Spaniards, and the great fault which the Archduke committed in not seizing upon Navarre, contrary to the advice of Count Staremberg, it would have been impossible for his Catholic Majesty to receive any

any succours from France, and consequently he must soon have been crushed. 1710.

THOUGH I did not expect any great success from my negotiation, yet, as the Court did not chuse to break it off, on the 5th of October I wrote the following letter to the Duke of Savoy.

“ THE affair in question cannot be
“ treated too secretly; but, at the same
“ time, as it is necessary to get on in the
“ business, that we should begin to put
“ things in form, I am led to think,
“ in virtue of the powers I have re-
“ ceived from the King, and considering
“ the advantageous manner in which
“ your Royal Highness has been pleased
“ to speak of me, that I ought to pre-
“ fer a direct address to your Royal
“ Highness to every other mode, and
“ have therefore sent a memorial, which
“ I intreat you to make remarks upon.
“ You will not see any figures of rhe-
“ toric in it, but a plain discourse,
“ such as becomes a man of my pro-
“ fession.”

MEMO-

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MEMORIAL.

“ No one can doubt, but that the King
“ sincerely wishes for a peace with his
“ Royal Highness, since his Majesty’s in-
“ terest is concerned in it: there is also
“ reason to think that this will be found
“ equally consistent with the interest of
“ his Royal Highness. It is in this view
“ that his Majesty has charged me, to
“ give all the necessary assurances of his
“ assent to every thing that can be rea-
“ sonably asked of him.

“ As his Royal Highness wishes to
“ have an account of the advantages and
“ succours he would receive from his
“ Most Christian Majesty, it will be
“ proper, before they are explained, to
“ make the following reflections; after
“ which, his Royal Highness will be
“ better able to judge of the solidity of
“ his most Christian Majesty’s offers.

“ THE pretensions of the Emperor upon
“ all Italy, the constant maxims of the
“ council of Vienna, and the daily cavils of
“ that court against his Royal Highness,
“ to elude the execution of their treaties;
“ all

“ all these circumstances, I say, make ^{1710.}
“ us judge, that as soon as the Emperor,
“ shall be disengaged from the war with
“ France, and shall no longer need the
“ assistance of his Royal Highness, not
“ only there will be nothing more said
“ about the Vigevenasco, or an equiva-
“ lent; but the Emperor will also be desi-
“ rous of taking from his Royal Highness
“ what he has already given him, and
“ of reducing him to the same state
“ of submission as the Princes of Italy.
“ His Royal Highness, whose penetra-
“ tion nothing escapes, knows very well,
“ that in that case he will only have his
“ own forces to defend himself with;
“ for there will then be no other power
“ in Europe, either at hand, or willing
“ to assist him. France will think of
“ nothing but enjoying peace, and reco-
“ vering herself from the mischiefs occa-
“ sioned by the war. England and
“ Holland will be in the same mind,
“ because it will be their interest, and
“ will not for a long time be disposed
“ to engage in another war, unless it
“ be on account of trade. There re-
“ mains

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“ mains only the House of Austria;
“ which, pursuing still the same views
“ of aggrandisement, traced out by
“ Charles the Vth, will not fail to avail
“ themselves of every opportunity; and
“ as his Royal Highness can be the only,
“ or at least the first obstacle to their
“ vast designs, they certainly will begin
“ by attacking him.

“ His Royal Highness knows better
“ than any other person the measures
“ he is to take, to prevent these in-
“ conveniences; but it appears from a
“ review of matters, that there can be
“ no firm engagement, except in an al-
“ liance with France. The King, there-
“ fore, upon the whole, makes the fol-
“ lowing offers.

“ 1°. THE restitution, on both sides,
“ of the dominions reciprocally ta-
“ ken, since the commencement of this
“ war.

“ 2°. THE total cession of all the
“ rights of the King of Spain, upon the
“ state and Dutchy of Milan, which his
“ Catholic Majesty gives up without
“ reserve

“ reserve to his Royal Highness, for him 1710.
“ and for his successors.

“ 3°. The union of his Majesty’s
“ forces with those of his Royal High-
“ ness, as much for the preservation of
“ that part of the Milanese he is in pos-
“ session of, as for the recovery of the
“ rest of that state, which the Emperor
“ has reserved to himself, and which the
“ King of Spain, to whom, in right, the
“ whole belongs, shall have ceded to his
“ Royal Highness.

“ 4°. AN entire concurrence between
“ his Most Christian Majesty and his
“ Royal Highness, as much with respect
“ to the number, as the nature of the
“ succours he is to be supplied with,
“ and the absolute command of which
“ shall be left to his Royal Highness.

“ 5°. His Most Christian Majesty
“ will furnish the necessary subsidies,
“ in proportion to what his Royal High-
“ ness would receive from the allies.
“ This article requires to be further ex-
“ plained, and cannot be entirely settled,
“ without entering more minutely into
“ particulars.

“ 6°. His

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“ 6°. His Most Christian Majesty will
“ acknowledge his Royal Highness King
“ of Lombardy.”

M. Laurent came back to me on the 21st of October, and told me at first, that the Duke of Savoy had sent word to Father Arnaud, to break off all correspondence; but however that M. Lanfranc, private Secretary to that Prince, had sent a long memorial to the father, in order that he should communicate it to me. This method of acting surprized me: however as the court would not break off the negociation, I debated thoroughly with Laurent upon the matters this memorial contained. 1°. It was required that the King should indemnify the Duke of Savoy, for all the towns which had been demolished; 2°. That his Royal Highness should keep Exilles and Fenesselle; 3°. That a Swiss garrison should be put in Briançon and Fort Barraux, for the security of the performance of the treaty; 4°. That Monaco should be given up to his Royal Highness.

As to the first point, I answered, it was in consideration of the places which
had

had been demolished, that his Most Christian Majesty consented to give up Exilles, and Fenestrelle: that the second point was answered by the first: with regard to the third, his Majesty could by no means consent to put into the hands of any foreign power two towns that were the keys of his own kingdom; and with respect to the last article, the King could not either in honour or conscience dispose of what did not belong to him. Beside, that if his Royal Highness's affairs required some pecuniary assistance, his Most Christian Majesty would assist him as much as his own finances would allow, without however binding himself to any thing by a public treaty.

I SENT back M. Lauret with this reply, which he carried himself to M. Lanfranc at Turin; but I could not get any answer till after my return to St. Germain; for having received orders for winter quarters, and the enemy also retiring, I separated the army, and returned to court the beginning of December.

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THIS winter the Abbé Gautier came to Versailles, with proposals of peace on the part of England; which determined the King to order me to send word to the Duke of Savoy, that if he had any thing to propose, it must come through the channel of the Queen of England, without whose concurrence France was determined not to treat with any power. I shall not take any notice of the share I had in this negotiation, till I have finished what concerns my campaigns; I shall only say a word of the Abbé Gautier, whose fortune has been very singular. He was of the meanest extraction, and very poor; being Sexton of the parish of St. Germain en Laie, he was ambitious of becoming one of the clerks of the chapel of the castle, which may be worth about three or four hundred livres per annum. L'Abbé du Vivier, Master of the chapel, being displeased that he should solicit for this little employment through any channel but his own, did not speak favourably of him to the King, so that other people, who were trying for the place, exclaiming against him, he took the

the resolution of seeking his fortune elsewhere. He found means to be appointed one of the chaplains of Marshal Tallard, Ambassador in England: And the war afterwards breaking out, he entered in the same capacity into the household of Count Gallas, the Imperial Ambassador. This gave him an opportunity of being known to the Countess of Jersey, who went there to mass; and as the Earl of Jersey, Lord Chamberlain to the Queen, with some others, entertained designs of overturning Godolphin's, and Marlborough's administration, and as this could not be done without a peace with France, the Countess pointed out Gautier to her husband as a man, who might be employed without suspicion. He was spoken to, and employed in carrying messages into France: the familiar access he had at the house of the Count de Gallas, often furnishing him the means of obtaining passports, he acquitted himself of this commission with understanding, and in a word it was through him alone that all the negotiation was carried on. The Earl of Oxford, when

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1711. he became Prime Minister, looked upon him as his confidential man. M. de Torcy did the same; and he knew so well how to avail himself of the good opinion that was entertained of him, that he obtained for himself a revenue of thirty or forty thousand livres, either in pensions or Abbeyes.

ON the 14th of April, the Dauphin died at Meudon of the small-pox, at fifty years of age: he was a very good Prince, of moderate talents, but not without understanding. Never had King a better son; always attentive to pay his duty, and interfering with nothing but as far as his father chose.

I SET out in the month of May to repair to Dauphiny, and arrived at Grenoble on the 1st of June. After having given all the necessary orders, I went into Provence, in order to visit the banks of the Var, from its mouth to its source: I then went back to Barcelonette on the 13th of June, and from thence proceeded to Briançon.

THE enemy began to assemble in the plain of Piedmont, about Orbassan and Vigone,

Vigone, and they were making great ^{1711.} preparations at Coni; this seemed to indicate a design upon the county of Nice, or upon the valley of Barcelonette.

THAT I might be in a situation to oppose the enemy on which-ever side they should march, I encamped at Guillestre with four-and-twenty battalions.

I PLACED ten battalions in the camp of Tournos, four at S. Martin d'Entraunas, near the source of the Var, and four at St. Laurent on the Var. I dispersed fifteen squadrons, from Gap to Frejus, and seven along the Rhone, towards Valence and Montelimart. I left fifteen battalions at Briançon and in Quieras, and five with seven squadrons in Morienne and the Tarentese. By this position, I could arrive by my right in five days upon the Var, with thirty-six battalions and twenty-two squadrons; which were sufficient to defend the passage of it, especially as the banks of it are steep, and I had beside raised some strong intrenchments there. If the enemy should march on the side of the Morienne, or of the Tarentese, by the pass of Galubier,

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I could have got there three days before them with any number of troops I might choofe.

IN the first week of July all the enemy's infantry had crouded into the valley of Susa, excepting two battalions which remained in the vale of Stura; their cavalry took the road of the valley of Aosta, and the Duke of Savoy set out from Turin for Susa. Upon this I marched all my troops back by the left, leaving my right at the camp of Tournos, and my left at Valloire, that I might be able to present myself equally on all sides, if the enemy should make any counter-marches. At length I was no longer in uncertainty with respect to the Duke of Savoy's design: for on the 6th of July, having passed Mount Senis, he encamped at Lannebourg with part of his army; and the next day he advanced to Termignon, from whence he detached four thousand men by the pass of Vanoise, in order to oblige our forces to abandon the Tarentese, and to be able to assist those troops that were to pass by the little Mount S. Bernard.

I MARCHED

I MARCHED to Valloire, and pushed 711.
on several battalions to S. Jean de Morienne, Aiguebelle, and Montmellian, in order to execute the same manœuvre as in the year 1709.

THE Duke of Savoy judging that he could not force his way into Savoy by the Morienne, followed a few days after the detachment he had sent by the pass of Vanoise, and having continued his march by Mouftiers, he crossed the Arly, near Conflans, and encamped with his right at Cheuron, and his left at the Isere. I then resumed my former camp at Montmellian; and instead of the detachment of fifteen hundred men, which I had kept before in the Bauges, I sent thither six battalions, and two hundred dragoons; leaving a few battalions to preserve my communication with the Galubier by the Morienne.

THE enemy's army was composed of fifty-four battalions, and about sixty squadrons; ours of forty-four battalions, and twenty-four squadrons: By this I mean the troops that were on this side the mountains of the Dutchy of Savoy;

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for I do not include those which the enemy had left for the defence of their intrenched camp near Exilles, and their other posts; nor do I, for the same reason, comprehend those which we had left about Briançon, Quieras, &c.

OUR cavalry, which in retiring from Conflans to Montmellian, had been pursued by some of the enemy's squadrons and Hussars, fell into some disorder, but on the arrival of Lieutenant-General de Cilly, who hastened up, every thing was quiet, and there was very little loss. Brigadier de Prades, retired to Seissel with a regiment of dragoons to defend the Rhone: I also sent him a detachment of infantry.

THE enemy not being able to dislodge me from Montmellian, but by making themselves masters of the Bauges, and by that means of the heights that commanded my camp, detached General Sumjungen, who first advanced to Chastellar: M. de Maulevrier, who was posted at the Abbey of Aillon, did not think he could maintain himself there, and retired towards my camp; upon which the
I enemy

enemy gained the pass and the woods of Lindar, from whence I could not hinder them from coming to la Tuille, and upon the heights of Montmellian; so that not being able to remain any longer with prudence in my camp, I retired on the 21st of July in the morning, and encamped with my rear to some mountains, upon the edge of the plain, from Chapareillan to S. Bardolf, half a league from Chambery, from whence I took care to withdraw all our magazines.

I STAYED a whole day in this camp, to show the enemy that we were not running away from them; and on the 23d I took possession of the camp of Barraux, one league and a half from Montmellian.

I HAD reconnoitred it two years before, with an intent to take possession of it at that time, if the enemy had made themselves masters of the Bauges. My right was upon some heights near the Isere, my left to a chain of very steep mountains; upon the top of which, however, I had a post of two hundred men, which could

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could not be driven off. I had thirty battalions with me, and although the post was a very excellent one, I had some good intrenchments thrown up as fast as possible, that I might be able to send off large detachments if it should be necessary.

I SENT Lieutenant-General de Cilly with my cavalry and eight hundred infantry behind the Echelles, to prevent the enemy from making any excursions on the side of Lyons: I posted Major-General Cadrieu near the castle of Entremont, with fifteen hundred foot and some dragoons, that the *blue* parties might not be able to slip into the neighbourhood of Grenoble, and molest our rear.

THE position I had taken covered Fort Barraux and Grenoble; and by means of the bridge I had laid over the Isere at Pont Charra, I preserved my communication with the Morienne and Briançon. For this purpose I had posted four battalions and one regiment of dragoons opposite to Montmellian, in order to observe the motions of the enemy, and prevent

prevent them from repairing the bridge ^{1711.}
I had destroyed in my retreat. I placed
two battalions at Aiguebelle, where the
entrance of the Morienne begins. They
were to keep a detachment of one hun-
dred men opposite to Fretterive, and to
have some parties continually above
Conflans, to observe what was passing
in the enemy's rear. As the Arc was
not yet fordable, I contented myself
with ordering patrols, and left three
battalions for the guard of S. Jean and
Valloire. I had good roads made, to be
able to go with expedition from my bridge
at Aiguebelle to S. Jean and Grave; by
which means I was sure of not being
surprized, nor out-stripped, by the ene-
my, unless all the commanders of the
troops which composed my chain, should
agree to fall asleep together.

As M. de Cilly's camp was not strong
enough to stop the enemy, if they should
march thither in a strong body, I or-
dered that all the city militia of Lyons
should mount considerable guards on
the bridge of the city upon the Rhone,
till the twenty-five squadrons which were
ordered

1711. ordered to come from Alsace were arrived.

THE army of the enemy appeared on the 28th, in the plain opposite to us, and encamped near the castle of Marches; the right near the Abbey of Mians, and the left near the Francin, a quarter of a league on this side of Montmellian; as they were obliged to follow the course of the Isere, the cannon we had placed at la Chavane did some mischief to their columns. The enemy sent parties to take possession of Chambery, and all their cavalry encamped there.

IN a few days, my intrenchments being finished, I detached ten battalions from our camp to the Croix d'Aiguebelle, and Aiguebelle, in order to remove any anxiety for the Morienne, especially as the rivers were now beginning to become fordable.

ON the 8th of September the enemy's army decamped from the castle of Marches, and retook the rout of S. Pierre d'Albigny and Conflans, in order to return into Piedmont by the same way they came. I had calculated, that, considering

sidering our position and that of the enemy, I should be able to reach Exilles several days sooner than they, and if I were once posted, I could easily lay siege to it, without any apprehension of it's being relieved; in consequence of this, I had made all my dispositions secretly; and as soon as I saw the enemy on their march, under pretence of being alarmed for my line in the Morienne, I pushed on several battalions towards Aiguebelle and S. Jean, and made the following disposition.

MESSIEURS d'Asfeld and Dillon were to set out on the 13th from about Briançon, with fourteen battalions and a regiment of dragoons, and were to be on the 16th opposite the camp of S. Colomban, on the other side of the Dora. M. de Broglio was to march at the same time from S. Martin on the Arc, with twelve battalions, to proceed by the upper Morienne, gain the little Mount Senis, take possession of the Tetines and la Touille, and to arrive on the same day, the 16th, below the camp of S. Colomban, announcing his arrival by throwing

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throwing up some rockets, and making a smoke. M. d'Asfeld was to pass the Dora, below Chaumont, proceed to Ramat, and there attack M. la Roque, while M. de Broglie was to fall upon him by the heights.

It could not naturally be supposed that Count la Roque would remain in so bad a situation, where he ran the risque of being taken with all his troops. Undoubtedly, therefore, he would have retired towards Sufa, and we should have laid siege to Exilles; but the Marquis of Broglie's ardour, or rather his desire of doing every thing without any other person having any share in it, was the cause of the failure of the affair, at the very instant that it had, as it were, succeeded.

BROGLIE, instead of regulating his march according to my directions, and of arriving on the 16th at la Touille, got there on the 15th by break of day, and reconnoitred the enemy's intrenchments. On the 16th in the morning, without waiting for any intelligence of Messrs. d'Asfeld and Dillon, he attacked the re-
doubt

doubt *des quatre dents*. Some soldiers and officers got possession of it; but as the enemy were not attacked by the side of Ramat, for d'Asfeld could not yet have got up, they threw all their troops against Broglio, and obliged him to desist from the attack, after having killed or wounded one hundred and sixty of his men; upon which he retired into the Morienne. Had he even staid there till the next day, every thing would have succeeded, notwithstanding the check he had received; for M. d'Asfeld had arrived on the 16th, at the Puy de Pragelas, and had immediately extended himself to the pass of Argeuil, opposite to Exilles. He had even pushed on a considerable detachment to reconnoitre the enemy, and make the dispositions for attacking the next day. Count la Roque finding himself incommoded by M. d'Asfeld's manœuvres, and not being informed of the Marquis de Broglio's retreat, abandoned his intrenchments on the 16th in the evening, threw his cannon into the river, sent three hundred men into Exilles, and retired beyond the Ravin
of

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of Claret, near Giaion, in order to wait there for the succours that were coming to him from Savoy, or at least to prevent us from cutting off his communication with Sufa. M. d'Asfeld having no news from Broglio, and being only informed from the report of the country people, that he had made an attack and had been repulsed, did not think proper to pass the Dora with his fourteen battalions, and post himself between Exilles and Sufa, lest the main body of the enemy's army, which was moving up with all possible expedition, should fall upon him. He therefore remained below Chaumont till five o'clock in the afternoon of the 17th, in hopes of receiving some intelligence of M. de Broglio; but perceiving that Count la Roque, who was better informed of Broglio's retreat, and reinforced with five or six battalions, was re-entering the camp of S. Colomban, he retired to the Puy de Pragdelas, and from thence to the Cotte-Plane, placing his left at Oulx. I caused M. de Broglio's troops to join him, and arrived there myself on the 25th
of

of September, with the rest of the army; ^{1711.}
so that I had fifty battalions and seven-
teen squadrons there: I extended my
right into the valley of Pragelas. I
may venture to say that no plan was
ever better concerted, or would have
been more glorious for his Majesty's
arms; for at the same time that the
Duke of Savoy thought he could keep us
in awe by the superiority of his troops,
and imagined that he could even make
an irruption into France, we should
have taken from him a fortress, on
which the security of his dominions,
on the other side of the mountains, de-
pended. Perhaps we should even have
taken Fenestrelles.

I HAD left M. de Cilly in Savoy with
seven battalions and the rest of my ca-
valry. On the 26th the enemy had all
passed the little Mount S. Bernard; and
towards the end of the month, Count
la Roque's corps was increased to thir-
ty battalions. I remained in this camp
till the 12th of October, when I marched
back to Sezane; from whence, on the
14th, I repassed Mount Genevre, and

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encamped at the bridge of Servieres, near Briançon.

I SENT back into Savoy some of the troops that were to winter there; and M. d'Asfeld also took the road of the valley of Barcelonette, with the troops that were destined for Provence. He marched to Barricades, beyond the pass of Argentera. The enemy abandoned it on his approach, and retreated towards le Pianche, where they had intrenchments guarded by two battalions, and a number of barbets: M. d'Asfeld attacked them, and after an engagement of an hour and a half, he drove them off, and pursued them near to Demont. He afterwards brought away from the valley of Stura, a number of hostages for the contributions, and resumed the road to Provence by the valley of Barcelonette.

MAJOR-GENERAL le Guerchois had entered at the same time the valley of Maira, had forced some intrenchments guarded by one battalion and some peasants, and had likewise brought away some hostages. Lieutenant-General de

Cilly was to have entered the valley of Aosta with sixteen battalions and the cavalry; but there fell such a prodigious quantity of snow, that he was obliged to put his troops into quarters, without undertaking any thing. At the end of October, I separated the army entirely, and arrived at Court in the beginning of November.

I CANNOT omit mentioning a very extraordinary adventure that happened at Lyons about the month of September. It was the custom to ring a bell, to give notice to the persons who were on the other side of the bridge of the Rhone, that the gates were going to be shut. There were above thirty thousand people out a walking; the serjeant who kept the gate, rang the bell an hour sooner than usual, upon which every body was hastening to re-enter the city. The serjeant, who had his views, kept the bar shut, in order to get a little money; so that the crowd increasing, those who were nearest the bar, were so much pressed, that there were more than a thousand of them stifled, or very

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much hurt. A coach and horses that were there, were crushed to pieces; in a word, it was a shocking sight to see heaps of bodies piled upon one another, and all this in an instant. The serjeant was taken up, tried, and broken alive upon the wheel.

1712.

IN the month of February the Daupiness died, a week after the Dauphin her husband; and in three weeks time the young Dauphin also expired. They were all three buried together at St. Denys. The loss of the Dauphin was very sensibly felt by the French; for they expected that his future reign would at least alleviate, if not put an end to their miseries. It is certain that no Prince ever united a greater fund of religion, with more understanding; it seemed as if nature had taken pleasure in indemnifying him for the injury she had done him with respect to his person, which was deformed. He was of a very hasty disposition; but had taken so much pains to subdue it, that it never broke out; he was much addicted to pleasures; but his piety restrained him from indulging

ing in any that were unlawful, and often led him to abstain from those which were permitted. Though he was very fond of his wife, he never suffered her to break in upon his hours of prayer and meditation: so extensive was his charity, that he denied himself many conveniences, to give to the poor. He carried his pardon of injuries, and neighbourly love so far, that he would risk his own reputation rather than say any thing against calumniators, or even express any dissatisfaction towards them. I have seen him receive such persons with as much politeness and regard, as if they had never deviated from the rule of truth, and from the respect which they owed him. Though I was honoured with his confidence, he never allowed himself to speak to me of their bad conduct; so much was he upon his guard against every thing that might be injurious to Christian charity; in a word, he made a continual sacrifice to God of all the crosses and mortifications he experienced. He had a very sound understanding and great penetration, was very

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fond of reading, and of conversing with men of merit and knowledge. His view in this was to make himself capable of governing well, in order to promote the happiness of his people, when he should be upon the throne. But Divine Providence, either to reward this Christian hero, or to deprive us of a Prince we were not worthy of, removed him from this mortal life to a blessed eternity, in the flower of his age, since he was no more than thirty years old when he died.

THE advanced age of Lewis XIV. and the extreme infancy of the Dauphin, who was no more than two years of age, occasioned many persons to solicit the King strongly to make a will, and to appoint a regency, in order to avoid the troubles which, without this precaution, might arise. The King spoke of it to M. de Harlay, who had been First President of the Parliament of Paris, a man of distinguished wisdom and probity, who had resigned his employments voluntarily. He received orders to draw up a plan, which might be consistent with

with the laws of the kingdom, and the good of the state. M. de Harlay being much a valetudinarian, employed his son, a counsellor of state, to reduce to writing all the ideas that occurred to him. This gentleman, who had a great share of wit and much imagination, but very little sound judgment, laid it down as a fundamental principle, that the King of Spain, uncle to the young Dauphin, should be his tutor, and regent of the kingdom; but as his Catholic Majesty could not absent himself from his kingdoms, he appointed the Cardinal Deljudicé to govern France in his name and by his authority. He carried this plan to the King from his father; but it was thought so extravagant, that at first reading it was laid aside. Notwithstanding this, M. de Harlay, the son, still persisted that the King might with propriety adopt it; and in order to make a merit of it with the King of Spain, he opened the matter to the Cardinal Deljudicé, when the latter came into France in 1714, from his Catholic Majesty. The King was told of it, and

1712.

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was very near sending him to the Bastile. The Duke of Orleans was likewise informed of it; but never shewed him any other mark of resentment on that account than not to give him any employment in the ministry.

IN the month of June I went back to resume the command of the army in Dauphiny. I began by visiting Savoy, and drew near to Geneva with a few troops, in order to alarm the canton of Berne, and by that means to endeavour to make them more tractable with respect to the other cantons, with which they were at variance. I afterwards repaired to Briançon. As the treaty of peace, which was negotiating in England, was far advanced, the Duke of Savoy did not form any designs against us this campaign; on the contrary, for fear of the Germans, he had put the greatest part of his troops into garrison; so I thought it best to proceed with the army on the other side of mount Genevre, as much for the sake of subsisting at the expence of the country, which was to be ceded to that Prince, as to spare our own. I put myself in
motion

motion on the 11th of July to cross the Alps; and on the 12th I encamped at the Sauze d'Oulon, with forty-one battalions, and nine squadrons of dragoons, extending my right to le Duc, in the valley of Pragelas, and my left to Oulx. The enemy placed eighteen battalions in the intrenchments of S. Colomban, five near Fenestrelles, and the rest of their army was distributed from Exilles to Susa. We remained in this position till the 6th of September, when we marched back to Sezane, and the next day to Pont de Serviers. I could have found subsistence for a longer time at Oulx; but I had projected an incursion into the plain of Piedmont on another side; and I had two motives for this: the first was, that in case the enemy should move from the neighbourhood of Exilles, to follow me, I could, by a forced march, easily advance in two days time, near enough to invest that place; the other was, that at the worst, if the enemy should not make any motion, I should levy contributions, and shew the King

1712.

1712. King how easy it was to penetrate on the other side of the Alps.

ON the same day that I arrived at Briançon, twenty squadrons arrived there likewise, to the great astonishment of our infantry and the people of the country, who had never seen a camp of cavalry.

I began my march on the 8th of September, and crossed the pass of Hayes and of Iffoire, in the valley of Quieras, from whence I detached Lieutenant-Generals d'Arennes and de Cilly, with my cavalry, and ten battalions. Major-General de Cadrieu, who marched in front with one hundred dragoons, twenty-five companies of grenadiers, and as many pickets, descended by the pass dell Agnello, into the vale of S. Pierre, drove away some detachments of the enemy, who guarded the intrenchments, and encamped at S. Pierre. Messrs. d'Arennes and de Cilly came up to him; the first remained there with the battalions, and the latter marched on with the cavalry and the detachment of M. de Cadrieu. He left his infantry at Venasca, upon the borders of the plain of Piedmont, which
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he entered with his cavalry; he found ^{1712.} there two regiments of the enemy's cavalry, which he charged, and took some prisoners; but the main body of the enemy's horse moving towards that side, he did not think proper to pursue any further than Villa-fallet, and contented himself with sending a number of parties into the towns and villages round about, in order to take hostages for the contributions; they brought away a great number, and we got fifty thousand crowns from them. In the action he had, there were forty troopers killed on our side, and twenty wounded. The loss of the enemy was more considerable.

I HAD advanced with the main body of my infantry to La Chanaz, near the castle Dauphin, and at the same time M. d'Asfeld had marched by the pass of Argentera, forced Barricades, and reduced Demont to submission; and having proceeded into the plain of Coni, he had picked up a great number of hostages, and had afterwards returned into the valley of Barcelonette,

M. DE

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M. DE CILLY, after having returned to Venasca, sent a considerable detachment into the valley of Maira, which brought off a number of hostages. Another detachment descended by the valley of the Po, and put the whole country under contribution as far as Barges.

AT my return to Pont de Servieres, I dispatched ten battalions for the Rouffillon, where they were to be under the command of the Count de Fiennes. The campaign ended towards the latter end of October, and having separated the army, I returned to Grenoble, and from thence to court.

DURING this summer the face of affairs in Flanders was totally changed: at the beginning of the campaign Prince Eugene attacked Quesnoy.

DURING this siege, Lord Bolingbroke being come into France to conclude the treaty of peace, and having settled every thing, the Queen of England sent orders to the Duke of Ormond, her General, to put a stop to every act of hostility. After the taking of Quesnoy, he accordingly declared to Prince Eugene, the orders he had

had received from the Queen, and that ¹⁷¹² he was going to publish the Armistice. The rest of the Generals, together with the Emperor's General, would not accept of it: so that Ormond retired with his troops to Ghent, and sent, agreeably to the preliminary articles, some battalions to take possession of Dunkirk. Of all the foreign troops, in the pay of the Queen, there were only those of Holstein that followed him: the rest refused to obey him.

PRINCE EUGENE, to shew the allies that he was able to pursue his conquests notwithstanding the desertion of the English, advanced to Landrecy, which he besieged. Marshal Villars received orders to succour the place: this was not an easy matter; but fortunately, upon the Marshal's approach to the Sambre, the enemy drew near to it likewise with all their troops, leaving only eighteen battalions and some squadrons at Denain upon the Scheld, to preserve that post, which was necessary for the protection of their convoys; for they brought every thing from Douay and Tournay. Mar-
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1712.

shal Villars made a counter-march in the night time, and proceeded with all possible dispatch to the Scheld, over which he threw some bridges, crossed the river, attacked the corps encamped at Denain, and totally defeated it. Prince Eugene was marching up to its relief; but the affair was at an end, before he could arrive. In a fit of despair, he ordered the bridges upon the Scheld near Denain to be attacked; and lost upwards of a thousand men, to no manner of purpose; for had the bridges been abandoned to him, he would not have been the more enabled to cross the Scheld in the face of the King's army. Prince Eugene, notwithstanding this check, would still have continued the siege; but the deputies of the States General obliged him to raise it, and to retire to Mons. Marshal Villars took Douay, and afterwards Bouchain and Quesnoy; which determined the Dutch no longer to refuse the peace proposed by France, and approved of by the Queen of England.

AT my return to court, I was ordered to leave it again in the month of November,

ber. The Count de Fiennes, having ^{1712.} marched with six thousand men to the relief of Girona, which was blocked up by the enemy, found them so well posted at the Côte Rouge, and moreover so superior in number, that he thought himself fortunate to be able to get back again to the Rouffillon, without receiving a check. Upon this the King, fearing lest Girona should be lost for want of provisions, resolved to send me thither with a sufficient force to succeed. I repaired to Perpignan on the 10th of December, after having stopped a few days at Montpellier, to concert with M. de Basville the succours I wanted for my expedition, and which he supplied me with. The troops which were to compose my army, coming from Germany, from Dauphiny and Provence, could not arrive till the 23d: and the 26th I took the field at Boulou, with thirty-four battalions, forty-one squadrons, and thirty pieces of cannon. It was very difficult to find subsistence for the men and horses, on account of the season, and because we had fifteen tedious leagues of an enemy's country

1712. country to traverse, and in very bad roads. We had collected a kind of fleet, which was to coast along with us, in order to furnish us with what we wanted; but one is never sure of any thing when one depends upon the winds.

ON the 28th we marched from Boulou, and crossing the Pyrenees, encamped at Junquera, the first village of Catalonia. On the 23d we marched to Figueras, where we placed our right, and our left at Alfar: we halted on the 30th, in order to have some bread and oats brought from Roses. On the 31st we crossed the Fluvia, and encamped at Armantera.

COUNT Staremberg, having learned that I was marching to the relief of Girona, had caused most of the troops that were in Catalonia to march to the blockade, and had repaired thither himself: he had thirty-six battalions, and thirty-seven squadrons.

1713. ON the 2d of January I marched from Armantera, and went to encamp at Verges on the Ter, three leagues from the enemy's camp, and four from Girona. The same evening I ordered three discharges

charges of my artillery to be made, in ^{1713.} order to apprize the Marquis de Brancas, who commanded there, of my arrival. As I knew that the post of the Côte Rouge, which the enemy occupied, was still stronger from the natural advantage of the ground, than from the intrenchments they had thrown up there, I judged it best not to think of attacking them in that place, although it was the most convenient to get at the town, it being the great road leading from that side of the Ter to Girona: if we had chosen to go by our right, we should have fallen in with some large mountains, where the enemy might have amused us for a longer time than our provisions would have lasted; so that I determined to march to the relief of the place by the other side of the Ter: As it was necessary for this purpose to have four days bread, because the circuit was great on account of the mountains, I resolved to wait for my biscuit, which was to be landed at Escalé; and in the mean time I pretended to have no other design but to attack the Côte Rouge.

1713.

UPON my arrival at the camp at Verges, I sent a detachment of six hundred horse across the Ter, in order to drive away the miquelets, and some troops of cavalry, which made their appearance there, and I also sent off a detachment towards the enemy's army to obtain some intelligence.

COUNT Staremberg strongly suspecting that I should take the resolution of crossing the Ter, and fearing that in that case he could not make his retreat without risque, decamped at the beginning of the night, and quitting the Côte Rouge, passed over the Pont Mayor, from whence, before break of day, he took the road to Ostalric, leaving behind him some pieces of cannon, ammunition and provisions. I was not informed of this march till it was rather late in the morning; I immediately dispatched Lieutenant-General de Cilly, with two brigades of infantry and all my dragoons, to take possession of the Côte Rouge, and to establish a communication with Girona: I afterwards extended myself in a line from Verges along the Ter, and remained in that

that situation till I had completely re-victualled the fortress, in which there were no sorts of provisions; I also changed the garrison, which seemed rather dead than alive. 1713.

OUR diligence was so great, that on the 21st of January, Girona was completely supplied with provisions; after which I decamped from Verges, and retired to Figueras, where I left the Count de Fiennes, with twenty battalions, and as many squadrons, to take up his quarters in the Lampredan. I sent back the rest of the troops into the different provinces from whence they came, and then returned to court, where I arrived on the 5th of February, 1713.

M. VOYSIN had proposed to me to demolish Girona, after having relieved it, upon pretence of saving the expence of a garrison; but in fact, with a view that the Spaniards might have one fortress less upon our frontier; I told him I could not do it without an express order under the King's own hand. When I spoke of it to his Majesty, I perceived that he wished it also; but was unwilling

1713. to give the order I required, and I thought it not right to incur his Catholic Majesty's displeasure without having my excuse in form; so that I heard no more of it.

ON my arrival, I found that the articles of peace were upon the point of being settled, and that all the valleys beyond Mount Genevre were ceded to the Duke of Savoy, as if they were of no value. I was too well acquainted with this country not to think myself obliged to represent to the King, that it was not proper to abandon so extensive and so rich a tract of land, without endeavouring to have at least some kind of equivalent. I therefore advised that the valley of Barcelonnette should be demanded, as that would be of great use to us for the facility of our chain of communication upon this frontier, and for defending the entrance into Provence and Dauphiny. The King and the Ministers had no mind to make the proposal, lest it should retard the conclusion of the peace; but I insisted so strongly, that at length they consented to it. The Duke of Savoy,

Savoy, who, on his part, was apprehensive, if he made any difficulties, that the other allies would sign without him, and who, moreover, knew not the importance of what was required, made no objection; and thus France, in losing Exilles and Fenestrelle, acquired a very plentiful valley, composed of twelve communities. 1713.

At length, on the 11th of April, peace was signed at Utrecht, between France, Spain, England, Holland, Savoy, Portugal and Prussia; but the Emperor and the empire would not come into it. It has always been a maxim with the court of Vienna, not to accede to the different treaties at the same time as the other crowns, thinking by this proceeding to shew the superiority of their grandeur and power, though in fact they cannot continue the war for any length of time by themselves.

THERE was therefore no longer any war, except upon the Rhine, where Marshal Villars commanded instead of the Marshal d'Harcourt, who had been seized with an apoplexy. He first laid siege to Landau, and afterwards to Fribourg;

1713.

Prince Eugene, who was much inferior in number, not stirring all the while, but keeping close and covered behind the lines of Etlinguen. The King's army consisted of two hundred battalions, and three hundred squadrons. Towards the close of the campaign, the two Generals had some conferences, and then the congress was held in the winter at Raftat, where the peace was signed.

IN the month of May I had given up my regiment of infantry to my eldest son, in order that he might go through the campaign with more satisfaction; he had already served two campaigns with me.

ENGLAND and Holland had made a separate treaty, signed the 14th of March 1713, for the evacuation of Catalonia, and the Emperor's plenipotentiaries had signed it afterwards. It was there stipulated that the allies should withdraw all their troops from that Province, and should give it up into the hands of Philip the Vth, King of Spain. In fact, Count Staremborg did deliver up Tarragona and Ostalric, and in the month of December,

ember, 1713, embarked at Barcelona ^{1713.} with all his troops. The people of that city, notwithstanding the advice of Staremberg and of the Cardinal de Sala, their bishop, would never submit to his Catholic Majesty, unless they were previously assured of preserving all their privileges. They therefore resolved to defend themselves, and ordered the Governor of Cardonia, who was a Catalan, not to deliver up that place to the Spaniards, notwithstanding Staremberg's orders.

By the terms of the treaty, Staremberg was not only obliged to evacuate, but also to deliver up to his Catholic Majesty all the places in Catalonia, reserving only Barcelona or Tarragona, at his option, which he was also to deliver up when he embarked. Indeed M. de Grimaldi, a Spanish Lieutenant-General, having been sent to Staremberg, to concert the execution of the treaty, made a kind of new one with him, in which he omitted the words *deliver up*; this served as a pretence to Staremberg, not to compel the people of Barcelona to open their gates,

1713. which, according to the treaty signed in Holland, he ought to have done.

As the Imperialists retired, the Duke de Popoly advanced into Catalonia, and summoned Barcelona to surrender; but the inhabitants not listening to any thing, the army of his Catholic Majesty advanced towards the town to blockade it, till all the necessary apparatus for a siege could be brought up. There were none of the requisites in Spain; so the King ordered that his Catholic Majesty should be supplied from our forts and magazines, with every thing he might want; and sent M. Ducaffe, Lieutenant-General of Marines, with two vessels of the line to command the Spanish fleet destined to block up Barcelona by sea.

1714. AT the beginning of this year died the Queen of Spain; upon which the King resolved to send me to Madrid, under pretence of a compliment of condolence, but in fact to determine that court not to defer any longer to sign the peace with Holland. The matter in dispute was a principality in Flanders, which the King of Spain was determined to give
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to the Princess Orfini. The English and the Dutch, whom this did not concern, readily consented to it; but the Emperor, to whom the sovereignty of the low countries was ceded, would not listen to it. The Dutch however, who were then masters of Flanders, offered to put her in possession of this little principality, but this did not satisfy the King of Spain, who wanted, that they should engage themselves by the treaty of peace, to maintain her in it. This the States-General refused; upon which his Catholic Majesty gave orders to his Plenipotentiaries, not to sign the peace with them but upon this condition. The Dutch called upon the King of France to fulfil the promise he had made them; to wit, that the King his grandson should make peace with them upon the terms already settled, among which the guarantee of the principality to the Princess Orfini, had never been mentioned. This was the principal motive of my journey to Madrid. I had orders besides, in case the King of Spain should sign the peace, to concert with him the means of reducing Barcelona, and

1714. and to make him the offer of a French army, but upon condition that it should be commanded by one of the King's Generals.

BEFORE I set off, it was thought proper to send a courier into Spain. Great was the surprize, when by the return of the messenger, it was found that his Catholic Majesty intreated his grandfather not to send me to Madrid, but to make me go straight forward to the army before Barcelona; this expedition being more necessary to him than a compliment of condolence. The Ambassadors of Holland made at the same time loud complaints, upon his Catholic Majesty's trifling with them, and continued to insist on the performance of the engagements the King had entered into with them; upon which the King not only ordered me not to go, but wrote word to the King of Spain, that he would send neither troops nor ships, nor any kind of assistance for the siege of Barcelona, till he had signed the peace with Holland.

THREE

THREE months passed away without any answer from Madrid. Orry, who governed Spain under the Princess Orfini, went to the camp before Barcelona, in order to see if it were possible to carry on the siege without the assistance of France, and at the same time the Cardinal Del-^{1714.}judicé was sent to Paris, to have an eye upon what was going forward, and to endeavour to prevent the King from taking any steps contrary to his Catholic Majesty's designs. But at length Orry finding it impossible to succeed without the assistance of France, the King of Spain wrote, in the month of June, by a courier, to the King, that he would consent to every thing he desired, and sent him the necessary orders for the Spanish plenipotentiaries at Utrecht: he pressed the King at the same time to send me off with all possible dispatch. Accordingly I received orders to repair to Barcelona, and the French troops destined for this expedition, were ordered to march.

I SET out on the 22d of June, and as I passed by Narbonne, a courier came to me

1714.

me from his Catholic Majesty, with the patent of Generalissimo, and instructions for my conduct with regard to the inhabitants of Barcelona; it was signified in these, that in case they should ask to capitulate, before the opening of the trenches, I should only engage to interfere in their favour with the Prince, that their lives should be saved; but if once I had begun the works, and the batteries, I was absolutely forbidden to receive them, on any other terms, than those of submitting at discretion. This order appeared to me so extraordinary, and so unchristian, and even so contrary to the interest of his Catholic Majesty, that I instantly sent dispatches to the King his grandfather, to know his intentions. I received for answer, that I was at liberty to do as I thought proper. I likewise wrote to Madrid to represent my reasons; but the only permission I could obtain from thence, was to promise my good offices, after the opening of the trenches, and the raising of the batteries. I was not in the least surpris'd at these sentiments in the court of Madrid; for since the accession of Philip the Vth to the crown,

crown, it had always been their maxim ^{1714.} to proceed with haughtiness; and they had by that means often brought themselves to the brink of destruction, through the discontents which this behaviour had occasioned: the ministers never spoke but of the grandeur of the Monarch, of the justice of his cause, and of the unworthiness of those who dared to oppose him; all those who had revolted were to be put to the sword, all those who did not take part against his competitor were to be treated as enemies, and those who assisted him were supposed only to have done their duty, and his Catholic Majesty was not bound to consider them in the least for it. If the Ministers and Generals of the King of Spain had been more moderate in their language, as it should seem that prudence would have required, Barcelona would have capitulated immediately after the departure of the Imperialists; but as Madrid, and the Duke de Popoly, talked of nothing else publicly but of sackings and executions, the people became furious and desperate: Popoly indeed had a personal
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1714.

and well founded hatred against the people of Barcelona, on account of the insults they had committed against his wife, when the Archduke took the city in 1705.

I ARRIVED at the camp before Barcelona the 7th of July; the Duke de Popoly resigned the command to me, and set out three days after to return to Madrid.

ORRY was with the army, and it was at my request the King insisted, with his Catholic Majesty, that he should be there: uncertain whether the accounts that were sent me of the immense preparations for the siege were true, it was my wish that Orry should be present, knowing well that while he was with me, he would neglect nothing to have me supplied with all I wanted. But when I found that we had plenty of every thing, and that money was the only article we might possibly be in want of, if the siege were long, I consented that Orry should return to Madrid, more especially as he was the only person in Spain who could find the necessary funds.

A FEW

A FEW days before he went away, he ¹⁷¹⁴ had proposed to me to remain in the service of the King of Spain, after taking Barcelona. He assured me, that his Catholic Majesty would give me the command of all his forces; that I should, moreover, be his Vicar-General in the kingdom of Arragon, and that I should have suitable appointments and pensions. I rejected the proposal entirely; 1st, because I was become a Frenchman, and being an officer of that crown, it did not become me to think of any such thing: 2d, I considered every establishment in Spain, as a very uncertain matter, and continually subject to the caprices of an ever-turbulent Court. He, however, pressed me again upon the subject, and told me, that the proposal should be made to the King by his Catholic Majesty, without committing me in any thing. I peremptorily refused, assuring him, that after the obligations I had to the King his Grandfather, I would never leave him, unless he should dismiss me from his service.

1714

THE army was composed of fifty battalions of French, and twenty of Spanish troops, and of fifty-one squadrons; we had besides fifteen battalions in Lampredan and Girona, and eight squadrons to keep the country in awe; and about fifteen other battalions and thirty squadrons, dispersed on the side of Tarragona, Ygualada, and the plain of Vich, to keep the miquelets in awe.

THE garrison of Barcelona consisted of sixteen thousand men divided into several regiments, as well foreigners as miquelets and soldiers of the Deputation.

IN our park of artillery I found eighty-seven pieces of heavy cannon, twenty of which were six-and-thirty pounders, and thirty-three mortars; there were more than fifteen hundred thousand weight of powder, and every thing else that could be thought of for a siege, in profusion; so that it remained only to determine where we should attack the place. The side of Monjuich would have been very difficult, by reason of the cannon which the enemy might have fixed half way up the declivity, to scour our trenches,

trenches, and batter them in reverse, and the more, as on that side the glacis of the town concealed the bastions, and the ditch there was very deep. ^{1714.}

THE front, which looked towards the convent of the Capucins, had not only five bastions, but was also provided with re-entering angles; and we should have found it difficult to advance under so great a fire.

I DETERMINED, therefore, to make my attack on the side towards the sea, which faces the river Besos, as the front, in this place, was only composed of three bastions, the curtains of which being much raised, offered a fair mark to the cannon, and the ditch was only six feet deep. The approaches here were much more easy, by reason of some small rising grounds, behind which several battalions might be placed under cover; besides, our park of artillery was near this spot; whereas in every other part, it would have taken us infinite time to have conveyed all the apparatus. The ground, indeed, was very low, and in case of rain there would have been a great deal of mud;

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but the season made us hope for dry weather.

ON the 12th of July we opened the trenches, with ten battalions, to which were added ten companies of grenadiers, and three hundred horse. The night was so short, that the parallel could not be extended so far as had been determined, so that the left could not be carried on to the sea, as we had designed.

THE next day, at one o'clock in the afternoon, the rebels made a sally on that side with four thousand foot and three hundred horse. Their cavalry passed along the shore, till they came to the rear of our parallel, and killed some of our workmen; their infantry advanced as far as upon the Boyall; but our grenadiers and pickets coming up, repulsed them briskly. Our three hundred horse advanced at the same time at full speed, charged the enemy, killed sixty of their horsemen on the spot, took one Lieutenant-Colonel prisoner, and pursued them as far as the pallisades of the covered way. About six thousand of the rebels sallied out of the covered way at
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the same time, and marched in order of battle to our parallel; but our ten battalions putting themselves in motion from behind the rising ground, obliged them, in an instant, to re-enter the place with very great loss on their part. In this action, which was long and sharp, we had not more than fifty men killed or wounded. The bad success of this sally disconcerted the garrison, who did not make any other of consequence during the rest of the siege. 1714.

I HAD forgotten to mention that on the 8th we saw a fleet of fifty sail on the sea; upon which Lieutenant-General de Bellefontaine, who, since M. du Cassé's illness, commanded our naval armament, set sail to go and meet it. Night came on before he could come up with it; and the next day this fleet endeavoured to make their way into the port of Barcelona. M. de Bellefontaine took twenty of their ships and one frigate, but thirty ships and three frigates entered the harbour. They were laden with provisions, and came from Majorca.

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ON the 25th of July our batteries began to play; there were fourscore pieces of cannon; they fired upon the bastions of Porteneuve, of S. Clara, and of the East. On the 30th a lodgment was made in the covered way, with very little loss; considering that the trenches were not more than ten toises distant from the salient angles, and that there were no traverses within. The next day the enemy attempted to drive away our troops from this lodgment; but they were repulsed with loss.

THE Marquis Delpoal, a Catalan of distinction, who was among the mountains, at the head of the Miquelets, resolved to attempt the succour of the place; for this purpose he assembled, on the side of Lanfan, between nine and ten thousand men. I contented myself with reinforcing Messrs. de Bracamonté, de Montemart, and de Gonzales, who were in the plain of Vich, giving them orders to attack the rebels as soon as they should find an opportunity.

ON the 12th of August, there being a breach in the bastion of S. Clara, and
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the mine under the flanked angle of the bastion of port Neuve being ready, I caused those two bastions to be attacked. Our people entered them at first without resistance, and worked at their lodgment; but in half an hour's time the enemy returned, and drove us away. However, we had no more than about a hundred and fifty men killed and wounded. 1714.

ON the 13th, at eight o'clock in the evening, I caused the bastion of St. Clara to be re-attacked; our people entered it, and made their lodgment, though with much loss and difficulty, on account of the superiority of the inner rampart, which closed the gorge of the bastion. The next day at noon, after the trenches had been relieved, the besieged sallied out afresh, and drove our troops from the bastion again; we had near a thousand men killed or wounded in this affair.

THE vigorous resistance of the enemy determined me to hazard no more attacks of this kind; but at the same time it was very difficult to find out how one could make one's self master of the town by any other method. Our

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engineers, whose knowledge did not extend beyond the ordinary rules of the art, seeing that the environs were all laid under water, proposed to me, as the only resource, to give the general assault at a breach of thirty toises, which had been made in the curtain between Portneuve and S. Clara. It appeared plainly, that those who were capable of making such a proposal, must have lost their senses; for the flanks were still entire, the breach undetermined; and besides, there was behind it a very strong intrenchment, and there were large openings made in the rampart on each side of the breach. At length, after having examined on all sides, and maturely considered, I determined to lay the front of the attack so much open, that one might enter the place as it were in line of battle; so that without exposing myself to fresh checks, I went securely to work. I therefore advanced some batteries, and armed myself with patience against all the discourses of the officers of the army, who grew very much tired with the length of the siege.

DURING

DURING this time, I had ordered M. ^{1714.} de Bracamonté to revictual the castle of Berga, which, for want of provisions, was upon the point of falling into the hands of the rebels. He marched, for this purpose, with six hundred foot and five hundred horse, and introduced his convoy. Delpoal had resolved to fall upon him at his return, and had posted himself at a defile with three thousand men. Bracamonté attacked and beat him, killing three hundred of his men upon the spot. Two other corps of rebels likewise attempted to prevent his return, but he defeated them also, and killed several of them. Delpoal, after this, having assembled twelve thousand men, came down the great mountains as far as Olsa, six leagues from our camp. I thought it best not to suffer his numbers to increase, nor to let him come nearer to us. With this view, I detached Major-General the Marquis d'Arpajon, with four French battalions and two hundred horse, to join Captain-General the Marquis de Thouy, near Martorell: De Thouy might have with him about twelve hun-

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dred men : Montemart and Gonfales were also to march from their side, and to attack the body of the rebels at the same time. The rebels, emboldened by their number, came further down into the plain, advanced to Teraffa and Sebadell, and from thence to Samanat; whither our detachments marched. Count Montemart arrived there first, with nine hundred infantry and five hundred horse, attacked Delpoal, beat him, and pursued him as far as the great mountains, into which all the Miquelets and Somettani threw themselves, and from thence returned home. Thouy and Gonfales likewise met on their side with some large bodies of the rebels, whom they defeated. We had not more than twenty men killed or wounded. The enemy had near one thousand killed and taken prisoners.

M. DE MORAGAS, a Major-General of the Archduke's, advanced at the same time towards the plain of Vich, with three thousand Miquelets; but Bracamonté obliged him to retire with precipitation. The Marquis Delpoal endeavoured

deavoured again to get together some ^{1714.} troops; but the Somettani did not chuse to venture: so that he could not collect more than about three thousand Miquelets. Count Montemart advanced to him with his usual vivacity, came up with him about Montserrat, attacked him on the highest part of the steep mountains, routed him totally, killed one hundred and fifty men upon the spot, and took sixty prisoners, who were immediately hanged. Delpoal appeared again a few days after, and entered, by surprize, the town of Manresa; a small Spanish battalion, which was there, retired into a corner of the town, where it defended itself with wonderful bravery; it would, however, have been taken, if Count Montemart had not come up. The rebels, who dreaded the sight of him, retired with precipitation, leaving behind them their wounded men and provisions.

As our breaches were very much advanced, and as I reckoned they would soon be in readiness for the general assault, I thought it necessary to comply with

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with the desire of all the General Officers, who pressed me to summon the place. This step was naturally repugnant to me; but as I would not have to reproach myself with the effusion of blood, I ordered the Lieutenant-General of the trenches, on the 3d of September, to acquaint the people of the town, that they should send me some deputies. Two hours after he had delivered my message, an officer appeared on the breach, to enquire if the deputies were to be military men, or inhabitants of the city: we answered him, that it was the same thing to us, provided they were persons in whom they reposed a confidence: upon which the officer said, that M. de Villaroel, who was General of the Barcelonians, had it not in his power to give an answer to such a question, and that they were going to assemble the councils to deliberate upon it.

ON the 6th of September, an officer of the enemy asked to speak to the General of the trenches. Lieutenant-General d'Asfeld advanced to the head of
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the saps; and then the officer read aloud ^{1714.}
a paper he held in his hand, the contents
of which were, that the three sovereign
bodies in Barcelona being assembled in
council, had resolved to do nothing,
and to listen to no proposal for the sur-
render of the place. The officer then
said to M. d'Asfeld, *Vuestra Excelentia*
quiere algo mas? "Does your Excellency
desire any thing more?" M. d'Asfeld
did not deign to give an answer, and
immediately ordered our artillery to be-
gin firing again. The obstinacy of these
people was the more surprizing, as there
were seven breaches in the body of the
place; no possibility of receiving any
succours, and no provisions in the town.
They wanted to send the women out;
but I would not suffer them to come
near us, and even gave orders that they
should be fired upon.

THE King of Spain, who had just
concluded his marriage with the Princess
of Parma, ordered me to send away im-
mediately eight large ships to go to
Genoa to fetch the new Queen. I did
not think proper to do this, especially

1714

as I knew that there were at Majorca forty vessels laden with all kinds of provisions, ready to set sail to endeavour to get into Barcelona. I therefore delayed the departure of this squadron, till after the taking of the place.

At length, all the breaches being very practicable, and all the dispositions being made for a general assault, the troops destined for the several attacks marched from the camp on the 10th day of September, after the night was set in, and placed themselves in columns at the openings that had been marked out for them in the trenches; those troops that were to make the corps de reserve, occupied the ground that was marked out for them in the rear.

M. de Dillon, Lieutenant-General of the trenches, commanded the right of the attack; and M. de Cilly, who was to relieve him the next day, was to take care of the left.

On the 11th, at day-break, the signal was given by a discharge of ten pieces of cannon, and twenty mortars; all the troops marched out in an instant, and
went

went up to the assault: every thing was carried with little resistance, except at the bastion of the East, where the rebels kept their ground, till M. de Cilly caused them to be attacked by the neck of it. All the troops that were in the three bastions, were put to the sword: the intrenchments, which passed from the bastion of Porteneuve, to the curtain that was between the southern and eastern bastion, were carried with the same rapidity; after which the troops extended themselves into the churches, houses, and neighbouring squares, that they might be able to advance with some kind of order into the town. 1714.

THE chiefs of the rebels, upon the report of the assault, having assembled all the garrison, came to attack our left; but found it so well posted, that they contented themselves with leaving some troops there to maintain themselves near the palace, and went with their main body to the side of the bastion of S. Peter. Our people had seized upon it, but had neglected to occupy the convent of nuns of S. Peter, which commanded all the
3 rampart

1714. rampart on that side ; so that the enemy having taken possession of it, made so brisk a firing upon our troops who were on the rampart, and at the neck of the bastion, that they were forced to abandon it. The rebels advanced there, and turned the cannon ; we marched up to them again, and drove them away several times ; but the convent prevented our people from maintaining themselves in this post, so that they were obliged as often to quit it. Though I had forbidden any thing to be attempted on that side, yet for a long time it was impossible for me to restrain the indiscreet ardour of some general officers. At length I went there in person, and confined myself to the keeping of the bastion of Porteneuve by my right, till I could make a fresh attack upon the rest of the city.

THE firing, during all this time, was continual and terrible, till three o'clock in the afternoon, when the enemy demanded a parley. They sent me three deputies with offers of capitulation. I answered that it was now too late ; that we were al-

ready masters of the city, and had it in ^{1704.}
our power to put every thing to the sword; and I should not therefore listen to any proposals on their part, except of submitting at discretion to his Catholic Majesty, and of imploring his mercy. They at first attempted to talk in a high tone; but finding that this did not succeed, they wanted to engage me to treat with them, by proposing to me the restitution of the island of Majorca, upon condition that both places should preserve their privileges. I listened no more to this proposal than to the rest; and having at length sent them back to the town to signify my intentions, they returned next morning, and submitted to every thing I thought proper to order. I then promised them that their lives should be safe, and even that there should be no plunder; which I did in order to preserve, to the King of Spain, a rich and flourishing city, from which he might hereafter, by this means, derive considerable succours.

I WOULD not suffer our troops to take possession of the rest of the city that day,

1714

left night coming on before I could have settled every thing, confusion and plunder should have ensued: I therefore thought proper to conceal from every one all I had been concluding with the deputies, and pretended to dispose all things for the general attack next day. I sent word to the rebels to keep a good guard on their barricades and intrenchments: in the evening however I took possession of Monjuich. On the morning of the 13th, the rebels retired from all their posts; and our troops having beat the general, marched through the streets in such order to the quarters that were assigned them, that not a single soldier got out of the ranks. The inhabitants were in their houses, their shops, and the streets, looking at our troops passing by, as in time of peace; a circumstance perhaps incredible, that such profound tranquillity should in an instant have succeeded to so much confusion; and what is still more wonderful, that a town taken by assault should not be plundered: this can only be ascribed to God; for

for all the power of man could not have contained the soldiers. 1714.

THIS action would not have cost two hundred men, had it not been for the improper manœuvres on the side of the Bastion of S. Peter. We had near two thousand men killed and wounded; the loss of the rebels that day did not amount to more than six hundred men.

MESSIEURS Dillon and de Cilly did all that could be expected from officers of courage and ability; and I must do this justice to all the troops in general, that they behaved themselves with great bravery.

DURING this siege we had ten thousand men killed or wounded; the inhabitants about six thousand.

As soon as Barcelona was taken, I sent Count Montemart to Cardona, with some battalions, to take possession of that place, by virtue of the order I caused the deputation to give for this purpose: the governor opened his gates, upon condition that those who chose to stay in the country should have their pardon, and those who wished to retire with their effects,

1714.

should be permitted to do so. The Marquis Delpoal, and several others, had thrown themselves into the town on purpose to take the benefit of the capitulation. The court of Madrid was not satisfied with the terms I granted to the people in Cardona; but I thought, considering the strength of the place in a country difficult of access, and the advanced season of the year, that it was better for his Catholic Majesty's service, to reduce all Catalonia to obedience as soon as possible.

WHEN I had disarmed all the inhabitants of Barcelona, I abolished by decree the deputation and all the antient form of government; and established a new one under the title of Administration and Junto, ordering that the police in future should be regulated according to the laws of Castile. The King of Spain would have wished me to remain some time in Catalonia, in order to put all things in proper order again; but such a commission could not suit me on any account: beside that my health was much impaired, having had several attacks of fever, both

before and during the siege of Barcelona; ^{1714.}
I was moreover so much exhausted by fatigue, that I had not the power of doing any thing. I therefore intreated the King of Spain to appoint a Commandant General of the principality, and the choice fell upon Prince Tzerclaes, who then commanded in Arragon.

I ISSUED a proclamation, requiring all the inhabitants of Catalonia, on pain of death, to give up their arms, except the gentlemen whom I allowed to keep a certain number. I gave at the same time such strict orders to the Commandants of the different quarters, that this matter was executed with as much exactness as possible, at least no person ventured to keep any arms in the house; and if they did not give them up, they took great care to conceal them in caverns.

THINKING it necessary to make an example of the principal incendiaries among the people of Barcelona, in order to intimidate those who should venture to excite fresh troubles, I sent twenty of them to be shut up for life in the castle of Alicant: I likewise embarked the

1714.

Bishop of Albarafin, with two hundred priests and monks for Genoa, forbidding them on pain of death, ever to set their foot in the dominions of his Catholic Majesty.

I ORDERED the inferior officers and Catalan soldiers of the garrison, to retire to their respective homes, having first made them take the oath of allegiance. With regard to the Castilians, Arragonefe and Valencians, who happened to be among them, I wrote to his Catholic Majesty to intreat him either to send them home, or convey them to Ceuta, to serve against the Moors.

AFTER having settled the winter quarters, and sent away twenty French battalions into their own country, I resigned the command of the army and of the country to the Chevalier d'Asfeld, till the arrival of Tzerclaes : I afterwards went to Madrid, passing by the Kingdom of Valencia, being desirous of looking into the estates I had there.

I ARRIVED at Madrid on the 28th of October, and set out again on the 4th of November to return into France. The King of Spain sent Orry to me upon the road

road at sixteen leagues from Madrid, to ^{1714.} confer with me upon the expedition to Majorca, which that Prince was determined to undertake. The King *, to whom he had written about it, referred the matter entirely to my decision, as much with regard to the project itself, as to the time of executing it, and the number of troops required. Orry pressed me to go there myself; but not being able on account of my health, I named in my stead the Chevalier d'Asfeld, whose abilities I was thoroughly acquainted with. Thus I settled every thing with Orry, and then continued my journey. D'Asfeld conducted the affair admirably well; and as soon as he landed in the island of Majorca, Palma and all the country submitted.

AFTER my return from Spain, I resumed the conduct of *****'s † affairs, which I had taken a part in since the year 1708, and from which the siege of Barcelona had withdrawn me for six months; but in order to understand them better, it is necessary to take matters up

* Of France.

† The Pretender.

1714. further back, not having been willing hitherto to interrupt the series of what related to military operations.

AT the end of the year 1710, the Abbé Gautier*, who was employed by the court of France to treat in private of peace with England, came to me at Saint Germain's from the Earl of Oxford, who had been lately made Lord High Treasurer. He was sent by the Marquis de Torcy, who signified to me that I might confide in him. Accordingly, he told me that he had orders to speak to me about ***'s † affairs, and to concert with me the means of restoring him; but before he entered upon the point, he had orders to exact a promise, 1^o. that no person at St. Germain's, not even the Queen, should be privy to the matter; 2^o. that Queen Ann should enjoy the crown in tranquillity during her life, provided that she confirmed the possession of it to her brother after her death; 3^o. that sufficient securities should be given for the preservation of the Church of England, and of the liberties of the

* Mentioned before, p. 114. † The Pretender.
kingdom.

kingdom. To all this, it may easily be ^{1714.} imagined, that I readily consented, and I had the same confirmed to him by * * * * †, to whom I introduced him for that purpose. These preliminaries being settled, we consulted upon the means of executing the business : but the Abbé could not, at this time, enter into any great detail, inasmuch as the Lord Treasurer had not yet fully explained his intentions to him; and it was necessary that the peace should previously be concluded, without which, the present ministry could not venture to open a matter which required so much nicety to manage. Though it appeared to me, that one of these points was no hindrance to the other, yet, in order to shew that we would omit nothing, and to give proofs of our sincerity, we wrote to all the Jacobites to join in with the court. This contributed greatly to make the Queen's party so superior in the House of Commons, that every thing was carried there according to her wishes.

† The Pretender.

1741.

GAUTIER told me, before he returned to London, the Earl of Oxford had ordered him to assure me, that in the course of the summer the plan should be sent over; and that if I were not at court, it should be forwarded to me at the army, for that no one was to be trusted but myself. In order that an answer might be sent to the plan without delay, we agreed that * * * * * †, under pretence of making the tour of France, should repair in the beginning of August to Dauphiny, where I was to command the army, and should stay with me as long as possible. Accordingly that Prince came there; but I did not receive the papers in question, and I heard no further mention of the matter till the winter; Gautier only wrote to me that he would soon come over with sufficient instructions.

WHEN Gautier returned into France, I expected him to be more explicit; but he only told me that we must still have patience, till the peace could be entirely concluded; that the least hint of Queen

† The Pretender.

Ann's

Ann's intentions in favour of her Brother, would give the Whigs occasion to exclaim loudly against the Court, and might not only destroy the necessary business of the peace, but perhaps even occasion a subversion in the Ministry and the state: Moreover, that it was necessary to make sure of the army, which could not be done till after the peace was signed, when they would proceed to a reduction of it, and care would then be taken to keep only such officers as could be depended upon.

1714.

So far the reasoning appeared very prudent; but when the peace was concluded and published, and the reduction made, the Lord Treasurer did not speak more clearly nor with greater precision, and deferred from day to day the regulation of the army, notwithstanding the solicitations of the Duke of Ormond, with whom I corresponded, unknown to Oxford.

THE Jacobites and other well-affected persons, were also continually pressing Oxford to take advantage of the moment; they represented to him, that

1714. there never was a House of Commons more favourably disposed; so that there was nothing more to do than to propose to them the repeal of the acts in favour of the House of Hanover, which would infallibly be carried. His answer was, that it was necessary to proceed more gently in the business; that he was seriously at work in the matter, and that we might make ourselves easy.

IN this manner did Oxford amuse us, and it was difficult to prevent it; for to break with him, would have been the destruction of every thing, because he had the power in his hands, and entirely governed Queen Ann. We were, therefore, forced to pretend to trust to him; but, at the same time, we neglected not to concert measures privately with the Duke of Ormond, and many other persons, in order that we might bring about this matter by their means, if Oxford should fail us.

GAUTIER returning into France in 1713, after the peace with England, I pressed him very strongly upon the slowness, irresolution and coldness of the Lord Treasurer.

Treasurer. At last, determined to give ^{1714.} him no opportunity of evading, after several proposals I opened to him, I commissioned him to make one, which appeared to me easy and secure, and even the only that could be made, though at first view it appeared rather chimerical. I recommended that * * * * * † should go privately, and by himself, to the Queen his Sister, who should then go to the Parliament; that she should there explain her Brother's incontestible right, and the resolution she had taken to restore what belonged to him by all laws divine and human; but she should assure them, at the same time, that she had taken proper measures with him to prevent the Church of England from being exposed to any kind of danger from such a step; that it was settled between them, she should peaceably enjoy the crown during her life, and that she should educate him as her son; that she would pass such acts as were thought necessary for the security of their religion and their liberty: she was then to introduce him

† The Pretender.

in

1714.

in full Parliament, and tell them, "Gentlemen, here he is, ready to promise you himself, religiously to keep all I have engaged for him, and to swear to the observance of it; I therefore require of you, instantly to repeal all the acts passed against him, and acknowledge him immediately as my heir, and your future sovereign, that he may owe you some goodwill for having concurred with me, in what your conscience, your duty, and your honour, should already have prompted you to do." An unexpected step of this sort, would so much have astonished the factious, and delighted the well-affected, that there would not certainly have been the least opposition. There is no reason to doubt, but that every thing would immediately have been executed agreeable to the Queen's orders; for no person would have doubted but that the Queen had taken her measures to insure obedience; so that, on one hand, the fear of punishment, and on the other, the hope of taking advantage of a new change, would have determined

determined the Parliament immediately ^{1714.} to restore all things to their natural order, according to the fundamental laws of the kingdom. Gautier, being made thorough master of this proposal, set out from my house, in Picardy, for England; but although he wrote regularly to me, I could never get any answer from him upon this head.

AT length, finding the time slip away without obtaining any plan from Oxford, and being moreover informed that Queen Ann's health was daily on the decline, I suspected more than ever that the Lord Treasurer was deceiving us, especially as I knew he had written to the Elector of Hanover, and had just sent his Cousin Harley to that Court. I therefore opened myself upon this point to M. de Torcy, Minister of foreign affairs, and through whom all my correspondence with Gautier and Oxford was carried on. He agreed with me, that the Lord Treasurer's conduct was very extraordinary; and we resolved to write to him, to represent that, as Queen Ann's death might happen very shortly, it was
necessary

1714. necessary he should inform us what measures he had taken in that case to secure the interest of ***** †, as well as the steps that Prince ought to take. His answer was, that if the Queen were to die, the affairs of ***** †, and their own, were ruined without resource. This was all we ever could get out of him, which was a clear proof that he imposed upon us; for if he had really had the intentions he declared to us, he would not have been so long without thinking of the means of carrying them into execution; nor would he have neglected, for his own sake, and that of the Tory party, to secure himself against the rage of the Whigs, who, he knew, would never forgive him, if once they got the power in their hands. This lethargy could not proceed from his want of understanding or courage, for no man had more of them than he: it was therefore morally certain, that his only motive in all the advances he had hitherto made to us, had been his own interest in endeavouring to join the Jacobites

† The Pretender.

† The Pretender.

with

with the Tories, and by that means securing to himself a majority in Parliament, that the peace might be approved of. As soon as he had compassed this end, he thought of nothing but to be upon good terms with the House of Hanover; and as to *****†, he amused him from time to time with some new proposal of changing his religion, or at least pretending to do so. The Court of France, as well as we, were then persuaded that Oxford was imposing upon us; but as they had concluded their principal business by his means, they were easily comforted.

As for me, I strongly solicited the Duke of Ormond and many other persons; I advised them to awake from their lethargy, and take their precautions against the misfortunes that would befall them, if the Queen should die: I represented to them that their private interest was the same as that of *****†; that there was no longer any time for them to hesitate; and that they must chuse the alternative, either

† The Pretender.

† The Pretender.

of

1714. of being ruined, they and their party, or of restoring that Prince. Convinced by what we were continually representing to them, they exerted themselves, and by means of Lady Masham, prevailed upon the Queen to remove the Lord High Treasurer, as it was not possible to conduct the affair properly while he remained in office. She therefore dismissed Oxford in the beginning of August 1714. The other Ministers did not doubt of being able to carry on their projects without opposition; but unfortunately, before the new Ministry could have time to concert their measures together, every hope of success was precluded by the death of the Queen, which happened on the 12th of August, 1714, four days after the Earl of Oxford's dismissal. The Elector of Hanover was instantly proclaimed King, agreeable to the act passed since the revolution, and by his orders every thing was changed.

I WAS then in Catalonia, at too great a distance to be able to act, or even to give advice; and had I been at Paris, I should have been much embarrassed, considering

considering the situation of affairs at that time. It was not our fault, that we had not concerted any arrangements, in case of the event which had just happened; and France, however well inclined she might be, was not in a condition to risk a new war to support the interests of the young ***** †. No measures had been taken, nor indeed could they have been, on our side of the water; it was the business of the well-affected party in England to prescribe to us what we ought to do, and they having not yet the entire ascendant, had not had opportunity to settle their plans.

As soon as ***** † learned the death of his sister, he set off post from Bar in Lorraine, where he resided since the Peace of Utrecht, and went incognito to Paris, to consult the Queen his Mother and his other friends, fully resolved to go over afterwards into the island of Great Britain, to lay claim to his right. The Court of France, informed of this step, sent M. de Torcy

† The Pretender.

† The Pretender.

1714. to persuade him to return from whence he came; and if fair reasons did not prevail, he had orders to declare, that they should be indispensibly obliged to compel him. * * * * * † therefore, receiving no comfortable intelligence from his friends in England, where universal consternation prevailed, and not knowing where he could land in safety, determined to go back to Bar.

KING George set out from Hanover in the month of September or October, and on his arrival in London, was received with every possible demonstration of joy. It would have been an easy matter for him, in the beginning, to conciliate the minds of the people, at least to prevent their animosity from being prejudicial to him. For this purpose, he had nothing to do but to avoid declaring for any party, to look upon all the English as being equally his subjects, and only to distinguish those who were of superior birth, or were most attached to his person; but, prepossessed in favour of the Whigs, he

† The Pretender.

began first by removing the Tories from ^{1714.} all offices, and dissolved the Parliament, which had just acknowledged him so unanimously. From hence the Tories took occasion to exclaim upon the danger that menaced the Church of England; the clergy were continually speaking of it in the pulpit, and the people, excited by these discourses, and by the intrigues of the Jacobites, began to assemble on all sides, raising a variety of tumults, and refusing to obey the orders of Government. Defamatory libels were also publicly dispersed against King George, his son, and all his family. At my return from Spain, I was of opinion, that the occasion seemed favourable to the interests of ***** †, and for this purpose we sent emissaries to the Duke of Ormond, and other Tory noblemen. Money was distributed among all the disbanded officers, and we neglected nothing on our parts, that might cast an odium upon King George, or conciliate the affections of the nation to us. Ormond, Marr, &c. assured us, that the

† The Pretender.

1714.

people had never been so well disposed; that there were nine out of ten against George, and consequently for * * * * †; so that if an enterprize were but fixed upon, there was reason to be assured of its success. Upon this, I proposed that a day should be agreed upon for making a general insurrection throughout the whole kingdom, and that a place should be pointed out to which * * * * † should repair. We were sure of the Scotch, who had already provided themselves with arms, and waited only for the signal to rise. My design was to take advantage of the present conjuncture, when there were but few regular troops in the whole island, and I had no doubt but that George, when he should see the flame kindled in the four corners of his kingdom, would find himself so dreadfully embarrassed, that he would not know what to do. I was moreover persuaded, that our design could not succeed but by a sudden revolution; that is to say, that in three weeks time, George must

† The Pretender.

‡ The Pretender.

be

be driven away, or the affair would fail; ^{1714.}
 because France, not being willing to give
 any succours of troops, and the whole
 being to be concluded by the English
 alone, George would soon be in a con-
 dition to crush all * * * *s † party, if he
 were allowed time enough to bring
 over troops from Holland or Germany;
 beside, George being master of all the
 towns, would have a considerable ad-
 vantage over the Royalists, if the affair
 were in the least protracted. In vain
 did I press Ormond and the rest; they
 always answered me, that notwithstand-
 ing all their good-will, and the favour-
 able disposition of the people, they nei-
 ther could nor would take up arms,
 till * * * *s ‡ had landed with a body
 of three or four thousand men. In vain
 did I represent to them, by letters, and
 by persons sent on purpose, that not-
 withstanding all the reasons we had been
 able to alledge to the Court of France,
 they still persisted in their resolution
 of not giving any assistance publicly, and
 therefore no troops were to be expected.

† The Pretender.

‡ The Pretender.

1714. To these representations I always received the same answers.

1715. In the beginning of the year 1715, Lord Bolingbroke, against whom the House of Commons had just brought an impeachment for high treason, at the same time as against the Duke of Ormond and the Earl of Oxford, thought proper not to expose himself to the animosity of the party, and made his escape into France. On his arrival at Paris, I saw him in private, and he confirmed to me the good disposition of affairs in England; but judging it not right that he should interfere publicly in the affairs of the young **** †, he retired to Lyons, from whence, in a few months, our friends sent him word, that he must return to Paris, which he did, and we then transacted every thing in concert. ***** †, whom he had seen at Bar, had given him the seals of Secretary of State.

IN the mean while the disturbances continued in every part of England; and the people not only exclaimed pub-

† The Pretender,

‡ The Pretender,

licly

licly against the government, but in many ^{1715.} places went so far as to speak in favour of the Pretender, which was the reason that numbers of persons, both at St. Germain and in England, were continually pressing us to undertake some enterprize, and blamed the indolence of * * * * †: upon this I wrote a memorial, which I sent by Lord Bolingbroke to Bar; it will be proper to insert it here, as it will clearly shew the state of affairs.

“ MANY people blame the * * * * †
 “ of * * * * for not risking his per-
 “ son in the present situation of af-
 “ fairs, and conclude, that if this op-
 “ portunity be lost, so favourable a one
 “ will never offer again, especially as
 “ George will not fail of providing
 “ himself with a good army; by which
 “ means the Tories will be crushed, or
 “ forced to submit.

“ I agree, that at first sight this rea-
 “ soning seems just; but as it does not
 “ belong to sensible men to give their
 “ opinions, or to decide, without hav-
 “ ing first thoroughly examined matters,

† The Pretender.

† The Pretender.

1715.

“ I will explain them in a few words,
 “ and then frankly give my opinion.

“ THE * * * * † has no friend or
 “ ally, from whom he can expect any
 “ assistance; this is not for want of
 “ having taken the necessary steps for
 “ that purpose; but because, in general,
 “ Princes do not interest themselves in
 “ favour of each other, unless their own
 “ private advantage be concerned. Dur-
 “ ing these last twenty-six years, Eu-
 “ rope has been engaged in a bloody
 “ and burdensome war, which has drain-
 “ ed the finances, ruined the trade, and
 “ even diminished the population of
 “ every country; so that all being tired
 “ of war, think only of living in peace;
 “ which nothing but absolute neces-
 “ sity can induce any Prince to break.
 “ * * * * †, therefore, has only the
 “ assistance of his own subjects to de-
 “ pend upon for the great work of his
 “ restoration. Let us see what he has
 “ to expect from them.

“ I will begin with Scotland, which,
 “ ever since the Revolution, has always

† The Pretender.

† The Pretender.

“ shewn

“ shewn itself attached to the * * * * Fa- 1715.
 “ mily, and of whose principal nobility,
 “ many have actually taken measures
 “ for an insurrection, as soon as they shall
 “ receive orders. They engage to bring
 “ into the field eight thousand High-
 “ landers, and ten thousand foot soldiers
 “ from the other counties; but for these
 “ last they are in want of arms: they
 “ are also in want of money for the sub-
 “ sistence of these troops, without which
 “ they could not keep them in order:
 “ the country would soon be plundered,
 “ and the army would of course disperse.
 “ They cannot raise at most above a
 “ thousand horse or dragoons, and those
 “ very indifferent. They are in some
 “ hopes of being able to seize upon the
 “ castles of Edinburgh, Sterling, and
 “ Dunbarton, but the success of this
 “ kind of projects is always very un-
 “ certain.

“ THE majority of the English nation
 “ is so well affected, that we may ven-
 “ ture to say, five out of six are for
 “ * * * * *. †. It is true this is not so

† The Pretender.

“ much

1715. " much on account of his incontestable
 " right, as from hatred to the house of
 " Hanover, and to prevent the total ruin
 " of the church, and the liberties of the
 " kingdom; but whatever may be the
 " motives, it is certain that numbers
 " of noblemen, clergy and gentlemen,
 " have given assurances of their good
 " intentions. Many persons of the
 " greatest consideration, interest and abi-
 " lities, have assembled, to concert the
 " means of restoring the ***** †;
 " but hitherto they have concluded,
 " that without the assistance of four
 " thousand men at least, of a quantity of
 " arms, and of a considerable sum of
 " money, it would be rash and even im-
 " possible to commence an insurrection
 " in his favour. They alledge, that not
 " being able to collect any thing but a
 " mob without arms, and without dis-
 " cipline, the regular troops, though
 " few in number, will still be sufficient
 " to disperse them, as soon as they shall
 " have thrown off the mask. Add to
 " this, that there are no arms in any part

† The Pretender.

" of

“ of England, except in the public maga- ^{1715.}
 “ zines, of which George is in posses-
 “ sion.

“ THE Duke of Ormond, Lord Bo-
 “ lingbroke, and several others, have
 “ exerted themselves with the court of
 “ France, to engage them to furnish the
 “ succours required : no argument has
 “ been omitted to persuade them, but
 “ they have not been able to succeed ;
 “ so that the * * * * * † can only reckon
 “ upon what he has been able to borrow
 “ on his own credit : the whole of which
 “ consists in ten thousand stands of arms,
 “ and one hundred thousand crowns.
 “ I ask therefore, whether any man of
 “ sense can advise the * * * * * † to risk
 “ his person, as well as the lives and for-
 “ tunes of his friends, with such trifling
 “ preparations, against a Prince who is
 “ in possession, who has on his side the
 “ present laws, though unjust, who has
 “ actually an army composed of Whigs,
 “ and who has powerful neighbours for his
 “ allies, from whom he may obtain what
 “ number of troops he pleases, besides

† The Pretender.

† The Pretender.

“ those

1715. " those he can bring over from his own
" dominions.

" THE * * * * † has not arms enough
" to supply Scotland, and the several
" parts of England that require them.
" He has no places of sufficient strength
" to assemble his friends in safety; and
" if he had time to form an army, he has
" not wherewithal either to furnish them
" with arms, or to pay them.

" I CONCLUDE that the * * * * ‡
" ought to run some risks, but not to
" precipitate himself into certain ruin.
" If he had an army of Highlanders,
" Scotch and English mob, he must ne-
" cessarily come to an engagement at last
" with an army of regulars, and I think
" he would then run a sufficient risk:
" but I do not see that he can even ex-
" pect this chance; for at present there
" is no agreement upon this in England,
" nor is there any inclination to act with-
" out foreign succours. Is it reasonable,
" notwithstanding this, that the * * * *
" § should set forward, or can we give

† The Pretender.

‡ The Pretender.

§ The Pretender.

" the

“ the name of greatness of soul, or he-
 “ roism, to a step that can only produce ^{1715.}
 “ a fruitless tumult? The same persons
 “ who now accuse him of timidity,
 “ would call him rash and unadvised,
 “ were he to miscarry. In a word, I
 “ can never be of opinion that he should
 “ embark, till the most considerable
 “ persons in England have promised him
 “ to be at a fixed time, and at a fixed
 “ place, with a number of their friends
 “ to receive him; for I shall always
 “ consider it as a folly, to think that he
 “ will be able to succeed in his under-
 “ taking with the Scotch alone.”

In the month of July, Father Calag-
 han, a Dominican, in other respects a
 man of good sense, went to * * * * * †
 from the Duke of Ormond, to desire him
 to set out immediately for England.
 That Prince, without consulting Lord
 Bolingbroke, or the court of France, or
 me, resolved immediately to depart, and
 fixed the 30th of the same month for
 his arrival at Havre de Grace, where he
 immediately sent to prepare a vessel,

† The Pretender.

having

1715. having sent word at the same time to Bolingbroke, to be at the rendezvous on the day appointed. Bolingbroke went immediately to give advice of this to M. de Torcy, who instantly, by order of the King, wrote to me express to repair with all expedition to Marly. When I came there, his Majesty told me that ***** † had hastily taken a resolution which appeared to him hazardous, and to which he would not give his consent, without being previously acquainted with my opinion. I then represented to him that I could not imagine the Duke of Ormond had sent such a message, for he did not name the place where ***** ‡ was to land, which was a very essential point; so that I thought it necessary to defer his departure, till we had received other information from the Duke of Ormond upon this point. M. de Torcy and Bolingbroke received orders to write in consequence to ***** §.

ABOUT a week after, a man of family came from England, sent by Ormond,

† The Pretender.

‡ The Pretender.

§ The Pretender.

Marr,

Marr, and several others, with a memorial in answer to those we had sent them before : it contained nearly the same things they had already written to us ; that without a supply of men, arms and money, they did not think it possible to induce the nation to take up arms ; that, however, if ***** † ordered them positively, they would do it, but that it could not be before the middle of September, the time when it was reckoned the Parliament would be prorogued, and the members gone into their respective countries.

A LITTLE time after this, towards the beginning of August, we were much surprized to hear that the Duke of Ormond had landed in France. That nobleman, having been accused of high treason, had retired to Richmond, where he lived in great magnificence, and kept open table. Numbers of people resorted there in crowds, for he was the idol of the Tory party, and seemed to have set up the standard against King George. He had assured us in his letters, that he had re-

† The Pretender.

1715.

solved to stay as long as he could with safety ; that he should afterwards retire towards the North or the West of England, and would put himself at the head of his friends, and a number of reduced officers, whom he had distributed for this purpose in different counties: he had even already settled relays of horses, in order to proceed with more expedition, when the time was come. He had moreover set on foot some correspondences in Plymouth, Bristol and Exeter, which he meant to seize, and make them his places of arms. It is certain, he was so well beloved at that time, that if he had openly declared against King George, for the Church and the liberties of the nation, people would have flocked to him from all parts, and he would have been at the head of so considerable a party, that George would have been much embarrassed, more especially as the Scotch would have risen at the same time, and perhaps part of the regulars would also have joined Ormond: but the execution of such a project, required a man of superior genius; such great designs can

only be conducted by a hero, and that ^{1715.} is what Ormond was not; for though personally very brave, and for some time past well affected, he had few of the talents necessary for such an enterprize, and very little knowledge of the art of war. The great expence he lived at, his liberality, his natural affability and his rank, had secured him the affections and esteem of the people. The Tories, who in the present conjuncture, saw that it was necessary for them to have an apparent head, had all united in following, and praising him; but all the great expectations that had been founded upon him were in an instant dissipated by his precipitate retreat. Having been informed that King George had sent some guards to surround his house, and seize upon his person, he made his escape towards the coast, and crossed the sea in a sloop, without leaving any kind of instructions for those who were waiting for him elsewhere.

BOLINGBROKE and I concerted all our affairs with him, and made fresh and strong solicitations to the court of France, to

1715.

obtain a supply of troops: but besides that his Most Christian Majesty, notwithstanding his good will, adhered strictly to his first principle, the retreat of Ormond confirmed him the more in it; for it was not reasonable to suppose, that a man so much beloved, and on whose credit our best hopes were founded, would have retired, and abandoned the cause, if the nation had really been in such dispositions as we had often represented to him. We therefore wrote back to England, to press them again not to insist upon a body of troops, but to resolve to take up arms, and to signify to us the time and the place to which they wished that the * * * * *† and Ormond should repair: their answer was always ambiguous.

THE repugnance I had experienced, not without reason, in the Tories, joined to the certainty I was in, that France would not alter its resolution, had determined me to apply some months before to the King of Sweden, whose interests seemed entirely opposite to those of

† The Pretender.

King George. That extraordinary Prince, ^{1715.} after having attracted the respect and attention of all Europe, by the most brilliant setting out, was fallen, by the loss of the battle of Pultawa, into a series of misfortunes, of which his enemies and his neighbours took such advantage, that he was then almost entirely stripped of all his dominions in Germany. Every one would have a share in the spoils; and without any regard to treaties, or even to guarantees, he was attacked on all sides. Far from being depressed by so much adversity, he seemed on the contrary to become more haughty, and more obstinate in rejecting every proposal of peace, in which the cession of any province or city was concerned; being resolved rather to perish, than submit ignominiously to the law of the conqueror.

THE character of this Prince, whose views were always great, and the private interest he would have in dethroning King George, led me to hope that he would assist us in the execution of our projects, more especially as there was no other

1715.

apparent method of relieving him from the critical situation in which he was in. I represented to him the just pretensions of * * * * * †, the glory there would be in restoring an oppressed Prince, and the advantageous consequences which he must necessarily acquire from it, not to mention the eternal gratitude of the * * * * * ‡ for so great a benefit. The affair appeared to me so much the more easy, as there was not even a suspicion that it had entered into our thoughts, and as there were at the time seven or eight thousand Swedes encamped about Gottenburg : add to this, that there were several transports in that harbour, designed to convey those troops to Stralsund, and that from Gottenburg, one might sail, with the same wind, straight into Scotland or England, the passage not being more than eight and forty hours.

WHEN I proposed this idea to the court of France, it was considered as chimerical ; but after we had spoken of it to the Baron de Spaar, the Ambassador from

† The Pretender.

‡ The Pretender.

Sweden,

Sweden, and it was seen that he seemed ^{1715.} inclined to approve of it, I was permitted to negotiate. M. de Torcy and I held several conferences with Spaar upon this subject; and to facilitate the enterprize, it was agreed that his Most Christian Majesty should pay the arrears of subsidies due to the King of Sweden, and that ***** † should give immediately fifty thousand crowns for the costs of embarkation. Spaar sent off a courier with the dispatches for his master, and sent at the same time an officer into Holland, with the remittance of the fifty thousand crowns I had given him, that if the answers from Sweden were favourable, that sum might be forwarded without loss of time to Gottenburg. Unfortunately the King of Sweden was then in Stralsund, besieged both by sea and land, so that it was a very long time before the courier could deliver his letters. The King's answer was couched in very polite terms; but he said, that in the present situation of his affairs, he could not part with any of his troops, as he

† The Pretender.

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was so much in want of them for the defence of his own dominions; besides, that King George had not yet declared against him. However, he assured * * * * * † of his friendship, of which he would hereafter give him proofs.

It is certain that the King of Sweden missed a glorious opportunity of advancing his own affairs, or rather, of relieving himself from oppression; for * * * * * ‡ being once restored, he would have drawn supplies of money, men, and ships from him, sufficient to enable him to reconquer all he had lost. According to the rules of good sense, the revolution in England could not then have failed, if the well affected had been supported by a body of regular forces. King George was universally hated, and had but very few troops on foot in Great-Britain; but the King of Sweden, who was then taken up with the thoughts of saving Stralsund, in which he flattered himself unseasonably, had no person near him, to shew him the utility of our project, and the fallacy of his own designs.

† The Pretender.

‡ The Pretender.

He

HE afterwards intended, in 1716, to undertake a descent in England; but the face of affairs was then totally changed; and if he had made it, there is reason to think, considering the large army King George had in England, and the succours which the Dutch would not have failed to send him, that it would have miscarried. ^{1715.}

ABOUT the 20th of August, Lewis the XIVth King of France, fell sick, and died on the 1st of September 1715. No man ever shewed greater steadiness, and less fear of death; ever submissive, and resigned to the will of God. He gave all the orders he thought necessary, and then waited quietly for the hour of his dissolution. He had been a long time engaged in these serious reflections; and he had often said to the Queen of England, he was aware, on account of his age, that he soon must die, and therefore he was every day preparing for death, that he might not be surprized by it. A very different opinion was entertained of him in the world, for it was imagined that he could not bear to be spoken to about death. But I have been told what I have

1715. just mentioned by the Queen herself, a Princess of great veracity.

IT must be owned that no Prince was ever so little known as this Monarch. The Protestants made him pass throughout Europe for a man of difficult access, cruel and false. I have frequently had the honour of audiences from him, and have been very familiarly admitted to his presence; and I can affirm that his pride was only in his appearance. He was born with an air of majesty, which struck every body so much, that one could not approach him without being seized with awe and respect; but as soon as any one was going to speak to him, he softened his countenance, and had the art of putting you in the instant quite at your ease with him: he was the most polite man in his Kingdom; and his answers were accompanied with so many obliging expressions, that if he granted any thing, the value of it was doubly enhanced; and if he refused, one could not complain. There never was a more humane King since the commencement of the Monarchy. There was no blood spilt among the
great

great during the course of his reign, except ^{1715.} that of the Chevalier de Rohan; and he lost his life only because no one had the friendship or courage to solicit his pardon; for the King, in going to, and returning from mass on the morning of the execution, turned himself round on every side, to see if there were not some of his relations or friends ready to throw themselves at his feet.

WITH respect to his good faith, I know that every thing he has done in violation of treaties will be urged against it; but I dare affirm, that he never violated any treaty, till after he had been persuaded that his enemies had first infringed it; and without approving of these infractions, what Prince, or what nation, can boast of having always preferred truth and justice to their interests? The dispute will be reduced to the greater or less degree of injustice; for it may be confidently asserted, that religion, equity and kindred seem no longer to be the motives that actuate us; and that we think every thing allowable to satisfy our ambition, and procure us any advantage.

THE

1715.

THE day after the King's death, the Duke of Orleans went to the Parliament, with all the Princes of the blood, and the Peers of France. Two thousand men of the regiment of guards, had been placed about the avenues of the palace, to prevent any commotions: beside, almost all the officers that were in Paris attended the Duke of Orleans, who had been persuaded that he should meet with opposition in being appointed to the Regency: his intention was to declare himself Regent, if the Parliament should make any difficulty, for he pretended that his birth gave him an incontestable right to this title. As soon as he had taken his seat in the grand chamber, he began by desiring the Peers to suspend, for the present, the intentions they had against the Presidents *à mortier* respecting the cap, promising that he would put an end to that contest in a fortnight; he also required in private of the Princes of the blood, not to attack, at that time, the legitimate Princes, to whom the King had not only granted the rank, but also the quality of Princes of the blood, and the power of succeeding

succeeding to the crown, in default of ^{1715.}
the real Princes of the blood. It was
with reason the Duke of Orleans wished,
that nothing should interrupt the affair
of the Regency, upon which depended
the quiet and tranquility of the State,
as well as his own private interest. The
Peers consented to the request of the
Duke of Orleans, and contented them-
selves with making the Archbishop of
Rheims read aloud their protest against
every thing that had been done, or
might be done against their rights.

THE Duke of Orleans afterwards made
a long harangue, in which he represented
that the reigning King being a minor,
the Regency belonged to him by right;
and he therefore desired that the King's
people should speak, and that the opi-
nions should afterwards be taken. He
also entered into a detail of the form
he meant to give the government, and
concluded with assuring, that to shew
his intentions for the public good, and
his esteem for the Parliament, he would
restore to them the liberty of making
remonstrances,

^{1715.} remonstrances, which the late King had long since taken from them.

HIS speech being ended, it was resolved, before they proceeded upon any declaration, that the will, which the late King had deposited with the Parliament the year before, should be opened. The first President and the King's people went to fetch it; and being opened before the assembly, it was read. The substance of it was, that there should be a Council of Regency, composed of the Duke of Orleans, the Princes of the blood who were fully arrived to the age of four-and-twenty, the Chancellor, four Secretaries of State, the Chief of the Council of Finances, the Comptroller-General of Finances, the Marshals Villeroy, Villars, Uxelles, Tallard and Harcourt. Every thing was to be determined by a majority of votes. The command of the King's Household troops was given to the Duke of Maine, without any subordination to the Regency; Marshal Villeroy was appointed Governor to the King; Mess. de Saumery and Geoffreville Sub-Governors; but the Duke of Maine, and in case of his de-

cease, the Count of Thoulouse, were to ^{1715.} have an inspection and a superior authority over every thing that concerned the person and education of the King. The codicil was afterwards read, by which they should have begun; it contained little, except that the young King was to be present in Parliament at the opening of the will, and that, in the mean time, Marshal Villeroy should order every thing relating to the young Prince, and should command the troops of the Household.

THE first President took great care to mention several times to M. de Dreux, Counsellor in Parliament, to read the will distinctly, and with an audible voice; saying, *this is our law*. It was not, however, judged to be so. As soon as the reading was over, the Duke of Orleans having only said, that there were several things in the will, to which he could not, in honour, consent, and which he would hereafter explain, desired that they should proceed to determine upon the Regency, which he claimed as his right. He was immediately declared Regent

1715. gent without opposition. The will was no longer attended to, and they proceeded to settle several other things agreeably to the wishes of the Regent. The Duke of Maine and the Count of Thoulouse, who, as well as the rest of us, had given their vote for the Regency, endeavoured to dispute the article of the command of the King's Household troops; but no one joined them; so that the Duke of Maine, perceiving that he was deprived of every thing, which the late King had settled in his favour, requested, that at least they would grant him some titular advantage for the sake of his honour. Upon this, the King's people proposed the title of Superintendant of the King's education, to which the Court consented; but with the clause, that it should not give him any authority over the officers of the King's Household, nor over the troops; it having been clearly specified, that no superior authority was acknowledged in the kingdom, except that of the Duke of Orleans, Regent.

ON

ON the twelfth of the same month, ^{1715.} the King went to the Parliament to hold his bed of justice, where every thing that had been settled on the 2d instant, was published and registered.

THE Duke of Orleans began his Regency, by establishing Councils, in which the affairs were to be transacted, instead of being left at the sole disposal of the Ministers, which is undoubtedly subject to great inconveniences; but, at the same time, it is to be feared that this multitude of Counsellors may retard expedition, especially in the war department, where, in order that things should go on well, it is necessary that one man should be charged with the execution, after the points have been previously settled in the Council: however this may be, the Regent had promised to be governed by the majority of votes in the Council, reserving only to himself the power of distributing favours, in the entire disposal of offices, employments, and ecclesiastical preferments.

THE Duke of Bourbon was declared Chief of the Council of the Regency,
the

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the Count of Thoulouse Chief of the Council of the Navy, having under him the Marshal d'Estrées, as President; Marshal Villeroy was Chief of the Council of Finances, and the Duke de Noailles President; Marshal d'Uxelles, President of the Council of Foreign Affairs; Marshal Villars, President of the Council of war; the Duke D'Antin, President of the Council of the Internal Affairs of the kingdom; and the Cardinal de Noailles President of the Council of Conscience.

THE Regent proposed to me to be of the Council of War; but as the first place was filled, I did not think it proper, on any account, to be second under my comrade, especially as the rest of the Council was composed of Lieutenant-Generals. If I had been inclined to act as other people, who, even before the King's death, had made their bargain with the Duke of Orleans, I should, perhaps, have been treated as advantageously; but, I thank God, I have not to reproach myself with ever having entered into any cabal. I have always held it as a principle to attach myself inviolably

lably to the Sovereign, and to justice; 1715. it is for this reason I constantly avoided listening to any thing respecting future objects: however, as soon as there were no hopes of the King, I declared for the Duke of Orleans, as it was consistent with right, and the interest of the State. I pressed the Regent to appoint me of the Regency, but he excused himself upon the terms he was obliged to keep with King George, and told me, that till he could give me that appointment, and shew the esteem he had for me, he would bestow on me some considerable command in the kingdom. I own that his reasons did not satisfy me, but I was obliged to have patience.

THE Earl of Stair, Minister from England, had, before and after the death of the King, given assurances to the Duke of Orleans of the friendship of his Master, and told him, that if there were any opposition in France, to his just rights, he would assist him with all his forces: the Regent had listened with pleasure to such offers, and had also given King George assurances of the desire he had

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to do any thing that was agreeable to him; all in the view of taking precautions against a cabal which he knew was formed against him. It is, indeed, certain, that most of those who had access to the late King, by constantly representing to him the danger that was apprehended from the Duke of Orleans, if he should have the power in his hands, had convinced his Majesty, that it was proper some measures should be taken to prevent it. Upon this he had made his will, dictated by the Chancellor Voisin; and it is thought that the Duke de Mayne, and other persons of the greatest influence, had never ceased to torment the King, till he had deposited this will in Parliament, with a declaration. I know, however, from the Queen of England, of what little use the King thought this would be; for that Princess having been to pay him a compliment upon the prudent action he had been doing, the King answered in the following terms, "They would absolutely make me do it; but as soon as I am dead, it will be just the same as if I had not done it."

"As

As soon as the Duke of Orleans was ^{1715.} acknowledged Regent, Stair never failed paying his court assiduously; and knowing that the flame of rebellion was ready to be kindled in the island of Great Britain, he pressed the Regent strongly to prevent the Pretender from passing through France in his way there. But as the Duke of Orleans had learned, that King George and the Whigs were continually giving it out that they would not stick to the peace of Utrecht, he was desirous of availing himself of this opportunity for discovering the truth; he therefore answered, that he was ready to enter into the strictest alliances, provided that England would, at the same time, give assurances of her adherence to the last treaty of peace; and for this purpose, that it was proper a defensive alliance should be made, to which the Dutch should be invited to accede. Stair replied, that the best way to enter upon such a negociation, was to begin by taking joint measures against the Pretender. The Regent perceiving by this, that

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Stair only wished to amuse him, made him some very vague answers, and resolved not only not to oppose the designs of ***** †, but even to assist him underhand as much as he could, without letting it appear; for as he knew the bad state of the kingdom, it was his intention to avoid every kind of war. Stair, however, having discovered that we had some ships laden with arms at Havre, and having made his complaint of it, the Regent could not avoid stopping those arms; which was a great prejudice to the affairs of ***** ‡, who could not get any elsewhere, to send where they were wanted, as much from his want of money, as from the impossibility of buying up arms in any country without the permission of the Sovereign.

THE Earl of Marr, who had been Secretary of State for Scotland, in the time of Queen Ann, and had been removed from that post by George, received, in the month of September, a

† The Pretender.

‡ The Pretender.

secret order from ***** †, to go im-^{1715.}mediately into Scotland and take up arms. Neither Bolingbroke nor I knew any thing of this, although we were his principal Ministers, through whom all the correspondences in England, and all the plans passed: this circumstance gave us no favourable opinion of the enterprise, since there could have been nothing concerted without our knowledge. Marr, however, set out by sea from London, and took with him Lieutenant-General Hamilton, who had long served with distinction in Holland and Flanders. He landed in the North of Scotland, and in a few days after, having assembled his friends and vassals, he publicly proclaimed ***** †, summoning every good subject to join him, in order to re-establish their lawful Sovereign upon the throne of his ancestors, and deliver the nation from the tyranny of George Duke of Brunswick, usurper of the monarchy. A great number of Highlanders and principal noblemen having joined him, he marched forward and seiz-

† The Pretender.

† The Pretender.

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ed upon the town of Perth, by which means he was master of all that part of Scotland which is beyond the river Tay.

SOME officers had, at the same time, attempted to surprize the castle of Edinburgh, which would have made Marr master of all Scotland, and would have obliged his enemies to quit the post of Stirling; but this project failed. As soon as King George was informed of the revolt of Marr, he sent the Duke of Argyll from London, who, without stopping at Edinburgh, advanced to Stirling with all the troops he could collect, which did not amount to more than fifteen hundred men. George, at the same time, caused some regiments to march from England into Scotland, and gave orders that several should be brought over thither from Ireland; he also sent to demand of the States General the six thousand men they were bound to give by the treaties made by the late King, in favour of the protestant succession.

MARR,

MARR, in the mean time, amused <sup>1715.</sup> himself with forming his army, and settling all his affairs, as if he were sure of having all the time he wanted. Had he marched forward as soon as he had collected eight or ten thousand men, he certainly would not have met with any opposition, and Argyll would have been obliged to quit Scotland, to retire to Berwick. He might then have been able to put his army in order, to assemble a Parliament, and to march to the frontiers, either to defend them against King George's troops, or to advance into England, and join the friends of \* \* \* \* \* †, in case they should form a party there, as there was reason to expect; but his little skill in military affairs made him lose this opportunity, and he gave time to the troops that were marching from all quarters to join the Duke of Argyll. A man may have a great deal of understanding, a great deal of personal bravery, and be a very able Minister, without having the talents requisite for an enterprize of this nature. It is certain

† The Pretender.

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that

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that Marr had them not; and we must not therefore wonder that he did not succeed. After he had drawn the sword, he did not know in what manner to proceed, and by that means missed the most favourable opportunity that had presented itself since the Revolution in 1688.

Soon after Marr had seized upon Perth, M. Forester, a respectable gentleman in the county of Northumberland, the Lords Derwentwater, Widrington, and others, took up arms there, and proclaimed \*\*\*\*\*†; but their principal force consisting in cavalry, they asked of Marr a reinforcement of infantry; upon which he detached Brigadier M'Intosh, to join them with eighteen hundred Highlanders. M'Intosh passed the Firth, near Edinburgh, in spite of some of the enemy's ships, which happened to be there; and instead of marching the nearest way to join Forester, he drew near to Edinburgh. The Duke of Argyll hastened thither from Stirling, and M'Intosh retired into an old ruined fort, called

† The Pretender.

Leith, at a mile distance from the town; 1715.  
he would not have been able to maintain his ground there for want of provisions, if the Duke of Argyll had not been obliged to return immediately to Stirling, to oppose Marr, who was marching thither. As soon as M'Intosh was relieved from the situation he had foolishly got himself into, he made what haste he could towards the frontiers of England; and was joined in his way by the Lords Kenmure, Nithsdale, &c. with five hundred horse from the south of Scotland; but he lost a great many of his Highlanders, who went back into their own country. After they had all joined Forester, instead of marching directly into Scotland, to attack Argyll on one side, while Marr attacked him on the other, which was the only wise step they could take, they advanced into the bishoprick of Durham, having some hopes that the town of Newcastle would declare for them; but General Carpenter having got there before them, and having posted himself with one battalion and some dragoons, they took the road  
towards



1715. towards Lancashire, where their army was increased by numbers of Catholics. They advanced as far as Preston, thinking that the neighbouring counties would also take up arms; but General Wills, whom King George had sent there, having got together some infantry, with several regiments of cavalry and dragoons, marched straight to them, and arrived near Preston, before they had the least intelligence of it. They put themselves in a posture of defence, and even repulsed the troops vigorously in their first attacks, so that considering the superiority of Forester, and the few troops Wills had with him, it is probable the latter would have been, if not defeated, at least obliged to retire; but all of a sudden Forester, and most of the chiefs of his party, losing their presence of mind, offered to capitulate. The enemy conducted the matter so well, that they submitted at discretion to King George, being satisfied with the assurances Wills gave them, of employing his good offices in their favour. Forester had with him about two thousand men,  
and

and Wills not more than one thousand <sup>1715.</sup>  
at most.

IN the mean while Marr, after having amused himself a long time at Perth, began his march to attempt the passage of the river Tay, above Stirling. Argyll being apprised of it, marched up to him, and they met at Auchterardire. \* \* \* \* \*'s † army might consist of nine or ten thousand men, and that of King George of three or four thousand.

ARGYLL, at first, broke the left of Marr's army, but the latter totally routed the rest of the enemy's forces, of whom he made a considerable slaughter; but he did not pursue them, and suffered Argyll, with his right wing, to retire in good order to Stirling. The next day, instead of availing himself of his advantage, he marched back to Perth: the reason he gave for this, was his want of provisions, his troops having thrown them away before the battle, and moreover the Highlanders would not fight any more. He ought, however, to have tried to induce them to it; for it

† The Pretender's.

was

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was of great consequence to him to push on, and to hazard every thing to beat Argyll, before he could be joined by the Dutch. This battle happened nearly at the same time as the unfortunate engagement of Preston.

MARR having been informed that Lord Sutherland, notwithstanding the engagements he had entered into upon his word of honour, that he would not stir any more against \*\*\*\*\* †, had risen again in the North, and had even seized upon Inverness, detached the Marquisses of Huntly and Seaforth, with their vassals, which amounted to five or six thousand men, to reduce Sutherland to obedience; but these noblemen, instead of coming immediately to action, suffered themselves to be amused by negociations, and Huntly, even upon an offer of pardon, accepted it. This put the finishing stroke to the ruin of \*\*\*\*\*'s ‡ affairs; Seaforth was not strong enough by himself to attack Sutherland, so that he con-

† The Pretender.

‡ The Pretender's.

tented himself with defending his own <sup>1715.</sup> country, without committing hostilities.

\*\*\*\*\* †, upon the news he received of Marr's insurrection, set out in the month of October from Bar, and repaired, incognito, to St. Maloes, where he was detained some days by contrary winds; during which time, having received advice that the partizans of King George had seized upon Dunstaffnage, a place in the Highlands designed for his descent, he took the road to Dunkirk, where he embarked, and landed at Peterhead, towards the end of December. Never was a voyage longer than this, for two whole months elapsed between his departure from Lorrain and his arrival in Scotland. This gave occasion to much murmuring among the Scotch, and many unfavourable reports among other people; besides, that the Earl of Stair, who was at length informed of it, complained to the Regent, and required that he should not be suffered to pass through France. The Regent answered, that as soon as they would inform him in what

† The Pretender.



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part he was, he would send there, and have him conducted back to the place from whence he came; but that he was not obliged to be either the spy or the executioner of King George. A few days after this, Stair assured the Regent that the Pretender was to arrive on such a day at Chalons, in Champagne. Upon which Contades, Major of the French Guards, was sent that way, in order to try to find him, and conduct him back to Bar: but there was no possibility of meeting with him; for, besides that he had been gone several days before, he had also taken a bye-road. At his return, Contades made up a fine account to Stair of what he had done, with which the latter seemed to be satisfied, although in the main he judged very properly, that the Regent had no very great mind to prevent the passage of the Pretender, and that Contades had not been very desirous of succeeding in his commission.

STAIR had also sent emissaries on all sides, to endeavour to find out the rout of the Pretender; but he was too well disguised, and had with him so few attendants,

attendants, that he could never receive intelligence time enough to make any use of it. 1715.

It has also been said that Stair had employed people to assassinate \* \* \* \* \*. †. I owe this justice to truth to declare, that after having thoroughly examined all the reasons alledged in proof of this accusation, I found them frivolous; and though Stair was a great Whig, and consequently a sworn enemy to the Jacobite party, yet I believe him too much a man of honour ever to have had such a thought. The Duke of Marr, whose interest was very opposite to that of Stair, always spoke of him in that light, and when he spoke well of his enemy he ought to be believed.

THE Duke of Ormond had set out from Paris, about the same time that \* \* \* \* \* ‡ went from Bar: he embarked in Normandy, with twenty officers, and twenty-five horse of Nugent's regiment, which then happened to be in those quarters. A storm obliged him to put back; and when he afterwards came again off the

† The Pretender.

‡ The Pretender.

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English coast, he returned without venturing to land there, upon receiving intelligence that King George, informed by Colonel M'Leane of the plots concerted in the West, had sent a body of troops there, and had caused many persons to be arrested. This M'Leane was the confidential man whom the Duke of Ormond had employed to conduct all his measures; it was he, who, in concert with the most respectable noblemen of the country, had laid the plan of a general insurrection, and who had also agreed with the officers of the garrison at Plymouth, upon the manner in which they were to seize on that place. George began by changing the garrison at Plymouth, sent a regiment of infantry into Bristol, and made all the proper dispositions to prevent the execution of Ormond's designs. This was not difficult, as he was thoroughly informed of them by M'Leane: moreover Lord Landsdown, and Sir William Wyndham, the principal supporters of all this business, having been discovered and arrested, there remained no chief capable of remedying this

this unfortunate event ; and all the gentlemen of the country being greatly alarmed, signified to the Duke of Ormond that they could not join him as they had engaged to do. <sup>1715.</sup>

I CANNOT avoid making another observation, upon the absurdity of Ormond's project. When he left Richmond, why did he not go immediately into the West ? His friends were then at liberty ; they were in the best disposition in the world ; there were two or three hundred reduced officers waiting for him, and George had not any troops to oppose to him. Did he imagine that by passing through France, he would acquire an additional credit ? And should he not have considered, that in cases of insurrection, men's minds must not be suffered to cool ; that every moment is precious, and that the one we have lost can never be found again ?

\*\*\* †, at the same time that he gave orders to the Duke of Ormond, to set out from Paris for England, sent me a commission, with a formal order to go into Scotland, and take the command of

† The Pretender.



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the army. As I had caused myself to be naturalised a Frenchman, with the consent of this Prince, and was consequently become a subject of his Most Christian Majesty; as I was moreover an officer of the Crown of France, engaged by several oaths, not to go out of the kingdom, without leave in writing, which far from being given me upon this occasion, the late King, and the Regent, had expressly forbidden; I did not think myself at liberty either in honour or conscience to obey the order I had received.

LORD BOLINGBROKE was to stay at Paris to attend to the interests of \* \* \* †, and endeavour to furnish him with every thing he might want. This matter was so much the more difficult, as the Regent, notwithstanding his good intentions, would not appear in it: he had entrusted it to the care of Le Blanc, and Renault. These gentlemen gave Bolingbroke hopes that they would supply him with arms; but it was in vain that he solicited them underhand, (for he could not venture to see them), he never got

+ The Pretender.

any thing but fair promises from them; and to say the truth, I believe the Regent beginning to have a bad opinion of this enterprize, was not much inclined to perform what he had given reason to expect: beside which, there were cabals among our people, which contributed not a little to the ill success of affairs. Bolingbroke was hated by the Irish, who were continually exclaiming against him. The Duke of Ormond, a weak man, suffered himself to be influenced by the jealousies they endeavoured to inspire him with, as if Bolingbroke did not pay him sufficient respect. The Queen and those in whom she placed the greatest confidence at St. Germans, were much discontented that he did not consult them continually, and that he did not acquaint them regularly with all he was doing. Even some women at Paris, who would be Ministers, and who had found means to insinuate themselves privately into the confidence of the Duke of Orleans, contributed by their importunities to prejudice that Prince against Bolingbroke: accordingly I found, in several conversa-

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tions I had with him, that he was dissatisfied with Bolingbroke; and what will appear more extraordinary, the only reason he gave for it, was, that he applied to those women to torment him from morning till night. I assured him that he did it only because he did not know how to get at his Royal Highness by any other means. Upon this he told me that he must apply to Marshal d'Uxelles, and to no other person, and that then he would listen to him readily. Bolingbroke immediately broke off every connection with these women; who being already ill disposed towards him, and irritated by this change in his conduct, became outrageous against him. The Regent told me of it himself, and ordered me at the same time to assure Bolingbroke that he approved of his conduct. In the mean while nothing was done for \*\*\* † on the part of France, and every thing ended in hopes, which never produced any effect.

THE King of Spain acted with more frankness; for upon our representing to

† The Pretender,

him,

him, the want \*\*\* † was in of a sum of 1715.  
 money, he sent us a hundred thousand  
 crowns in ingots of gold, which we sent  
 off immediately by my son, the Chevalier  
 Erskine, and M. de Bulkley; but every  
 thing seemed to conspire to ruin our pro-  
 ject: the vessel they were in was ship-  
 wrecked on the coast of Scotland, and  
 they had but just time to escape by night  
 in the boat, without being able to carry  
 off the ingots, which they had concealed  
 in the bottom of the vessel.

I HAVE already observed, that upon the  
 representations of Stair, the arms em-  
 barked at Havre had been stopped: we  
 had, besides these, three thousand fusils,  
 which were luckily in a vessel at the  
 lower part of the Seine: we wanted  
 to send them into Scotland; but the Duke  
 of Ormond, who had nothing else in his  
 head but his expedition into England,  
 kept them in spite of all we could do,  
 so that they never were of any use.

\*\*\* †, on his arrival in Scotland,  
 found his affairs in a deplorable state.  
 His army, which the Earl of Marr, in his

† The Pretender.

† The Pretender.



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letters, made to amount to sixteen thousand men, consisted at that time of no more than five or six thousand, ill armed, in bad order, and in want of every thing. This did not prevent him from going to Perth, to see what effect his presence would have there: he sent word to the Marquisses of Huntley, and Seaforth, to come and join him; but the former having already made his peace, excused himself upon the impropriety of the season, and upon his not being able for some time to re-assemble his vassals, who were gone to their respective homes. The second acknowledged the same reasons; besides that he could not leave his country exposed to the invasions of Sutherland. \*\*\* † not being able to induce these noblemen to join him, sent them officers and money to keep them in his interest.

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IN the mean time Argyll, notwithstanding the rigour of the season, was making all the preparations necessary to march forward, as soon as he should be joined by six thousand Dutch; he had also sent for a great number of pioneers,

† The Pretender.

to

to open the ways for him through the prodigious quantities of snow that had fallen; he had collected all the carriages of the country, to convey, not only his ammunition and provision, but also some wood, and coal, to keep his troops warm. He had a very large train of artillery; in a word, all that was necessary for his subsistence, and for a considerable siege. On the 9th of February he marched from about Stirling, and encamped the first day at Dumblain, the next day at Auchtarardire, the scene of the late engagement, and on the 11th arrived at Tullibardine, eight miles from Perth. This last town had no other fortification than a simple wall; and though Marr had been at work there, the want of tools, materials, money and intelligent persons, joined to the badness of the weather, had prevented him from raising any fortifications of consequence. It is true there was opposite to it a post very good in itself, as it was covered by the river, which is very broad, and not fordable but at ten miles above, in a mountainous country, difficult of access. Unfortunately

1716.

nately the cold was so excessive, that all the rivers were completely frozen over; so that the enemy crossed as if it had been solid ground. This reason, and the bad condition of his little army, which was inferior by one half to that of Argyll, determined \*\*\* † to quit Perth; he abandoned it on the 11th, and retired to Dundee, from whence he repaired to Montrose with part of his troops, and sent the rest to Brechin. The Chevalier Erskine, who came into France from him, to give intelligence of this step, positively assured me, that the \*\* ‡ intended retiring towards the North, as the enemy should advance, and that a little on this side of Aberdeen, he was resolved to make a stand, as there was an excellent post, which five hundred men, could defend against ten thousand. The right of this post adjoined to the high mountains, and the left to the sea, while all the front was covered by an impracticable morass, which could not be passed but by the causeway. Two days however after the arrival of the Chevalier

† The Pretender.

‡ The Pretender.

Erskine,

1716.

Erskine, we learned, that on the approach of Argyll, \*\*\*\*\*† had caused his troops to march towards the North; that he himself, with Marr and some others, had embarked, and was arrived in France. He left the command to General Gordon, ordering him to endeavour to obtain terms of the enemy, for those who were of his party. It may readily be imagined, that as soon as the Highlanders and others were acquainted with the departure of their \*\*\*\*\*‡, they thought of nothing but dispersing and concealing themselves.

Thus ended, in an instant, this enterprize; all the country submitted to the Duke of Argyll, who had advanced to Aberdeen; and those who thought they could not obtain their pardon, retired into the islands, from whence they afterwards came to France. My Son and M. de Bulkley, whom \*\*\*\*\*§ had not brought to France along with him, and who could not think of hiding themselves in the mountains as others did, ran

† The Pretender.

‡ The Pretender.

§ The Pretender.



1716. the risk of coming from the North of Scotland to Edinburgh. No one discovered them; and after they had staid a week in that capital, they hired a vessel which landed them in Holland, from whence they proceeded as fast as possible to France. The Regent, at the solicitation of Lord Stair, caused them to be removed from their employments, as well as all those who had been in Scotland. When the regiment was taken away from my Son, it was restored to me.

ONE may, perhaps, be curious to know why \*\*\*\*\* † returned so soon from Scotland, and why he did not, as the Chevalier Erskine had assured us, retire to the post on this side of Aberdeen. All I have been able to discover on this matter, is, that Marr had persuaded him that it was no longer possible to support the enterprize; that it would be the total ruin of all his party; and therefore it was necessary, by his retreat, to give them an opportunity of coming to some accommodation, which his presence ren-

† The Pretender.

dered

dered impracticable. This reflection <sup>1716.</sup> might indeed have been made before Erskine's departure; but I am convinced, that if there was a fault committed, it proceeded only from the too great deference that young Prince paid to the counsels of others.

THE \*\*\*\*\* † came privately to Saint Germain, where he staid a few days: from whence he went to pass a week near Neuilly, and afterwards proceeded to Chalons, in Champaign, to wait for an answer from the Duke of Lorraine. That Prince made some difficulty of permitting him to return into Lorraine, on account of the consideration he thought himself obliged to have for King George; he therefore advised him to go to Deux-Ponts, assuring him, however, that if the King of Sweden would not allow him to stay there, he would receive him in his own dominions, at the risk of every consequence that might happen from it. \*\*\*\*\* † being much dissatisfied with this answer, as well as because the Prince de Vaudemont advised

† The Pretender.

† The Pretender.

him

1716. him the same thing, went to Avignon, where the Duke of Ormond and Marr, with several other noblemen, came to join him.

DURING the stay which \* \* \* \* † made about Paris, he had dismissed Lord Bolingbroke in the most disgraceful manner.

AT his return from Scotland, he received that nobleman very graciously, and shewed him an entire confidence: at length, after having given him his orders respecting several matters he intrusted him with, and having particularly desired that Bolingbroke would make haste to follow him, he pretended to set out from Malmaism for Chalons; but instead of that, he went to Mademoiselle de la Chaufferaye, near Neuilly. In two days after this, he sent the Duke of Ormond to require the seals from Lord Bolingbroke, who was very much surprized at the message, and gave them up immediately. The reason \* \* \* \* † alledged for this step was, that Lord Bolingbroke had

† The Pretender.

† The Pretender.

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entirely neglected to send him any supplies of arms, money, &c. into Scotland, and that this had been the cause of the ill success of his affairs. The pretended politicians at St. Germain's added, that it depended entirely upon him to attain any kind of succours from the Regent, but that he purposely neglected it, with a view of ruining the Pretender, whom he clandestinely betrayed; but the true reason of his disgrace proceeded from other motives; one might even suppose that \*\*\*\*\*†, who was desirous of exculpating himself from all that the malice of his enemies could invent against him, was not sorry that all the blame should be thrown upon Bolingbroke. On the other hand, the Duke of Ormond had always been jealous of Bolingbroke, whom he considered as a man of superior genius, and consequently as being always likely to have more interest than himself. A number of petty politicians, who found that they made no figure with so enlightened a minister, and who thought themselves

† The Pretender.

certain



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certain of enjoying the reputation of universal knowledge, and of doing every thing if Ormond were at their head, were continually irritating that nobleman against Bolingbroke, and representing his most trifling actions in the most odious light. Marr had also his private interest in view; he wished to impose upon the public the idea, that if he had been assisted by Bolingbroke, his enterprize would have succeeded: besides this, he wanted to be the sole Minister, and to govern every thing; for which purpose it was necessary that Bolingbroke should be dismissed; for, as he was well acquainted with the Duke of Ormond's slender talents, he was under no apprehension of any opposition from him. Mademoiselle de la Chauferaye and several other women, who, as I have before observed, were angry with Bolingbroke, because he did not consult them any more, joined themselves to the rest of the assailants, and it is probable, that the Ministers of St. Germain, if they did not concur in promoting this dismissal, did not at least oppose it. One must be entirely deprived

deprived of common sense, not to see that \*\*\*\*\* † committed an enormous fault in dismissing the only Englishman capable of conducting his affairs; for notwithstanding what may be said of some persons more guided by passion than sense, Bolingbroke was universally acknowledged in England, one of the most able Ministers they ever had. He was born with superior talents, which raised him, when very young, to the highest employment. He was moreover in very high esteem among the heads of the Tory party, of which he was, as it were, the life. It was therefore a fault of the first magnitude to get rid of such a man at a time when there was most need of him, and when it was highly improper to create any new enemies. Had he even been to blame, prudence required that some more gentle method should have been devised to take the management of affairs out of his hands, which might easily have been done. They had only to insinuate to him, that on account of the coolness subsisting be-

† The Pretender.

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tween Ormond and him, it was not proper they should be together; and that besides, his presence at Paris was necessary, to watch more narrowly into every thing that was passing there. They might have told him frankly, that for particular reasons it was not thought adviseable to employ him any longer. I am sufficiently acquainted with his temper and character, to affirm, that he would immediately have asked leave to quit; but to put a public affront upon him, and endeavour to blacken his reputation in the world, was a most unaccountable step; and indeed \* \* \* \* † lost many more friends by it than he imagined.

As I have been partly witness of what Bolingbroke did for \* \* \* \* †, while he had the direction of his affairs, I owe him the justice to declare, that he omitted nothing that was in his power to do. He stirred heaven and earth to obtain succours, but the Court of France did nothing but amuse him; and though he saw this, and complained of it, yet

† The Pretender.

† The Pretender.

there

there was no other power to which he could apply. Beside, the cabals I have before-mentioned thwarted him in every thing. Some time after this, \* \* \* \* \* † demanded from him all the letters he had written to him, and Bolingbroke returned them all immediately without keeping a copy of them. The Duke of Marr served him rather a scandalous trick; he told Bolingbroke, that being embarrassed with business, he had not taken any minutes of his letters, and therefore desired he would lend them to him, that he might take copies of them; Bolingbroke gave them to the Duke, and was never able to get them returned.

IN the month of April, I was appointed to command in Guyenne, in the room of Marshal Montrevel, who was to go into Alsace. The occasion of this change was, that the Duke of Orleans was very glad to have a person in that part of the country, upon whom he could depend, more especially as he had no reason to place any confidence

† The Pretender.



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in the Duke of Maine, whose second son was governor of that province. He had even intended, with the same view, to give me likewise the command of Languedoc, and my residence was then to have been at Toulouse, which is situated in the center of those two provinces; but I represented that this might possibly expose me to the envy of some persons; and moreover, might give rise to some reflections which it was better to avoid; and that there would always be time enough to send me that commission if it should be found necessary.

THE Duke of Maine, displeased, that the Duke of Orleans had designed me for Guyenne, without having previously spoken to him of it, did all he could to prevent it; and not being able to succeed, he took it into his head, in order to mortify me, to have inserted in my patents, *under the authority of his son the Count d'Eu*. He pretended that this was a privilege belonging to Princes of the blood. As soon as I was informed of this, I declared, that I would not accept of the office upon those conditions, unless

less he could produce vouchers for the custom; for I would not be the first to <sup>1716.</sup> establish a precedent so derogatory from the dignity of a Marshal of France; that we knew very well the distance there was between us and Princes of the blood, and accordingly would always shew them every kind of respect; but that in point of command, we could not obey any absent person except the King or the Regent. M. de la Vrilliere, Secretary of State, came to me from the Duke of Orleans, to shew me the instances upon which the Duke of Maine founded his pretensions, and to acquaint me that his Royal Highness expected I should make no difficulty of complying. I answered, that the instances alledged were in my favour; and I should therefore have the honour to speak of it myself to his Royal Highness. Accordingly, I went to the *Palais Royal*, and shewed the Prince clearly that he had been imposed upon: however, as the Regent had in some measure engaged with the Duke of Maine in this affair, he knew not how to extricate himself; he employed the Duke de Noailles, and several other persons, to persuade me to

1716. give up the point; but I persisted in my resolution, so that for the space of two months I was uncertain whether I should be employed. At length, the Regent finding me immoveable, and, beside, most of my brethren, the Marshals of France, openly taking my part, he had my patents made out in the usual way, and in the month of July I set off for Bordeaux. Marshal Montrevel might have put an end to the dispute the first day, by shewing his letters patent, which had been renewed three months before the death of the late King, and consequently since the legitimated Princes had obtained the rank and title of Princes of the blood: but in order not to be at variance with the Duke of Maine, he did not mention this, till after the affair was decided. The Marquis de la Vrilliere, who had dispatched the patents to Marshal Montrevel, ought also to have told the Regent of it; but the desire of paying his court to the Duke of Maine, made him conceal the truth, and neglect upon this occasion the duties of his office.

END OF THE MEMOIRS.

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AN ABRIDGED CONTINUATION OF  
THE MEMOIRS, TAKEN FROM THE  
LETTERS OF THE MARSHAL OF  
BERWICK, AND PRINCIPALLY FROM  
HIS CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE  
MINISTRY.

**T**HE Marshal of Berwick, at forty-four years of age, had already made twenty-six campaigns, and accomplished a great career. The long war, from which Europe was just emerged, had furnished him with opportunities of displaying, at the head of armies, his talents for an art, the art of Heroes, which, to excell in it, requires more talents than any other; and these he had exercised through the eleven last campaigns, in which he commanded, with glory and success: a circumstance the more remarkable in that unfortunate war, when victory, which hitherto had been accustomed constantly to follow our banners, seemed in every other part to have abandoned

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doned them. Another career now began to open itself to the Marshal of Berwick.

He arrived at Bourdeaux in July 1716, to take upon him the command of the Province of Guyenne. The Regent, who was thoroughly acquainted with his abilities, and meant to employ them for the service of the state, was desirous, as has been already seen, that they should not be confined to the command merely of that province. In the year 1705, the Marshal had shewn in Languedoc, where he commanded at a difficult and critical period, that he was not less qualified for the administration of civil government, than for the command of armies: men of genius are such almost in every thing. The Regent, in a letter written to him on his arrival at Bourdeaux, says: "No-thing is difficult in your hands, and "I beg you will always depend on my "friendship." This friendship was founded on the perfect esteem and confidence, with which that Prince honoured the Marshal, from the personal knowledge he had acquired of his probity and talents,

talents, in the campaign they had made together in Spain in 1707; an opportunity, which served to unite them for ever. The Regent was not much inclined to believe the existence of honest men; but he used to say, that, if there was such a thing as a perfectly honest man in the world, it was the Marshal of Berwick \*

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\* The Abbé Millot asserts, p. 2. vol. 4. of his *Memoirs*, that the Marshal of Berwick made himself disagreeable to the Duke of Orleans, and that this was the cause of his being recalled from Spain in 1707. If he says this upon the authority of the Duc de Noailles, it is inconceivable, where he, who ought to have been well informed, could have picked up this false anecdote. Nothing is further from the truth. The Marshal of Berwick frequently declared, that this very campaign of 1707, had been the occasion of bringing him into the Duke of Orleans's favour. The Abbé Millot himself, vol. III. p. 395, speaking of the siege of Lerida, which happened at the close of that campaign, acknowledges that "Berwick, by his ability and courage, contributed greatly to the success of it." In fact the success was chiefly owing to the resources he found out, in the straits to which they were reduced, and the infinite pains he took, (though the siege had been formed contrary to his opinion) having nothing more at heart than the glory of the King's arms, and the personal re-

THE different parts of the administration, during the Regency, were conducted by councils, which engaged the commandants of the provinces in a very voluminous correspondence. We need only read that of the Marshal of Berwick, to be convinced of the extraordinary respect the several members of these councils had for him. Many of

putation of the Duke of Orleans. Was this making himself disagreeable to him? That Prince had too much magnanimity and personal merit to be jealous of the Marshal of Berwick, or even to be suspected of it: his whole subsequent conduct is a proof of the contrary. The solidity of the Marshal, and the strictness of his morals, were not always suitable to the taste and amusements of the Duke of Orleans; but they were attached to each other by firmer ties, those of esteem and friendship. Lewis XIVth, to the great regret of Philip Vth, and of the Spaniards, recalled the Marshal of Berwick from Spain, because the affairs of that country were re-established, and there was no longer any fear about them; besides that they were in very good hands, being in those of the Duke of Orleans. The frontiers of the Rhine and Dauphiny, required more attention, and able generals were wanted in those parts. The command of one of the two armies then assembling was intended by Lewis XIVth, for the Marshal of Berwick, as hath been seen in these Memoirs.

them

them were united to him by the ties of friendship, and all held him in the highest esteem.

THOUGH his character for severity had, before his arrival in Guyenne, disposed the province, and particularly the town of Bourdeaux, to dread his administration, and though, during the whole time he commanded there, he had continual disputes with the Parliament; yet he was soon known, and then (says the President Montesquieu) “ he was beloved “ by every body, and there was no place “ in which his great talents were more “ admired.” The nobility placed an entire confidence in him, and the gentlemen frequently referred their differences to his arbitration.

IN all his disputes with the Parliament he was always in the right; but though the Minister decided in every instance agreeable to his views, which were always found to be manifestly the best, yet, afterwards, in the execution of the King's orders, he used so much prudence and moderation, that it was impossible even for the officers of the Parliament  
not



not to acknowledge, that his conduct had not in any respect been influenced by vanity, but only by motives of justice, order, and the public good. If he determined always upon his own judgment, it was because he thought that the person, with whom the conduct of affairs was intrusted, was more interested than any other in the success of them, and for that reason it was more his interest to adopt right measures: but he never failed to listen to those, who ought to be, and were capable of informing him, before he took his resolution; and after having taken it, no man was more firm. This firmness, as it was the fruit of the most diligent examination, and the most unbiaſſed integrity, ſo was it entirely free from any tincture of obſtinacy.

WE ſhall not enter into a detail of many intereſting matters, in which the Maſter of Berwick was employed: it is ſufficient to have marked his principles, from which his conduct never deviated.

1718. THE Parliament of Bourdeaux, in April 1718, were diſpoſed to avail themſelves of the privilege of remonſtrating, which  
the

the Regent had restored to all the Parliaments, by the declaration of 15th September 1715. They refused to register the letters patent granted to the general Hospital of St. Andrew. Their debates had been carried on with much warmth. It was judged, that they had transgressed the rules prescribed by the declaration, which had reinstated them in their former functions; by that declaration\*, they were only to exercise them in matters which concerned the general good of the kingdom; whereas the present was only a private business. Monsieur d'Argenson, Keeper of the Seals, however wrote to the First President and Attorney-General, that his Royal Highness would consent to receive the remonstrance of the Parliament, provided it was made within the time prescribed by the declaration, and without a deputation. In the mean time the President Lebreton had been deputed, and was set out for Court without asking leave. This step, which he could not

\* M. d'Argenson's, Keeper of the Seals, letter, 10th April, 1718.

1718.

avoid, would in some measure have taken off the irregularity of his appointment.

THE Marshal of Berwick thought it incumbent upon him to give an account of all that passed to his Royal Highness. Monsieur de la Vrilliere, Provincial Secretary of State, on his part, informed the Marshal \*, that the Regent was determined not to pay any regard to the representations of the Parliament, as they appeared to him not to deserve any; and that he had dispatched to Mons. de Courson, Intendant of the Province, a *lettre de cachet*, for the Solicitor-General Dudon, banishing him to Auch. The Court considered him as the most culpable, because he had opposed the letters patent with more warmth than any member of the Parliament, contrary to the duty of his office as the King's Solicitor, which ought rather to have engaged him to support them. M. d'Argenson, in his answer to the Marshal of Berwick upon this business, concludes thus: " It is not to be presumed, that the assembly, on

\* M. de la Vrilliere's letter, 10th of April 1718:

“ this occasion, will adopt any other 1718.  
“ measures but what are conformable  
“ to the views of his Royal Highness;  
“ who, at the same time, does not doubt  
“ that your authority, and persevering  
“ attention, which are used to provide  
“ against the slightest incidents, will pre-  
“ vent the consequences that might arise  
“ from this.” The Regent also writes  
to the Marshal with his own hand:  
“ I have given the most precise orders  
“ for putting a stop to the proceedings  
“ of Parliament on this point; and I  
“ agree with you, that it is of great  
“ importance to suppress attempts of this  
“ nature in the beginning.”

LE *Parlement*, says Pasquier, some-  
where, *est une bonne piece dans l'etat*; and  
we may add, that their remonstrances  
are of excellent use; but they should  
take care to employ them with prudence  
and reserve. The abuse of this privi-  
lege is even dangerous in its tendency,  
and the Ministry cannot keep too strict  
an eye over them: it is of these abuses  
the Regent is to be understood as speak-  
ing in his letter.

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THE President Lebreton, on his arrival at Court, was reprimanded by the Keeper of the Seals, and ordered to return to Bourdeaux. The Court thought proper to send mandatory letters: the Marshal of Berwick was present in Parliament when they were read; he gave his vote for submission, demonstrating, at the same time, a strong zeal for the Parliament. The Regent was obeyed; the letters patent, in favour of the hospital of St. Andrew, were registered purely and simply, and thus the affair ended. The *lettre de cachet*, for the Solicitor-General Dudon, was revoked at the instance of the Marshal of Berwick, and the order was given through his hands. The whole affair had been conducted by his advice, and the Keeper of the Seals wrote to him in these terms: "The orders of H. R. H. are exactly conformable to your advice, which is always dictated by prudence and zeal for the King's service."

FRANCE had but just begun to taste the sweets of a peace, which she yet stood in extreme need of, when the ambition

bition of Cardinal Alberoni, the Prime Minister of Spain, interfered, to disturb it with projects of his own conceiving. He wanted to recover to that crown, all the possessions it had ceded by the treaty of Utrecht. Sardinia he had already got possession of; from five-and-twenty to thirty thousand Spaniards were landed in Sicily, to reduce that island; he was equipping a fleet at Cadiz, and every thing was in motion in the different ports of the kingdom. 1718.

It was foreseen, in the year 1718, that France would be forced to come to an open rupture with Spain, and even to carry on an offensive war against that kingdom, in pursuance of the engagements she had entered into with her new allies the Emperor, England and Holland, to oblige Philip Vth to renounce his projects, which tended to nothing less than destroying the tranquillity of all Europe, and introducing revolutions every where. War however was not declared till January 1719: all the preceding year was passed in negotiating with Cardinal Alberoni, who amused France

1718. France and England, in order to defer the rupture with those two courts, and to give himself time to prepare every thing he thought necessary for the success of his projects. He went so far as to flatter himself, that by his intrigues, and by insurrections, he should be able to deprive the Duke of Orleans of the Regency, and to transfer it to Philip V. who, by that means, would be armed with the whole power of France: his views extended likewise to produce a revolution in England, to restore \*\*\*\*† to the throne of his ancestors, and by driving out his rival, to secure him for an ally. The other instruments, which he was to make use of, and which he had no doubt of engaging in his interests, were the Turk on one side, and the King of Sweden on the other. It is apparent, that all the hopes of Alberoni were built upon an imaginary foundation, and on the concurrence of a variety of events so improbable in themselves, that he ought not to have flattered himself with an expectation of bringing them

† The Pretender.

about: he had, however, the address <sup>1718.</sup> to persuade the King of Spain to adopt his vast projects, unjust as they were, as well as rash; and yet that Prince, though singular in some respects, was not naturally wanting either in integrity or judgment.

THE whole plot was discovered by intercepting some letters written to Cardinal Alberoni by Prince Cellamar, Ambassador from Spain at the Court of France. The Regent thought proper to dismiss the Ambassador immediately, and had him accompanied as far as the frontiers by one of the King's Gentlemen. The intercepted letters were printed, and the tenor of them was too clear to leave the smallest doubt, respecting the practices of Prince Cellamar and Cardinal Alberoni. The Duke of Maine was seized, and sent to the castle of Dourlens; his Dutcheſs to that of Dijon; and several of their dependants were put into the Bastile. The Prince de Dombes, and the Count d'Eu, were ordered to retire from Court; and Cardinal Polignac was confined to his Ab-



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bey at Anchin. From this time preparations were made, with the utmost expedition, for opening the campaign.

THE Marshal of Berwick was pitched upon to command the army, from the extraordinary confidence placed in him on every account by the Regent; yet there was not a Frenchman more affected with this breach, however just and necessary on the part of France. Beside the reasons which he had in common with every Frenchman, there were others, peculiar to himself: he had been twice the instrument of preserving Spain; and the favours he had received from Philip V. attached him more immediately to that Prince. On the other hand, he had obligations to the Regent, who was personally attacked in this war; but all these were inferior considerations with the Marshal of Berwick, and were made subservient to the great line of duty. He thought himself bound indispensably, as Governor of Guienne, upon the frontiers of Spain, to execute, without remonstrance, the orders he received for invading that kingdom. A refusal

refusal to serve, would have been a breach <sup>1718.</sup> of an immediate duty, from which he had, at that time, no right to excuse himself: it would have been a dangerous example, and might even have admitted a construction of criminality, if it had been followed by others: he obeyed therefore, because it was his duty to obey.

He had been sent for to Court in September, in order to make the arrangements for the campaign; and had been some time returned to Bourdeaux, when he transmitted his plans for his Royal Highness's decision and final orders.

No man had an understanding better <sup>1719.</sup> qualified than the Marshal of Berwick to comprehend, at one view, the whole of an object, how vast soever the extent of it might be. He had made use of this talent in the four defensive campaigns he had made on the frontiers of Italy, in the war of the succession; he found occasion for it again this year.

THE frontier of France and Spain occupies an extent of more than one hundred leagues from Bayonne to Per-

1719.

pignan and Collioure. As it was impossible to attack Spain at once in every part of a line of such length, it became necessary, in making an attack on one side, to provide at the same time for the defence of the rest. This object was the more essential, as Alberoni was known to be bold and enterprizing to excess. The Marshal had therefore recourse to calculation, comparing the strength of the enemy with his own; representing to himself the different views they might have, and the various movements they might possibly make; and upon these several combinations, he formed his plans of attack and defence. His letters and dispatches to the Ministry shew that he had foreseen and prepared for every thing: he points out in them beforehand what he shall do in the course of the campaign, according to the different situations he shall be in; and the events seemed to be governed by his prediction.

THE Marshal of Berwick would have wished to commence hostilities by the siege of Pampeluna; for which he had strong

strong reasons. The object of the war with Spain was to intimidate her, in order to bring her back to her engagements; for this purpose it was necessary she should be convinced, that France was acting against her seriously, and without any regard to the ties of blood, which the King of Spain and his Minister were not inclined to believe. Nothing was more likely to convince them of their error, than the taking of that important fortress, which would open a passage for the army to Madrid; beside that it would bring them into a country abounding with provisions, where they might find subsistence during the campaign, and afterwards take winter quarters at the enemy's expence. And further, as this point was the nearest to the center of the frontier, it was the most convenient for the defence of the other parts. The siege, however, could not be undertaken; the preparations for sitting down before a place of such importance as Pampeluna are immense, and the Court had not issued the necessary orders in time. The

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1719. whole would not have been ready till the close of the campaign, and it would have been risking too much to have undertaken the siege when the season was so far advanced. This enterprize, therefore, was reserved for the next campaign, (which happily did not take place, peace being made in the mean time) and the sieges of Fontarabia and St. Sebastian were determined on.

DURING these expeditions, which were to be made on the right, there remained Navarre, Bearn, and all the rest of the frontier to be covered. The Marshal had had the precaution to go himself, during the winter, to visit all the passes. For the defence of them, he now appointed M. de Geofreville, giving him, for that purpose, fifteen battalions and twenty squadrons, which he extended along the Pyrenees, so as to be ready to assemble at the first order, and to support each other. This corps was designed to occupy some good post, in case the enemy should pass the mountains with a superior force, by which it might stop their progress till the Marshal

shal could come up with a sufficient reinforcement to drive them back. 1719.

To make the different parts of this defensive line more secure, Major-General de Bonas was ordered, with seven battalions, to make himself master of the castle of Castel-leon, which, though under the Spanish government, is situated at the foot of the Pyrenees, on the French side. He was obliged to open trenches against it on the 30th of May, to erect batteries, and to make a breach. It was the 12th of June before he took it.

DURING this time the army was assembled, and marched about the 15th of May to Iron, from whence it proceeded to invest Fontarabia. The first business of the Marshal of Berwick, was to reconnoitre the place, in order to determine on which side he should make his attack, and where he should place his park of artillery. As the cannon, however, which was brought from Bayonne, was not sufficient for the siege, and that which was to be sent from Bourdeaux could not arrive for some  
T 4 days,

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days, the trenches were not opened till the evening of the 27th. They broke ground very near the place, by means of a hollow not more than a hundred and fifty toises from the covered way; the attack was directed against the polygon, formed by the bastions des Innocens and la Reine. They set to work immediately on the batteries; but these were not in readiness to play till the 5th of June; because it was thought proper to wait till they were all completed, that they might be opened and played off together, so as to defend each other, and to answer more fully the plan of attack.

As soon as the artillery of the place was silenced, they endeavoured to make breaches in the left face (towards the besiegers) of the bastion de la Reine, the curtain between the two bastions and the right face of the half-moon; they extended their lodgment on the covered way, where they had already fixed themselves; and on the night of the 15th, the breaches being very fair, the half-moon was attacked and carried at once without much resistance. A lodgment  
was

was made from one shoulder to the other, <sup>1719.</sup> but it cost them dear; they lost about one hundred and fifty men. They proceeded next to make their way into the ditch, and to finish the openings, that they might give the assault to the body of the place. The enemy prevented them by beating the chamade on the 17th; the Marshal of Berwick did not insist upon making the garrison prisoners of war; retarding the capitulation would have prolonged the siege, and it was of consequence, in the present situation of things, not to be restrained in his movements.

ON the 18th the garrison marched out with the honours of war, and was conducted to Pampeluna, by St. John Pie de Port. Two battalions were sent into the place; and the next morning they set about levelling the works and filling up the trenches; the rubbish of the breaches was removed, and the breaches themselves stopped up with fascines, and put into a state of defence.

WHILE the siege was carrying on, the King of Spain, attended by the Queen, had



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had put himself in motion from Pampeluna, where he arrived on the 11th of June, giving out, that he was going to give battle to the French, and oblige them to raise the siege. Dom Blaise de Loya sent this information to the governor of Fontarabia in a letter, which was intercepted. In fact, the Spanish army marched to San Estevan, and the King repaired in person, on the 16th, to the camp of Lessaca, two leagues and a half from Iron. But receiving intelligence on the 17th, that the place was capitulating, he caused his equipages on the 18th to return to San Estevan, from whence he went back to Pampeluna. His Catholic Majesty was not well advised in this march: it was but little to his honour to have advanced within sight of Fontarabia with his army, to be a witness of the capitulation, and to march back immediately to Pampeluna.

NOT to interrupt the account of the siege, we have deferred mentioning till this time, an action, which, though of little importance in itself, yet deserves to be related, on account of the bravery shewn

shewn in it by our troops. M. de Ca-<sup>1719.</sup>  
drieux had been sent forward, with a corps  
of troops, on the road to Pampeluna, to  
discover the motions of the enemy. They  
learned that the same Dom Blaise de  
Loya, who commanded in Guipuscoa, had  
assembled two thousand militia, to which  
he had added six or seven hundred re-  
gular troops, and with these had advanced  
to Ernani, not above two leagues from  
M. de Cadrieux's post. The Marshal of  
Berwick, not choosing to suffer this  
little corps of the enemy to remain so  
near him, dispatched M. de Cilly with  
a sufficient detachment to attack Dom  
Blaise. His vanguard, under the com-  
mand of M. de Verceil, fell upon the  
troops Dom Blaise had stationed in an  
advanced post, and without any assistance  
drove them in. Our people pursued  
them as far as to Ernani, where they at-  
tacked Dom Blaise himself, beat the re-  
gulars, and dispersed the militia, so that  
they were not heard of after.

THE superior strength of the French  
army was such, that the Marshal of Ber-  
wick would have had no cause to fear that  
of

1719. of Spain, had they been brought in a body against each other : but the great extent of frontier, through which he was under a necessity of acting offensively, left him constantly in some degree of fear for the center, which was entirely destitute of fortresses, whenever he meditated any enterprize at the extremities to the right or left, in the face of an enemy like Alberoni, who had the utmost confidence in his own projects. He might possibly flatter himself, that he should find in Guienne, as he had already in Brittany, disaffected persons ready to join the Spanish army, if it could penetrate any where into France ; and it must be acknowledged that there were malcontents in the kingdom. Cardinal Alberoni was the man to hazard every thing, be the consequence what it might. There would have been no difficulty in obliging the Spanish army to repass the Pyrenees ; but many malcontents would have joined it on its first appearance ; and the King of Spain's entry into France, at the head of an army, was enough to excite a ferment in the minds of the people throughout

out the kingdom, and to create a great disturbance; which ought by all means to be avoided. It is true, that the Marshal of Berwick had foreseen all this, and had arranged his marches and counter-marches in consequence; but it was necessary that every thing should co-operate with exactness. If the success had depended singly on the Marshal, there would have been no cause of apprehension; but a General cannot be every where: such great movements required the concurrent operations of several persons, who might not all of them deserve the same degree of confidence. These reflexions induced the Marshal of Berwick to ask for some additional battalions and squadrons, which were granted him. He said, that in the circumstances they were in, nothing ought to be left to chance; prudence required that the event should be secured. It hath been seen in his campaigns in Dauphiny and Provence, that he was not the man to ask for an unnecessary reinforcement; since, of his own accord, he sent back to Lewis XIVth twenty battalions, which he thought he could



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spare from the defence he was to make : and which were very serviceable in reinforcing the other armies. The King of Spain, on his side, had augmented his army with twenty-six squadrons, so that it was now composed of sixty-two squadrons, and twenty-one battalions.

THE Marshal of Berwick, having resolved to lay siege to St. Sebastian, and to improve his conquests, pushed forward to cover the convoys and preparations necessary for his undertaking. Intelligence being given him, that Prince Pio had advanced to Tolosette with a strong detachment, he sent M. de Cilly against him with three regiments of dragoons, two hundred horse, twenty-two companies of grenadiers, and as many of piquets. On his way the General met with three hundred of the enemy's dragoons, whom he attacked with great vivacity, and took the commandant, two Captains, and five or six dragoons prisoners, beside killing several. On his arrival at Tolosette, he fell in with an advanced post of infantry, which he caused to be attacked : near thirty of them were killed, and sixty made prisoners,

prisoners, among whom were three officers of the Spanish and Walloon guards. 1719.  
Prince Pio had retired very early in the morning of the same day, taking the road to Pampeluna, to which place his troops followed him.

ON the 30th of June the Marshal encamped before St. Sebastian, and invested the place, having his right to the sea and his left to the river Gurumea, which runs by Astiaraga. The Spanish army, which was encamped a league from Pampeluna on the road to Tolosette, remained in its position; and the Marshal of Berwick had nothing for the present to take off his attention from the siege.

HE determined to carry on his attack by the river Gurumea, on account of the opportunity it afforded of erecting batteries on the opposite shore, about two hundred toises distant from the body of the place, by means of which he might make an opening in the wall, it being of no great thickness, and having nothing to flank it in that part. Between the town and the river, was a space sufficient to get at the breach from the right of the  
trenches,

1719.

trenches, which were to be close upon the river. It was however still necessary to attack the horn-work in front on the left, which flanked all that part, but this was only to silence the guns, and to destroy the defences. Any other plan of attack would have been ineligible, particularly of the horn-work, as it was so much sunk, as was likewise the body of the place on that side, that no breach could be made, without having batteries on the covered way. Of course we must have taken it, before we could attempt to raise batteries on it to batter in breach, and open the works attacked: and the same ceremony must have been observed with the body of the place, as with the horn-work.

THE heavy rains had retarded the convoys of artillery for the siege, and of consequence the opening of the trenches: but on the return of fair weather, the necessary stores having been brought up, the trenches were opened in the night between the 19th and 20th of July, at the distance of two hundred toises from the covered way: the loss on this occasion

sion was inconsiderable. They had already been at work for the batteries of cannon and mortars on the other side of the river; and the next morning they were to make others on the new parallels to batter the horn-work. The whole was finished and the batteries began to play on the 25th. In the night between the 26th and 27th they made a lodgment on the salient angle of the covered way to the right [of the besiegers]: this was the principal point to be gained, to enable them to get up to, and attack the breach they were making in the body of the place, by means of the batteries mounted on the other side of the river. As these fired from a distance of not less than a hundred and eighty toises, the breach was not soon made; it was not practicable till the first of August. The Governor, fearing that the place would be taken by assault, beat the chamade the same day. The Marshal of Berwick obliged the whole garrison to retire into the castle, with a view of cooping them up, consuming their provisions, and by this means hastening the reduction of

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it. The first step they took towards making themselves masters of it, was to open some trenches in the front of it; but on attempting to carry them forward, they soon found what difficulties the attack would be attended with. The castle stood so much above the town, and all the ground about it, that it was next to an impossibility to get at the works by trenches, though they were not more than thirty toises distant from them. Beside this, they could not find a level fit for their batteries of cannon; the ground was so low, that they would have had no effect: they were therefore obliged to content themselves with bomb-batteries, which are not of much use in destroying out-works, and of none at all in making a breach. With these, however, they made themselves masters of the castle. In order to maintain themselves in their trenches, they were forced to cover them with blinds, to prevent the enemy crushing them to pieces with bombs, grenades, and stones which they rolled down upon them.

THE

THE only method of carrying the place <sup>1719.</sup> by force, was to undermine it all the way to the castle; but this, if they met with never so little of the rock in their way, would have been a work of infinite time. The only resource they seemed to have, was that of blockading it, and it was what they were forced to confine themselves to.

IN the mean time they continued the bombardment, for the purpose of destroying the houses and what magazines they could; and it was attended with a success they had no right to expect. The bombs spoiled the provisions, and threw the garrison into such despair, that they capitulated on the 19th of August. The Marshal of Berwick made no difficulty of granting them the honours of war, being glad to get rid of them at so easy a rate.

DURING the blockade, the English fleet had taken on board seven hundred and fifty men of our army, with which it sailed for Santona. Here our troops were disembarked, and took possession of that little port, after driving out se-

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ven hundred of the Spanish militia. They then burned three large ships of war on the stocks, and reembarking, came and rejoined the army without the loss of a single man.

THERE now remained only the sieges of Urgel and Roses to conclude the campaign agreeable to the plan projected. The Marshal of Berwick, while he was waiting for final orders from H. R. H. made his troops file off on the side of Navarre and Oleron. The King of Spain was at Tudela with his army, and Prince Pio stationed so as to cover Pampeluna; but upon our troops filing off by our left, Philip V. determined to make a considerable detachment from his army to march into Catalonia, where the people appeared inclinable to revolt; and as to himself, he returned to Madrid. His army fell back to Sanguesa, and soon after marched for Catalonia, which they found was to be the scene of our operations.

THE Marshal of Berwick having received his final orders for the expeditions of the Lampredan and Cerdagna,  
fixed

fixed the rout of his army over Mount <sup>1719.</sup> Lewis, and went forward himself, in order to expedite the necessary preparations. He arrived at Mount Lewis on the 11th of September: the siege of Urgel could not be undertaken so soon as he wished, because the roads were so bad, that it took up almost a fortnight to bring the artillery from Mount Lewis. Part of it came up on the 2d, and the rest on the 4th of October. M. de Bonas occupied an advanced camp at la Pobla, on the Noguera Palleresa, with ten battalions and two regiments of dragoons: he was in possession of the heights, and his post was so good, that he could not be attacked, even by the whole Spanish army, which was at Ager, five or six leagues from his camp. A detachment of them however fell upon our mountaineer chaf-seurs, and drove them from the bridge of Montagnano. M. de Bonas resolved to punish this insult; and marching with ten companies of grenadiers, attacked the party of the enemy and defeated them; he afterwards made himself master of Conques and Tremp, after having attack-



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ed and put to flight four hundred men, whom they had left on Mount Sec.

THE siege of the castle of Urgel was not finished by the 10th of October, and the Marshal of Berwick, who was anxious about the expedition to Roses, quitted it, and repaired to Boulou, where the army was to rendezvous on the 17th, and to march immediately into Lampredan and to Roses. He left M. de Coigny, with seventeen battalions, to push the siege, which did not continue long after his departure; for on the 12th, he received intelligence at Mount Lewis, by an officer dispatched to him express, that the castle of Urgel had surrendered, and that the garrison were prisoners of war. M. de Coigny put himself in march on the 13th, with eleven battalions, to join the grand army, and left M. de Bonas to defend the new conquest and the adjacent country, with nine battalions and two hundred chaffeurs.

THE Marshal of Berwick obtained considerable rewards for the officers of his army, after the sieges they had been employed in; but, at the same time, he thought

thought it necessary to have M. de Champier punished in an exemplary manner. This officer had, at first, shewn great activity and knowledge of his profession : after the taking of Castel-leon, the Marshal of Berwick thought he could not do better than to give him the command of it; but M. de Champier was not long before he began to abuse his authority in this confidential post. He harrassed the country, raised contributions, and carried off the corn to dispose of it for his own profit. He had even the folly or impudence to give an account of his exploits to M. de Bonas. The Marshal having the proof of his crime under his own hand, reported it to the Duke of Orleans. The manners of the age were even then, it is true, very corrupt, but yet there remained a sense of shame, and no one dared to protect an avowed criminal. M. de Champier was broken, and declared incapable of being restored : he was imprisoned in the citadel of Mount Lewis, and afterwards in that of Perpignan.

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ALL the troops that were to compose the army, destined for the siege of Roses, which consisted of forty battalions and sixty squadrons, being assembled at Bou-lou, were put in motion on the 22d of October, and in two days came and encamped at Castillon, in order to invest Roses on the land side; but they could not begin any of the works of the siege, excepting the fascines, till the convoy of artillery, ammunition and provisions arrived. These were expected to be brought by sea in tartans, which were to bring every thing to shore, under an escort of two French galleys and six ships of war, two of them French, and four English.

OUR French men of war appeared in the gulf of Roses on the first of November; but the badness of the weather kept back the tartans, which were obliged to wait till the sea was more calm. The storm in some degree abating, part of them arrived on the 4th of November in the bay of Roses. The next day, though there was still a considerable swell, they began to disembark the artillery and stores: however,

however, they could land but little that day. The day after, the sea ran so high, that the sloops could not be worked so as to continue the unlading. On the 6th the wind grew so violent, that twenty-eight of our tartans were driven on shore; ten of them were wrecked, the rest sunk. Assistance was immediately sent to save as much of the cargoes as possible. Many of the sailors perished; the remainder of the tartans, to the number of twelve or fifteen, put in, where they could, on the coast. 1719.

THIS misfortune deprived us of the greatest part of what we had occasion for to carry on the siege; and after an accurate examination, we found ourselves under a necessity of abandoning it. The season was so far advanced, that nothing more was thought of than separating the army, and sending it into quarters. We decamped on the 17th from Castillon, and each corps marched off to the quarter assigned for it. The Marshal of Berwick remained some days at Perpignan, and set out for the Court on the 27th.



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THE proceedings of this campaign were sufficient to convince Philip V. that France was sincerely acting in concert with her allies, and did not mean to keep any measures with Spain; consequently that it was impossible for him to continue a war, which he must support singly against the formidable powers he was attacking. In fact, Spain found none of those supports she had reckoned upon. The Turk had made peace with the Emperor; by this she lost the means of a powerful diversion, and the Emperor was entirely at liberty to employ his whole force against her. Charles XII. King of Sweden, had been killed before Frederickshals: and his death deprived Spain of a support, the hope of which had made part of the calculation in her plans. The intrigues of Alberoni, to excite troubles and revolutions in France and England, had entirely failed. All these events at length opened the eyes of Philip V; he saw the precipice, to the brink of which he had been brought by the rashness of his Minister. To save himself, he made prudent

and pacific resolutions; there was no <sup>1719.</sup>  
need of more than one, he dismissed his  
turbulent Minister, and peace followed.

THE Marshal of Berwick, as a mark  
of confidence and approbation, was ad-  
mitted into the Council of the Regency;  
but it was not intended that he should  
give up the government of Guienne.  
This arrangement was not less conform-  
able to the views of the Duke of Orleans,  
who was desirous of having a person he  
could depend upon at the head of that  
great province, than to the fortune of  
the Marshal, who was not rich, and had  
occasion for the appointments of that  
command to support his dignity. He  
staid at Court till June, when he re-  
paired to Bourdeaux, to take upon him-  
self again the administration of the pro-  
vince.

It was a principle with the Marshal,  
that, in every state, whatever might be  
the political form of it, there must be  
a supreme and absolute authority, to  
which every citizen and every society  
ought to yield a passive obedience. Ac-  
cordingly, no person paid greater respect  
to

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to that authority than himself; and when it was vested in him, no one could make it more respectable, because, using it only agreeable to the dictates of justice, he never exposed it to be called in question. His natural integrity, candour, knowledge, and great discernment, prevented his deviating from it; and if he knew how to preserve the dignity of government and the share of authority, with which he was entrusted, he was not less acquainted with the boundaries of that authority, and took care never to exceed them; being particularly attentive not to encroach in any respect upon the administration of justice; for he was fully sensible, that his authority and that of the Parliament, though both derived from the same fountain, were yet different in their objects and independent of each other; but upon their harmony depended order and the good of the public. When this harmony seemed to be interrupted, it was always contrary to the Marshal's inclination, and endeavours to preserve it: to this effect the Chancellor d'Aguesseau wrote to him

on

on the affair we are going to speak of: 1719.

“ I am well persuaded, Sir, that if the  
“ Gentlemen of the Parliament will not  
“ live upon good terms with you, it  
“ must always be their own fault. With  
“ you the use of power is regulated by  
“ justice.”

IN the month of September 1720, the 1720.  
Jurats and Bailiffs of the Bakers being  
sent for by the Parliament to give an ac-  
count of the corn and meal, declared,  
that there were in the town more than  
two thousand bushels spoiled. The Par-  
liament appointed two Commissaries to  
make a search in Bourdeaux; the search  
was made with great parade, even in the  
King's magazines; this was the place,  
which inflammatory persons, under pre-  
tence of the public good, seemed to  
have pointed out as the principal ob-  
ject of the search. At their instigation,  
the commissaries themselves caused a con-  
siderable number of bushels of corn and  
meal to be thrown away, without a parti-  
cular examination, and without consult-  
ing the Marshal of Berwick, and the In-  
tendant, which they ought to have done in  
whatever



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whatever related to the Administration, and particularly when the matter in question was the destroying of the King's stores. The Marshal, in affairs of this consequence, where the King's service and the public good were equally concerned, always made it his business to obviate difficulties as much as possible, without attending to any casual breaches of the respect which was due to himself. Upon this principle, therefore, he proposed to the Parliament to have their own seal put upon such sacks of corn and meal as might be spoiled; then to report the matter to the Court, and to wait for the King's answer: but this prudent advice was neither taken nor even listened to. The conduct of the Parliament was such, that it could not but be censured by the Regent and Council; above all, they disapproved the forwardness and imprudence of the two Commissaries in the execution of the decree, who seemed to have endeavoured, by indiscreet remarks\*, to excite commotions among the people.

\* Chancellor d'Aguesseau and M. de la Vrillier's letters, 16th September, 1720.

These

These Gentlemen were ordered to attend the Council at Court, to give an account of their conduct. The Chancellor d'Aguesseau, in a letter written by him to the First President, blames the Parliament for not having acceded to the moderate proposal made by the Marshal of Berwick. The orders given by the King and Regent were\*, that "every thing respecting the ordinary police should be left in the hands of the Jurats, subject to an appeal to the Parliament, and if any extraordinary cases should occur, requiring the interference of that body, as Superintendants of the general police, they should confer with the Marshal of Berwick, and the Intendant of the province, before they took any steps in it, even before the appointment of Commissaries." The Parliament shewing a disposition to submit and conform to the King's orders, the affair was dropped.

\* Chancellor d'Aguesseau's letter, 16th September, 1720.

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THE Ministry had followed in every thing the advice and opinion of the Marshal. M. d'Aguesseau, in a letter of the 28th of September, writes to him: " You see too with how much deference your views are adopted here; " it is looked upon as the best method of promoting the interests of " the province under your command." M. d'Aguesseau, at the time of writing this letter, received fresh dispatches from the Marshal of Berwick, acquainting him, that he had changed his opinion with respect to the letters of reprimand he had desired to be sent to four officers of the Parliament; that body seemed to him now to be in so good a disposition, that he did not think there was any necessity for the letters. M. d'Aguesseau adds, with his own hand, in a PS. " I laid it before the Regent this morning; H. R. H. approves your indulgence at this time, as he formerly " did your severity; and leaves it to " you to give these four officers proper advice for their future conduct. " I cannot do better than to follow his example;

“ example; accordingly I shall not <sup>1720.</sup>  
“ send you my letters, being persuaded  
“ that we cannot be wrong in follow-  
“ ing your suggestions.” One should  
suppose, that the Parliament would be  
more circumspect in future, and that  
there would be less violence and more  
moderation in their proceedings; but  
the most respectable bodies of men, when  
the interests, privileges, or authority of  
the society are supposed to be concerned,  
are apt to forget their wisdom and pru-  
dence. The pride of this body was hurt  
by the appearance of humiliation they  
had undergone; and the resentment they  
preserved was not long before it broke  
out.

ON the 14th of January 1721, the 1721  
Marshal of Berwick found himself under  
a necessity of acquainting M. d'Aguesseau  
of a new dispute between the officers of  
the Criminal Court of the Parliament  
of Bourdeaux and the Jurats, relative to  
some servants he had caused to be im-  
prisoned for a disturbance they made  
at the play-house, and for resisting the  
guard.



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It must be acknowledged, that this affair, of itself, would not deserve notice; but the importance it derived from the interference of the Parliament, makes it interesting, as it serves to shew the spirit and manners of the time, as well as the constant prudence and moderation of the Marshal of Berwick. The Criminal Court summoned the Jurats, and reprimanded them for not proceeding against the ringleaders of the riot. They replied, that it was not in their power to proceed against them; that the officers had been imprisoned by orders from the Governor, and continued under the same authority. The Judges of the Criminal Court, however, claimed the jurisdiction of this affair, and ordered it to be examined into. The Marshal, being informed of their proceedings, signified to the Jurats, that they had only to demand the offenders of him, and he would order them to be delivered up to the usual course of justice. The Magistrates of the Criminal Court would not adopt this expedient, though it was natural and conformable to law and reason; they

they even refused to submit to the directions of the Chancellor, who himself prescribed to them the same expedient. <sup>1721.</sup>

In a letter to the Marshal of Berwick, dated 29th June, he says: " But if the

" Criminal Court do not make a better

" use than hitherto of the attention we

" have had for them, we must take other

" measures to put an end to the business

" of the footmen, without the interpo-

" sition of a parliament, which sets itself

" even against all that is done in its fa-

" vour!" For the rest, I cannot but

" commend your wisdom; and wish it

" may at last find some who will endea-

" vour to imitate it in the country where

" you reside." The Chancellor wrote,

at the same time, in the same terms, to

the First President. The firmness of this

second letter had its effect, and the affair

ended in the manner proposed by the

Marshal.

THE plague had for a long time raged

with great violence in the town of Mar-

seilles. The first infection was supposed

to have been communicated through the

negligence or avarice of the persons em-

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ployed in the Lazaretto. They were accused, or, at least, violently suspected, of having, in the course of their contraband traffic, introduced into the town goods that were infected with this contagion, which afterwards spread into the province. It had likewise been suffered to penetrate into some of the neighbouring provinces for want of proper precautions being taken by those who were intrusted with the administration of them; whether it were through indolence, incapacity, or fear of injuring the trade carried on with the infected province, by laying it under such restraints as were necessary to preserve their own from contagion.

THE Court was informed that it had got into the Gevaudan; it was barely suspected to be in the town of Mende; but it had broke out with violence at Canourge and the adjacent villages on the borders of Rouergue and Auvergne. The ministry, justly alarmed at the progress of so cruel a scourge, thought they could not exert themselves too much to protect the nation against its advances,  
and

and that it was necessary to take the most <sup>1721.</sup> speedy and effectual measures to put a stop both to the evil and the contagion. The surest remedies were to be adopted, at the same time care was to be taken that commerce should suffer as little as possible: the medium was not easy to be preserved. The Regent cast his eyes on the Marshal of Berwick, as the person whom he knew to be most capable of executing properly a commission of such delicacy and importance. The Marshal was at that time in a very indifferent state of health; he was just setting out for the waters of Barege, when he was called upon to sacrifice the care of his own health to that of the nation: he repaired without delay to Montauban, in order to be nearer to the infected provinces, as well as to those which he was to preserve from infection. To his government of Guienne were added, at this time, those of Auvergne, the Bourbonnois, and Limousin.

THE methods he proposed were at first thought too strong, though it was afterwards found that they were the only ones



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capable of putting a certain stop to the contagion : they were opposed by those, who from too great a respect to commerce, or, perhaps under that pretence, too great an attention to their private interests, had suffered the evil to spread, and were unwilling to acknowledge their mistake. Their arguments were plausible; and in the beginning, the greater part of the ministry were persuaded by them.

THE Chancellor d'Aguesseau, who was placed by the Regent at the head of the *Council of Health*, established on account of the plague, and some others of the greatest ability in that council, agreed in opinion with the Marshal of Berwick, whose advice was, to cut off all communication with the infected provinces. This was the most efficacious plan, and he pursued it as far as his government extended; but the majority of the council, having different views, prevailed; in consequence of which, those provinces which were not within the department of the Marshal of Berwick, were regulated by other principles.

ALL

ALL the Governors of provinces which <sup>1721.</sup> were either attacked or threatened with the plague, kept an exact correspondence with the Council of Health. It was impossible, therefore, to conceal the progress of the evil from them; the danger, which grew more pressing every day, increased their fears; and those fears working strongly on the minds of the Council, brought them to more serious reflections. Every one then perceived that the Marshal of Berwick had seen the object in its true light. The Regent, more convinced of this than any one, directed, that his arrangement should be followed in every instance: his regulations were approved and adopted, and an order of the King's Council was formed upon them, which was published and sent into the provinces that were infected with the pestilence, and those that bordered on them, with strict injunctions that it should be observed with the utmost exactness. The Chancellor d'Aguesseau wrote to the Marshal in these terms: "I have long said, that we had  
" only to leave you to your own judg-

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“ ment, and we should be well taken  
“ care of.”

BUT it was not enough to make good regulations, unless they were likewise carried into execution. The distemper continued to rage in Languedoc, and spread itself more and more in the different parts of that province; while Auvergne and Rouvergue, which had the contagion at their door, as it were, were entirely preserved from it by the wise orders of the Marshal of Berwick, and particularly by his vigilance and activity.

THE Regent, struck with this difference, and alarmed at the dreadful consequences resulting from it to the whole kingdom, determined to entrust the Marshal with the preservation of all the provinces in the neighbourhood of the contagion. M. le Blanc, Secretary for the War department, wrote to him, by H. R. H.'s direction, to form a general plan of a line, such as he had already proposed, which H. R. H. was determined to pursue, and to confide in him alone for the execution of it: accordingly

ingly the necessary orders were dispatched. It was recommended to him, however, at first, to keep them secret till the instant of their operation, on account of the Duke de Roquelaure, who was Governor of Languedoc; but there was little occasion for a hint of that kind to him. A principle of caution and justice, by which he governed himself in all matters of business, had hitherto prevented his interfering in the preservation of Languedoc, out of respect to the Duke of Roquelaure: and in the present circumstance, there was more need of compulsion than restraint. In fact, the Regent, finding afterwards that his own management and the delicacy of the Marshal might be attended with ill consequences, thought it necessary to take a more decided part. “ You (says  
“ M. le Blanc, writing to him on the  
“ part of H. R. H.) are much above  
“ the suspicion of encroaching upon  
“ M. de Roquelaure’s command; and  
“ an apprehension of that nature ought  
“ by no means to weigh with you against  
“ the



1721. " the public good, which hath always  
" been your chief object."

THIS was touching the Marshal in the part that was most sensible, and most capable of moving him; he felt that he could not, on any consideration, refuse to comply with what was required of him, the interest of the whole kingdom being so deeply concerned. In consequence, he determined to send the Regent the plan he had conceived of a line guarded by troops, to cut off all communication between the provinces infected, or supposed to be so, and those which the distemper had not yet reached. In this he proposes, in order to supply the wants of the inclosed provinces, that care should be taken on every side to send them all sorts of provisions, which should be conveyed to the line, there to be distributed to the persons who had demanded them, but so as that there should be no communication, the commodities being deposited by those who carried them, at a certain spot within the line, to which those who were to receive them were not to approach till the others had

had retired. This line was drawn from <sup>1721.</sup> the Mediterranean on the right, along the canal of Languedoc as far as Beziers; from thence up the river Orbe to Rouergue, (an extent of about ten or twelve leagues); it was then continued by the frontiers of Rouergue, Auvergne, and Forez, and extended through Velay, on the left, to the Rhone. The Marshal proposed also, that the same orders should be given on the other side of that river, to prevent all commerce and communication with Languedoc and Provence; and that these two provinces should be supplied with necessaries from Lyons and Dauphiny, instead of Vivarais.

ALTHOUGH the Regent had expressed to the Marshal of Berwick an earnest desire that he would take upon himself the whole command of this line, the Marshal, notwithstanding, proposed to the Duke de Roquelaure, to have a consultation with him at Beziers, intending to leave to him the honour of commanding that part of the line which should be in Languedoc. Upon this occasion M. le Blanc writes to the Marshal, " Few  
" persons

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“ persons possess so elevated a mode of  
 “ thinking as you have shewn in this  
 “ instance. H. R. H. highly com-  
 “ mends your sentiments ; but has been  
 “ too long acquainted with you to be  
 “ surprized at them.”

THE affair became so serious, that the Regent saw it would be quite unseasonable to pay any respect to persons, that might put it in their power to defeat the precautions necessary to be taken for putting a stop to the evil ; he therefore gave positive orders that the Marshal should command in Forez, and as far as the Rhone, in Velay and Vivarais, which constituted part of the government of Languedoc.

THOUGH no man was more firm than the Marshal of Berwick in his adherence to principles he had once adopted upon mature deliberation, yet he was entirely free from obstinacy ; he never failed to relax from his strictness as soon as he thought he might do it without prejudice to the service he was employed upon : of this he gave a proof on the present occasion. He thought that the absolute

prohibition of all communication, which he had at first suggested, might be so far dispensed with, as that the commerce between Lower and Upper Languedoc might be continued, provided it were confined to Beziers, and a month's quarantine established. He stated this to the Regent; and accordingly the King issued an Order of Council agreeable to this new arrangement.

IN the midst of all these cares, he met with a fresh disturbance on the part of the Parliament of Bourdeaux. He had established in that city an Office of Health, conformable to the King's orders, to see that the proclamation he had issued for preserving the province from contagion was duly executed. The Parliament complained to the Chancellor, that none of their body had been appointed to this office. The Chancellor wrote to the Marshal of Berwick on the subject. His answer is remarkable.

“ I did not think it proper (says he)  
“ to appoint any officer of the Parlia-  
“ ment, because it appeared to me to be  
“ necessary that there should be no delay  
“ in



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“ in a business of this nature. The  
“ extraordinary conduct of these Gentle-  
“ men, on many occasions, made me  
“ judge, that they were not well qua-  
“ lified for societies, where union, con-  
“ cord, and expedition are required;  
“ and as long as I shall have the honour  
“ of being Governor of that province, I  
“ shall carefully avoid every opportunity  
“ of entering into a dispute with them.  
“ Instead of desiring to be concerned in  
“ matters which the King hath thought  
“ proper to commit to other hands, they  
“ ought to apply themselves to their  
“ immediate functions, and not suffer,  
“ by their absence, that languor in the  
“ courts of justice which consumes the  
“ parties for want of judges to deter-  
“ mine their suits.”

It would be forming a very false idea of the Marshal of Berwick to suspect him of having written this letter to indulge a peevish humour, or a spirit of censure. He thought it his duty to acquaint the Head of the Law with what might require to be redressed, and was of consequence to public order in the Par-  
liament

liament of the province, of which he <sup>1721.</sup> was Governor. The purity of his intentions and actions was such, that all, without exception, who knew him, were convinced of this.

THE Chancellor, in his answer to this letter, says, " It must be acknowledged  
" that you would have had a very difficult task in concerting matters (with  
" the gentlemen of the Parliament).—  
" Besides, the success which Providence  
" still continues to grant to your zeal  
" and vigilance, for the preservation of  
" the country where you command, is  
" a sufficient pledge not only of the  
" uprightness of your intentions, but of  
" the wisdom and firmness of your conduct : we have therefore only to let  
" you act agreeable to your usual prudence."

THE distemper being confined to the infected countries, disappeared in time; and through the arrangements and vigilance of the Marshal, did not communicate itself to any of the neighbouring provinces.

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THE whole country being purified, and no symptoms of the plague appearing in any part, the Marshal of Berwick thought he might quit his command to go to Paris and the Court on his private affairs, which the public business had obliged him to neglect. Having obtained leave for this purpose, he arrived at Court in June 1722. He continued Governor of Guienne till the beginning of the year 1724.

1723.

THE Duke of Orleans dying of an apoplexy on the second of December 1723, the Duke of Bourbon immediately demanded the post of Prime Minister. Though care had been taken to instil into the young King a prejudice against that office, yet in his embarrassment what answer to give, he did not dare to refuse him. The Duke was no sooner placed at the head of affairs, than a variety of changes took place in the different departments of administration: among other things, the provincial governments were suppressed, and of course that of Guienne.

RETIRED from affairs, and in the state of idleness to which he was reduced, the Marshal of Berwick passed the greater part of his time at his country-seat, and divided the rest between the Court and the capital. He lived at Fitz-James, with his family and a few friends, employing himself in laying out his gardens. They had been planted by himself, and were the picture of his mind; every thing in them was in a grand style and in the best taste. One of the first connoisseurs in this branch \* walking in them one day, was in admiration. He asked himself where this Englishman had acquired so much taste. He might have been answered, *from his mode of considering objects, and the justness of his ideas.* In his manner of living there was no ostentation; all was uniform and simple. All his hours were fixed and appropriated: reading and walking were his chief occupations. He played but little, preferring conversation, in which he was gentle, amiable, and copious: he had seen

\* The Duke d'Antin, Superintendant of structures.



so much ; his life had been passed in the highest scenes of business ; till this time, he had no repose. His soul, therefore, was now, for the first time, given up, as it were, to itself. The recollection of his past life, in which he had never had any other principle of action but the public good, gave so much serenity to a mind so well composed, that it was impossible for those who lived in intimacy with him, not to see that he was happy. The sight was an encouragement to virtue, and a surer recommendation of it than all the discourses and writings of the most eloquent and pathetic moralists.

It was from this peaceful and happy life that he was called in 1733, to take upon him the command of the army then assembling on the Rhine. Lewis XV. not being able to send one into Poland to support the lawful election of his father-in-law against the Emperor and Russia, thought it equally just and glorious to revenge the insults he had sustained from those two powers. He attacked the Emperor on the Rhine and in Italy ; and the Kings of Spain and Sar-

dinia joined their arms to his. The Emperor, indeed, succeeded in his design of placing the Elector of Saxony on the throne of Poland; but it cost him the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily; and France, as a recompence for its generosity, got Lorrain, which Lewis XIV. even in the height of his victories, could never obtain. Lewis XV. did, what his Great Grandfather could not have attempted to do without alarming all Europe, and drawing upon himself the united arms of its different Potentates. He attacked and overcame the Emperor: the English and Dutch, the natural allies of that Prince, took no part in the quarrel; they remained neuter, and friends to Lewis XV. who owed both that neutrality and his success to the reputation he had acquired during the administration of Cardinal Fleury, of being a just and pacific Prince, and which he preserved even when crowned with victory, by the moderation he displayed in it.

THE Marshal of Berwick repaired to Strasburg in the beginning of September:

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there was not yet any actual preparation for the business of a campaign. The Minister was even divided, among the different objects, what plan to fix upon; the Empire had not yet declared in favour of the Emperor; and it was thought proper to keep on good terms with that body. The question therefore was, whether they should fall upon Brissac, which belonged to the Emperor, or upon the Imperial towns, Kell and Philipsburg. The Court had also another object very much at heart; this was the siege of Luxemburg: but the season was already too far advanced to admit of the preparations, necessary for a siege of that importance, being made time enough to enable them to get possession of the place before winter. Besides, the Marshal of Berwick looked upon the taking of Luxemburg to be less advantageous than the conquest of Philipsburg and Kell, which would secure the passage of the Rhine, and give us a more favourable opportunity of attacking the Emperor and the Empire, if it should think fit to declare in his favour, which it did, and of supplying

plying ourselves with provisions in a plentiful country, where we might live at the enemy's expence. The Marshal's advice was followed.

THE preparations for opening the campaign, and forming a siege, took up considerably more time than was expected. The army could not pass the Rhine till the 13th of October. The next day Kell was invested, and on the 20th the trenches were opened. In the mean time the King caused a declaration to be made at Ratibon, that he intended to live upon good terms with all the Princes of the Germanic Body, who should not enter into engagements contrary to his interest; that necessity obliged him to possess himself of the fortress of Kell, in order to secure a passage over the Rhine, as well for the purpose of offering more effectual assistance to the Empire against the oppressive measures of its Head, as to attack his enemy, the Emperor. The siege of Kell was not of long duration: the ordinary methods were employed, and the place capitulated on the 29th. The season was too far advanced to think of



making further conquests, and the siege of Philippsburg was reserved for the opening of the next campaign.

Two different memorials had been presented to the Marshal of Berwick, containing plans, as they were called, for covering Champagne, and preventing the enemy from levying contributions in that province: but the defence of it, according to these proposed plans, would have cost infinitely more both to the King and the province, and have proved more vexatious to the people, than even the contributions themselves. For these reasons, and several others, the Marshal of Berwick rejected them; it was difficult not to suspect the persons who proposed them of being influenced by other views than those of the public good. No act of hostility had been committed on that side by either party; and a reciprocal neutrality was preserved the year after, with respect to the countries of Luxemburg and Champagne. The Marshal acquainted the King of the arrangements he had made in order to march his army to the Maese, the Moselle and the Sarre, in case the enemy  
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should choose to attack us in that part ; but throughout this first campaign, which was very short, no enemy appeared. Towards the latter end of October, the bridge of Fort Lewis and the fortifications of Schelingen were repaired ; and another bridge was built over the Rhine, at Hunninguen, it being thought proper to have a passage in Upper Alsace. In the first week of November the army repassed the Rhine, and went into winter quarters.

THE Marshal of Berwick proposed to open the campaign very early with the siege of Philipsburg. The possession of this new passage, which he meant in the first instance to secure, over the Rhine, was the basis of all his projects ; but before he could get to it, it was necessary either to force the lines of Etlingen, which the enemy had formed during the winter, above Philipsburg, and which, by covering that place, shut up the country from the river to the mountains ; or to render them useless by passing the Rhine below them. This project could not be executed without great difficulty, unless by being before-

hand with the enemy, and taking the field before they had assembled all their force. Beside this, there was another reason; the place must be besieged either in spring or autumn, on account of the overflowing of the Rhine, which usually happens in summer from the melting of the snow, and makes a siege, if not impracticable, at least highly difficult and dangerous in that season. The Marshal of Berwick accordingly set out at the latter end of March 1734, for Strasburg, where he arrived on the 30th; but he found nothing in readiness; whether it were, that the Court had too long delayed issuing the orders, or that the execution of them had been neglected. This delay, however, had the appearance of not being the effect of chance, but of intrigue. The horses for the artillery and provisions were not yet at their place of destination; nay, the greatest part of them were not yet purchased, though M. d'Angervilliers, Secretary for the War Department, had assured the Marshal, that they should be got together in Alsace by the beginning of April,

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to the number of eighteen hundred for the artillery, (without reckoning the piquet horses) and five thousand for the provisions. The Marshal, however, had continued all the winter to press the Ministers upon the subject of preparations for the campaign, representing to them always in the strongest terms, how essential it was not to lose a moment, if they meant to insure success to the important siege of Philipsburg; but it is the misfortune of Courts to be governed, for the most part, by intriguing persons and favourites, to whom they listen more readily than even to persons of the most acknowledged merit.

FOURTEEN years of command, with uninterrupted success and glory, were not sufficient to induce the Ministry to place an entire confidence in the Marshal of Berwick, for the operations of this campaign. The Count de Belleisle, afterwards Marshal of France, had, beside the favour of the Court, the credit to be listened to, and by his enthusiasm and peremptory asseverations, even to seduce Cardinal Fleury and the rest of the Ministers, who



who were either Churchmen or of the long robe, and consequently little capable of forming a right judgment on military projects. He opposed those of the Marshal of Berwick in a multitude of memorials, which he was continually pouring into the closets of the Ministers; and in which his own interest generally appeared to stand foremost, because he never knew how to disguise it. Though he shewed more ambition than real talents, yet it must be acknowledged, that he was capable of the most extensive details; but as he carried every thing to excess, he entered so deeply into the minutiae, that he was overwhelmed with them: his ambition misled him in almost every instance, because his views were always personal and interested; his head, which was always in a flame, carried him beyond the truth into the boundless region of chimeras. He used such vigour and activity in his endeavours to have his plans adopted, that he often carried his point with the Ministers almost in spite of themselves; yet he could not succeed this time in the manner

manner he wished. In the month of January, this year \*, he had made a serious proposal to the Ministry for conducting the army through all Germany, carrying it as far as Saxony and Bohemia, and even still further. Of consequence he endeavoured to overturn every other plan for the campaign, and gave in, at the same time, a memorial against the siege of Philippsburg. The Marshal of Berwick disapproved of these projects: it was rashness, in his opinion, to think of leading an army above an hundred and fifty leagues from the frontiers, especially without any certain communication with France; and he had no difficulty in convincing the King of the absurdity of the project, when he explained to him his reasons. The King alludes to them in his letter to the Marshal of Berwick of the 8th of May. " It is  
" certain, says that Prince, that the  
" conquest of Philippsburg is to be pre-  
" ferred to every other object, for many  
" reasons, with which you are acquaint-

\* M. d'Angervilliers' letter of 24th January, 1734,

“ed as well as myself.” The project, therefore, of the Count de Belleisle was rejected\*. He then contented himself with proposing the siege of the castle of Traerbach, and obtained an order to undertake it. From that time this became the first step, notwithstanding the strong reasons assigned by the Marshal of Berwick, who had made it appear, that we ought to begin with Philipsburg. The Court had occasion more than once to repent of not having followed implicitly the more deliberate and consist-

\*It was better received in 1741, at the death of the Emperor Charles VI. but the success, as every body knows, was not answerable to the expectations and promises of the Count de Belleisle, then Marshal of France: which clearly proves how unreasonable it must have been in 1734, when we had to engage the power of the whole House of Austria, joined to that of the empire, which declared for the Emperor; whereas in 1741, we had at first only the forces of the Queen of Hungary to combat with for the execution of the project, and we had for allies the two most powerful Princes of the Empire, the King of Prussia and the Elector of Saxony; without reckoning the Emperor and the influence of the Imperial Authority. The English, Dutch, and the King of Sardinia did not declare against us till 1743 and 1744.

ent plans of the Marshal of Berwick, and of having, in some instances, given the preference to the scholar instead of the master. The Count de Belleisle, lately promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-General, had scarcely yet served, in time of war, in a higher capacity than that of Brigadier, and had not been employed on any enterprize of moment.

M. D'ANGERVILLIERS, in order to remove the difficulties which the Marshal of Berwick objected against putting off the siege of Philipsburg till summer, sent him word in his letter of 5th of April, that as there had been but little snow that year, there would be no inundation. But the season and the elements were not so complaisant to the Ministers. The heats were violent, and occasioned an unusual melting of snow in the black-mountains; the quantity, which accumulates on their summits, never being thoroughly exhausted, however great the melting may be. The Rhine swelled and overflowed this year more than usual, and the Court had determined to run the risque. The Minister



fter acquainted the Marshal, that the King was extremely desirous the siege of Philipsburg should be undertaken, although in the summer season, and that he would be greatly mortified if it could not be pursued. It became necessary, therefore, to resolve upon it. From that moment the Marshal of Berwick thought of nothing but how to surmount the obstacles he had himself foreseen and foretold, and which he must expect to meet with.

It was to be supposed, that Prince Eugene would have time enough to assemble the forces of the Emperor and Empire, before the conclusion of the siege, in order to march to Philipsburg, and try to attack us, or endeavour to draw us off from the siege, by making a diversion on the Moselle, or on the Upper Rhine, that he might be able to engage us with all his forces united, while ours would be weakened by the troops we should have left at the siege, and thus by obtaining a victory, oblige us to raise it. It was likewise necessary to provide against an inundation of  
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the Rhine. The Marshal of Berwick was never surprized by events; because his active foresight had always thought of some remedy among the accidental circumstances that might attend them. He communicated to the King his plans and dispositions. Thirty-five battalions and twenty squadrons were destined for the siege: with the rest of his force, consisting of seventy-five or eighty battalions and a hundred and twenty squadrons, he formed an army of observation, ready to move on any side, and to oppose Prince Eugene wherever he might appear. He meant to draw lines of circumvallation round Philippsburg, and to make them impregnable; they were to be manned with a hundred battalions: in this situation he was determined to receive Prince Eugene, if he came with his whole force, which he did.

SOME of the General Officers were of opinion that he should not wait for the enemy in his lines: they were for marching out to meet Prince Eugene, and continued in great anxiety during the whole time of the siege. It is however agreed, that

that the soldiers were not under the least apprehension : they seemed even to wish for an attack, relying upon their own courage, and believing themselves perfectly secure in a position chosen for them by a General, in whom they had an entire confidence. The Marshal of Berwick thought, with M. de Luxembourg \*, that intrenchments, formed with every advantage that art could give, and of so small an extent, as to admit of being defended throughout by two lines of infantry, could not possibly be forced. It appeared by the event, that Prince Eugene's opinion was the same, as he never ventured to attack our lines; for, critical as the situation of the French army might then be considered, he would not have hesitated to engage them in their intrenchments, if he had had the least hope of succeeding.

THE Marshal of Berwick, though too prudent ever to promise any thing lightly, was so assured of the effect of his operations, that he did not scruple to write to the King in the most positive

\* See the Memoirs, Vol. I. p. 84.

terms,

terms, and like a man who had no doubt of the success of the siege: "When we  
"are got before the place, says he, we  
"will endeavour to remove the obstacle  
"of the waters, either by making drains  
"to reduce them as we can, or by employing a quantity of fascines for carrying on our trenches: the worst that  
"can happen, is, that we may be obliged  
"to suspend our operations for some  
"time, in order to renew them with  
"more vigour, when the waters are  
"funkt." In a word, Sire, we will wait  
"patiently in our well-intrenched camp,  
"till the difficulties are removed, and  
"we will make ourselves masters of  
"Philipsburg, even though we should  
"be obliged to wait till the month of  
"October."

NOTWITHSTANDING these absolute assurances, the Court was thrown, a short time after, into the most terrible alarm; and at the critical moment when it happened, the Marshal of Berwick, on whom they would have had an entire reliance, was no longer existing.



BUT to return to the operations at the opening of the campaign. The Marshal of Berwick assembled part of the army in April, and went to encamp on the 9th at Spires and Little Holland, from which he covered the road to Philipsburg: he extended his troops as far as Frankendal and Worms. By this movement, he made the enemy apprehensive for the Lower Rhine, and kept them in doubt with respect to our designs. The operations of the army being put a stop to by the siege of Traerbach, where the Count de Belleisle could not open his trenches till the night between the 25th and 26th of this month, they remained in the same position till the end of April. They were then put in motion, and coasted along the Rhine up to Fort Lewis, where they crossed the river, and marched immediately to the lines at Etlingen. As soon as the enemy got intelligence of our march, they were convinced that our design was upon their lines, and they brought up accordingly all their force. But, notwithstanding the delay we had suffered

in our operations on that side, we were still before-hand with them. They had not been able, in their hurry, to collect more than thirty thousand men, under the command of the Duke of Bevern. The lines had been formed with a good deal of care; they were furnished with a good ditch, redans at certain distances, which flanked each other, and an excellent parapet. On the left, they were continued along the mountain to which they extended; from thence they crossed the plain, and their right was carried on to the Rhine, near Mulberg. Though they occupied a space not less than four leagues, the Princes of the Circles of the Lower Rhine looked upon them as a sufficient barrier to keep us out. This consideration had even been suggested by the Emperor's Ministers as a motive to determine the Diet of the Empire to declare against France, as it had done.

LIEUTENANT-General the Duke de Noailles, and Major-General Count Saxe (both of them afterwards Marshals of France) were ordered to turn the lines by

the mountains, which they performed. But what the Marshal of Berwick depended most upon for obliging the enemy to abandon their lines, was a body of twenty thousand men he had left near Spires, under the command of the Marquis d'Asfeld. That General had instructions, as soon as he should be informed that the enemy had brought up their whole force to the lines, in order to defend them against the grand army, to march to the isle of Nekerau, below Philipsburg, to throw a bridge over the Rhine at that place, and to pass it: for this purpose he carried one along with him upon sledges. By this manœuvre, combined with the motions of the grand army, the Marshal of Berwick was certain, that, as soon as the enemy knew that d'Asfeld had passed the Rhine, and could be reinforced with as many troops as he should want to attack them with advantage in the rear, they would think of nothing but quitting their lines and retreating. Accordingly, upon the news of M. d'Asfeld's having crossed the Rhine, they retreated

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On the 4th of May, the very day we turned their lines, and with such expedition, that it was impossible to come up with their rear-guard, at least to make any impression upon it. They retired to Hailbron, and during these movements, Prince Eugene joined his army. Traerbach had just surrendered to the Count de Belleisle. Our army marched from the lines to Bruchsal, where M. d'Asfeld rejoined us on the 11th, with the corps under his command.

On the 13th M. d'Asfeld was detached with thirty battalions and two regiments of dragoons to invest Philippsburg, whither the army followed him. The trenches were opened between the 3d and 4th of June, and the attack was carried on along the Rhine against the horn-work: some days before an attack had been made by the Swiss on the work that covered the draw-bridge of the town, upon the left bank on the other side of the Rhine. The taking of that work was attended with this singular advantage, that we could erect batteries on that shore, which would



command the backs and interior parts of the works of the town, which lay on the Rhine, and beat them to pieces. This was what had partly determined the Marshal of Berwick in his choice of directing his attack along the side of the river. It was on the same side, that this place, when besieged by the Dauphin and M. de Vauban in 1688, had been taken. Of the three attacks made at that time, this was the most successful.

It might be supposed by officers, whose moderate talents and ill-digested notions lead them almost always into false applications of great models, that the Marshal of Berwick, in imitation of M. de Vauban, ought to have made three attacks; but the Marshal, who was known to be one of the most enlightened Generals in the science of engineering, was too skilful and too deliberate to depart from a plan laid down by Vauban without good reasons. It was easy for him to conceive that Prince Eugene, as soon as he had collected all his force, might march to Philipsburg, with a view of attacking his lines; on such a supposition,

position, it was of importance to confine himself to one attack, that he might not have three intrenchments to defend, and too great a number of troops employed, which would weaken the army that was to face Prince Eugene, if he should come to a resolution of attacking the lines. The Dauphin and Vauban, in 1688, had not the same reasons: they were not at that time in fear of any enemy in the field that could come to interrupt the siege: besides, it was formed at the end of October, and the troops, after this service, had nothing more to do but to go and take their ease in winter quarters. The three attacks, under these circumstances, appear to have been well imagined for the purpose of fatiguing the garrison, and making its resistance weaker at each attack, by dividing its forces. It must, however, likewise be acknowledged, that this method has its inconveniences in some cases; it increases the labour and fatigue of the besiegers, and even much more in proportion than that of the besieged. It may also be supposed, that it is fre-

quently expedient to employ a little more time in a siege, than to hasten the conclusion of it by over fatiguing the troops, and bringing on, by that means, disorders, which are destructive to an army. Every body knows that the labours of a siege are immense, and that they are multiplied by every additional attack. The siege of Philippsburg, in 1734, was formed at the opening of the campaign; and it was of the utmost consequence to preserve the health of the army as much as possible, to keep it upon a footing with that of the enemy, which was quite fresh, newly come out of quarters, and against which they would have to act for four months in the field, after the conclusion of the siege.

THE Marshal of Berwick never depended upon any person for what he could see or do himself. It was he, properly speaking, who directed the siege. He never failed to visit the trenches very early every morning, where a report was immediately made to him of the progress during the night. He then repaired to the extremity of the Sap, to make his

his own observations on the state of things, after which he settled with the chief Engineer the operations of the following night. On the 12th of June, he went as usual to the trenches, visited the Saps, and placed himself on the raised ground to take a general view. One of our batteries was pointed at the bank on which the Marshal stood; some soldiers had been killed there by our own cannon; and a sentinel had even been placed near the spot, to hinder any person from stopping there, and particularly from getting upon the bank. Whether the sentinel did not dare to speak to his General, or whether the Marshal, influenced by his natural intrepidity, which always led him to despise danger too much, had not paid sufficient attention to the notice, this was precisely the spot he chose for his observations. The position was exactly between our battery and the opposite one of the enemy; they both fired at an instant; and a ball carried off the Marshal's head, but from which side it came could never be thoroughly ascertained. The report of his death was soon



spread through the army, and caused a general consternation: it had the same effect at Court and in Paris; for he was possessed of the confidence of the army, the King, the Ministry, and the nation. The enemy feared him as a General, who had accomplished great things, and had ever been fortunate. His death left the army in a situation, which many thought critical; it was enclosed within lines, encompassing a strong place, to the assistance of which Prince Eugene was coming up with all possible speed at the head of a formidable army\*. The secret of his plans died with him; it was only known in general that they were very great. Notwithstanding his usual moderation, he had, during the expedition of Traerbach, discovered his impatience at the delay that siege occasioned in his grand operations.

THE Marquis d'Asfeld, who, immediately after the death of the Marshal of Berwick, took upon him, as the eldest Lieutenant-General, the command of the

\* The number was said to amount to a hundred thousand men.

army,

army, lay quiet in his lines facing Prince Eugene. He continued the operations of the siege in spite of that General and of the overflowing of the Rhine, and made himself master of Philipsburg on the 18th of July. The campaign closed with this conquest.

THOUGH Lord Bolingbroke, in what he says of the Marshal of Berwick, has pretended to no more than sketching out some of the principal features of his portrait, and the President Montesquieu was prevented by death from finishing that which he had begun, we shall not attempt to draw a picture of him after two such able masters: we shall only desire permission to describe some features, which they have omitted, leaving to some other and more skilful hand, the business of collecting them together, and making a finished piece.

WE have seen the Marshal of Berwick, in the long course of a laborious life, atchieving memorable exploits; but he appeared each time so superior to what he was before, however great, that he was still believed capable of greater things.

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It may therefore, with truth, be said of him, that he had more greatness in him than he had opportunity of shewing, acting as he always did by the most simple process, and never endeavouring to display himself to advantage.

THE Marshal of Berwick possessed all the requisites for a warrior; but it would take up too much time to enter into a detail of them; it would be, in a manner, writing a treatise on the art of war. Every military man, who will study his campaigns, will admire, in the plans of them, the justness of view, the extent of combination, and the character of genius throughout: he will not discover the least fault in the execution of them; he will see, that the measures were so skilfully taken, that the success was almost always insured beforehand: no General had the coup d'œil quicker or more accurate, whether in action to discover the means of advantage, and make those decisive movements which carry victory with them, or in a campaign to observe and take advantageous positions, upon which the suc-

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cess of the whole depends. He was more than any man master of the art of subsisting an army; we have seen the care and pains his activity enabled him to employ, and the resources he found out to supply his own with provisions in 1709, when they were in want of every thing; but he was most remarkable for his extraordinary skill in the arrangement of his provisions, and the judicious choice of depôts, by which, and the consequences resulting from it, the event of campaigns is often determined. Those, in which he commanded, were not without that brilliancy which attracts the admiration of mankind in general; but to distinguish and feel the whole merit of them, requires professional knowledge and a nice examination: they bear the characteristic mark, which is always found in the works of great masters; the more one dwells on them, the more one separates and examines the minuter parts, the more perfection is discovered; they have in them, for the most part, peculiarities, which distinguish them from the campaigns of other Generals;



Generals; one can scarcely cast an eye over them without observing, almost in every instance, a particular stroke of genius which marks them for his own.

How many striking examples, in proof of what we have advanced, might we produce from these Memoirs? It would be sufficient to call to mind the four campaigns he made in Dauphiny. In the protection of that frontier he carried the art of defence further perhaps than any General had ever done. Marshal Catinat had been employed in 1692 to conduct the same kind of war in the same country; but he did not support the reputation he had before acquired in Piedmont in the offensive war he had carried on against the Duke of Savoy. We cannot even but remark a wide difference between the method he took of defending the frontier at that time, and the plan upon which the Marshal of Berwick defended it several years after. Besides this, Marshal Catinat was superior in force to his enemy; the Marshal of Berwick always inferior. M. de Catinat had, according to M. de Fenquiere,

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eres\*, an army composed of a hundred battalions and forty squadrons dispersed along the frontier; yet, in spite of so large a number of troops, and the acknowledged ability and vigilance of M. de Catinat, the Duke of Savoy, with a force greatly inferior in infantry, contrived to penetrate into France. He took Embrun in the rear of our army; and would even have proceeded further into Dauphiny, if he had not been seized with the Small-pox at Embrun, which attacked him so severely that it put a stop to his expedition. From this instance, and several plausible arguments, M. de Feuquieres concludes, in his Memoirs †, that “it is not possible to maintain a defensive war in that part without sustaining some inconveniencies annually.”

MARSHAL Villars did not succeed better than Marshal Catinat in the defence of this same frontier in 1708, though he also had an army superior in infantry to that of the Duke of Savoy; he could not

\* Mem. de Feuquieres, tom. ii. p. 192, 12mo, 1750.

† Ibid. p. 147, hinder

hinder that Prince from besieging and taking Exilles and Fenestrelle, the garisons of which places he even made prisoners of war.

WE may therefore consider that which the Marshal of Berwick sent to Lewis XIV. in 1709, as a certain plan of defence for our Italian frontier. In fact, it was by pursuing uniformly the same plan through four successive campaigns, that he checked the advances of the Duke of Savoy during that whole period, and kept him from penetrating into the kingdom in any part, notwithstanding the projects he had formed, and in spite of the superiority of his forces at that time, in infantry as well as cavalry. Accordingly that Prince, since King of Sardinia, who was, no doubt, well qualified to decide upon the merit of Generals and campaigns, was used to say, in speaking of those which the Marshal of Berwick had made against him, "that he had never seen so good manœuvres, nor so skilful and noble a method of making war."

As it is our intention to point out whatever may best contribute to a thorough knowledge of the Marshal of Berwick's military talents, we ought not to omit two circumstances. This defensive plan, the greatest perhaps and most difficult to be devised, on account of the extent and nature \* of the country to be covered by it, and, when discovered, the safest and most easy to be executed, was the result of a single journey the Marshal took from one end to the other of the frontier, before the opening of the first campaign. The second circumstance, which is not less remarkable, is, that this plan, which, from the immensity of its combinations, seems to be a prodigy of calculation, was so complete from the instant it was conceived, that he had not occasion to make the smallest change in it afterwards; he ventured constantly to assure Lewis XIV. of the goodness and safety of his defensive plan; the success of which, repeated each campaign against an able general, was the best proof that could be given of it. The experience

\* More than 60 leagues in length across the Alps.



he acquired in these four campaigns we are speaking of, furnished him with the knowledge, that upon his plan an army of forty-five battalions and twenty squadrons were sufficient to defend the whole frontier against an army of sixty or seventy battalions and fifty squadrons.

THE difference we find, upon a comparison between the defensive plan of the Marshal of Berwick and those of the other Generals, with respect to the number of troops each of them required, in proportion to what he supposed the enemy to have for the offensive, may reasonably surprize us : Marshal Catinat had always demanded one third more infantry than the enemy had ; the Marshal of Berwick limited himself to one-third less at the end of the four campaigns he made. This great difference can proceed only from the new and superior manner of defence which the Marshal of Berwick invented, and which had escaped the penetration of the greatest Generals. M. de Feuquieres was well apprized of the advantage of a central position for moving to any point of the circumference,

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and preventing the attack of an enemy; but he did not, like the Marshal of Berwick, conceive the application of it to the defence of that frontier by means of such a line as the latter formed an idea of, and the extent of which is astonishing.

His campaigns in Spain may equally serve as models for military men to copy after; he was there alternately upon the offensive and defensive. It would be more than useless to recite his manœuvres; he has done it himself in his Memoirs much better than it could be done here; we shall only observe, that he shewed in that situation that he was never greater than in misfortunes; and when matters were thought desperate: in unforeseen and critical events, he was, as it were, the man of the moment, the resource of the Court, and even of the Generals. He was sent from Spain in the middle of the campaign of 1707, to the Duke of Burgundy, in Provence, who was marching to the relief of Toulon, then besieged by the Duke of Savoy. After the battle of Malplaquet in 1709, he received orders to repair from

Brianzon, where he had just finished the campaign, to the army in Flanders, which was commanded by Marshal Boufflers, since the wound of Marshal Villars. Lewis XIV. at the instance of Marshal Villars, dispatched him into Flanders to succour Douay. At the end of the year 1712, he was but just arrived at Court from Dauphiny, when they sent him straight into Catalonia to preserve Gironne, which was blockaded by Count Staremberg, and reduced to the last extremity.

In the hurry of the most difficult operations, and the heat of the warmest actions, the Marshal of Berwick preserved that tranquillity and coolness which is the effect of natural intrepidity, and a perfect knowledge of that art, which in shewing us all we have to fear from an enemy, points out at the same time what we have to oppose to him. This tranquillity of mind was likewise the consequence of that firmness and resolution which places the wise man so far above the reach of accidents, because he never has any thing to reproach himself with. In all his enterprizes he had

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likewise that success which, for the most part, attends a great man, because his enlarged understanding enables him to comprehend the whole of his object; nothing escapes him; the accuracy of his judgment forms true combinations, and never fails to point out the proper path: in a word, because the diligence he uses in the execution of his designs, and which is the guarantee of success, is always under the direction of prudence.

Few men had seen so much service as the Marshal of Berwick; he had made twenty-nine campaigns; in fifteen of which he had commanded in chief; he had however been present at but six battles, of which there was only one, that of Almanza, where he commanded. It may perhaps be matter of surprize, that in the great number of campaigns, where he was at the head of armies, and especially with that distinguished bravery he had always shewn, there should be but one battle fought under his command: he explains this himself. He said, in order to come to an engagement both the Commanders must be of a mind, and



that no General ought to fight but when he could not do otherwise, because the issue was always uncertain; and that it was not right to endanger the success of a campaign, or a war, perhaps even the fate of a nation, when one might by good dispositions and able manœuvres equally accomplish the object without risking a battle. He did not however avoid battles in such a manner as to draw upon himself the imputation of timidity, because the honour of an army requires that there should be no signs of fear, because he held honour above every thing; because he was not afraid of engaging (which he fully shewed in the field of Almanza); and finally, because an appearance of timidity in the General would have been realized in the soldier. If therefore we do not find him courting battles, which is too often the case of heroes, and if he placed himself above the splendor which the lives of great Captains derive from them, it was, if we may venture to say so, the consequence of a superior heroism. He considered it as a duty to avoid the spilling of  
blood

blood unnecessarily, and to prefer at all times a sure game, with respect to the general good, to any private honour he might flatter himself with an expectation of, from battles, in which his skill would generally have given him every advantage against his adversary.

THIS grand principle of humanity swayed him equally in sieges. He was always attentive to save the lives of his men; he chose, for their preservation, rather to carry on the sap inch by inch, and to prolong the duration of a siege several days, than to cut it short by those violent and destructive attacks which are made at the expence of so much valuable blood.

No man exercised command with greater dignity. He was, indeed, taxed with severity; but those who knew him well, said, that he was rather exact than severe. Being entirely free from pedantry, he was, in fact, severe only from a sense of duty, so far as respected others, and was more rigid to himself than to them. This exactness was likewise, in some degree, the result of a love of order and

discipline, which he possessed in the highest degree; knowing all the importance and necessity of keeping up both the one and the other, particularly in armies. History, which will shew that he knew how to command, can likewise attest, that he knew how to obey; two qualities very rarely to be found in the same person. Educated in the principle of passive obedience, he was the most submissive of subjects to his Prince, and the most zealous for his service. This submission, however, which was the invariable rule of his conduct, was neither mean nor blind; he would oppose the Ministers of the greatest Princes with a firmness not to be shaken, and even bordering upon obstinacy, when the points in question related merely to war; because he thought the advantage must evidently be on his side in the discussion of matters, with which he was much better acquainted than those who endeavoured to overrule his judgment.

THE same firmness he shewed also upon some occasions, when in particular operations of war he differed from the great masters

masters of the art, because he had a strong and clear conviction that they were mistaken. He was too great an adept in every part of war, and of too solid a judgment, to submit to their decisions with that blind confidence by which the generality of men are governed. Sensible that men of the profoundest skill may sometimes err, he examined as well his own opinions as those of others, with that impartiality, which, when joined to a sagacity and reflection like the Marshal of Berwick's, always leads to truth. For this reason, in besieging the castle of Nice in 1705, after having thoroughly inspected and reconnoitred the place, he was not afraid of deviating from the advice of Marshal Vauban, communicated to him by Lewis XIV. and to attack that fortress on the very side which Vauban had declared could not be attacked. The success, and the lights which were acquired in this siege, proved that the Marshal of Berwick's judgment and choice in the side of his attack were preferable; that he had discovered what had escaped the no-



tie of professors of the art, and that his genius sometimes made him superior to the greatest masters. But there was so much simplicity and so little self-sufficiency in his manner of opposing the sentiments of those he differed from, that it was not easy to be offended with him.

ALTHOUGH the life of the Marshal of Berwick is scarcely to be considered in any but a military view, yet he shewed that he could likewise have been an able politician. He was for several years minister to \* \* \* \*, known by the name of the Chevalier de St. George. His plan for the re-establishment of that Prince in 1715, after the death of Queen Anne, demonstrates that he had great penetration in those matters, and was capable of discovering and taking advantage of circumstances which had escaped the observation of others. He proves in his Memoirs, that the success of the enterprize, situated as affairs were at that time, was infallible: there wanted but one word from the King of Sweden, which would have been as much for his  
intere

interest as for that of \*\*\*\*†, and the revolution in England would have been effected.

THE Marshal of Berwick was not without ambition; but that passion, which more or less misleads almost every man who is possessed with it, never made him deviate from the path of virtue. He was fond of glory; but he sought it chiefly in the line of his duty, which no one knew or performed better than himself. Far different from those who acquit themselves with a servile caution, and always seem to be on their guard lest they should do too much, he measured the extent of his duty by his talents, persuaded that the use and the account of them is due to God, from whom they were received; to one's King and one's country, for the service of which they were given; and to one's self, for the ease of one's conscience. There is no modern better calculated than the Marshal of Berwick to renew the idea of the great men of antiquity, particularly the Greeks. Their chief study was mora-

† The Pretender, which would  
lity;

lity; and they placed their glory in the accomplishment of their duties. If Aristides, Epaminondas, Fabius, or Cato had appeared in our wretched age, and been circumstanced as the Marshal of Berwick was, they would have been what he was in every respect. The internal sense of an enlightened conscience, the integrity of which is preserved solely by the practice of virtue, was the guide of this Christian Hero in all his actions. The object of these was that truly great end which religion presents, and which alone is capable of fixing and concentrating all the desires of man. Attached to true and great principles, with great elevation of soul, his conduct was simple; modesty and truth ever composed and marked his character. He was cautious not to praise any but those who deserved it; attentive to speak ill of none; and never made himself the theme of his discourse. Although impenetrable where secrecy was necessary, his frankness and the certainty of not being deceived by him, exacted from others that confidence which

smooths

smooths the greatest difficulties in business.

NEVER did Patriot carry the love of the public further, or manifest a more fixed desire of acquitting himself well of the trust reposed in him : this was his ruling passion ; and it was so strong, that he would employ even the man who had endeavoured to do him mischief, in preference to others, if he thought him more likely to promote the success of a business ; thus appearing to forget all causes of personal animosity, which he might have, but with which his soul was only lightly affected. It was by this generous, truly noble, and public spirited proceeding that he made real friends of those who were capable of gratitude ; and who, ashamed of the injustice of their former sentiments respecting him, became the greatest admirers of his virtues, and were from that time so attached to him, that they would have sacrificed their lives for his service.

THE arts of a Court were unknown to the Marshal of Berwick ; and those even who practised them with the most address



dress seemed to respect his virtue. He was universally known as a man who in great affairs would never be swayed by private considerations, still less by selfish views, but always by the good of the public. So notorious was this, that actions, which the necessity of circumstances would have made equivocal in any one but himself, were always taken on the good side, and favourably construed by the public; so much was his integrity above the slightest suspicion.

THE Marshal of Berwick might have enriched himself in fifteen campaigns by the command of armies, but he lived in a constant contempt, or rather forgetfulness of wealth. Kind and tender as he was to his children, it will perhaps be thought that his neglect of money was too great for the father of a family; but his heart was engrossed by true glory and virtue. In his expences, particularly those which related to his person, he was moderate, as much by taste as principle; yet he lived conformable to his rank, and sometimes even magnificently when occasion required it.

To

To the qualities of patriot, friend, and father, the Marshal of Berwick added those of a good husband; there never was one more affectionate, more complaisant, more patient even, but not to weakness. He lost his first wife soon after his marriage. It seemed to be his destiny to have one, and to make her happy. It was not long before he entered again into the marriage state, in which his second wife enjoyed the greatest felicity for thirty-four years that he lived with her in the most perfect harmony. She survived him seventeen years, a continual prey to grief, and inconsolable for his loss. She was distinguished as well for resolution and courage as for wit; her tenderness for her husband therefore had no tincture of weakness in it: the uncommon impression which his loss made on this strong, but sensible, mind, and which was so deep, that neither time nor the absence of the object could ever efface or impair it, affords the most incontestable proof of the amiable and essential qualities of the Marshal of Berwick.

His

His noble figure, fine size, calm and serious deportment, gave him an air of severity which inspired respect, and even a kind of awe in those who approached him, and whose rank or employment placed them beneath him. This commanding outside covered much humanity and gentleness, and a remarkable equality of temper, whether in business, in the command of armies or provinces, or in society, by which he was always perfectly master of himself. The regularity of manners which he assumed in early life did not interfere with that mild gaiety which was natural to him. It always recurred in his private and familiar scenes; though that sort of decorum, so much recommended by the ancients, had brought him to a habit of grave composure, required in public characters and in the great employments which he bore even in his youth. Hamilton, so much celebrated for his elegant poetry, his tales full of wit and taste, and some other works, was one of the Marshal's companions, and scarcely ever left him: he found there that  
amuse-

amusement and pleasure to which he himself so much contributed. In the absence of the Marshal, they had a correspondence by letters.

THE Marshal of Berwick spoke little, unless he was animated by some subject that pleased him: what he said was always well expressed, and in few words. No man had clearer ideas, or delivered them more clearly. He had strong sense, sound judgment, and great penetration; which appears in all his actions and enterprises, and has been seen in his Memoirs.

THERE are few heroes who do not sometimes forget themselves and betray the man; but the Marshal of Berwick, without having need of art to conceal himself (he knew not what it was), never shewed a weakness in any moment of his life, even to those who had the nearest access to him. He had, without doubt, his faults, because he was a man; but there are none imputed to him, because he had none in any eminent degree. The utmost that could be said of him was, that he was naturally inclined to be cho-



leric; but he corrected this so thoroughly in his youth, that it could not perhaps be perceived afterwards but by those who were most intimate with him.

IN finishing our sketch of the Marshal of Berwick, we cannot avoid observing, that he united in himself an assemblage of circumstances not only remarkable, but perhaps peculiar to his own person. He had commanded the armies of three of the greatest Monarchs in Europe, those of France, Spain, and England: he was possessed of the highest rank in each of those realms, being a Peer of France as well as England, and Grandee of Spain; and each of these Kings had invested him with their respective Orders.

THE END.



MEMOIRS OF  

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NOTES  
TO

The SECOND VOLUME of the MEMOIRS of  
the Marshal Duke of BERWICK.

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No. I.

Extract of several Letters written by the Duke  
of BURGUNDY, by the Duke de VENDOSME,  
and the Marshal of BERWICK, during the  
Campaign of 1708.

LETTER.

From the Marshal of BERWICK to the Duke of  
BURGUNDY.

*Lisle, 15th July, 1708.*

*[Duplicate of that of the 14th.]*

THE army of the enemy came to encamp yesterday at Helchin, as I have had the honour to acquaint you. To-day they passed the Lys at Menin and near it, and are gone to encamp at Outhem; this morning they forced the lines without much trouble, and took the posts that were at Commines and Warneton. It seems by this step that they have designs upon Ypres; I do not know, however, whether they have a sufficient quantity of artillery

in Menin for such a siege. M. de Chevilly has informed me, that, agreeable to what I wrote to him yesterday, he has retained all the soldiers of your army, which amount to about five thousand men.

I am assured that Prince Eugene's army has joined Marlborough's, so that now the other side of the Scheld is free; it remains, therefore, for you to determine what you think proper to do, that I may conduct myself accordingly.

It appears to me, that you have but four things to do: First, to remain behind the canal, in which case it will be necessary that you should send a large body of infantry to take post between Nieuport and Bruges, for the security of your convoys; and then, as I believe you will think it unnecessary to keep all your cavalry with you, you may be able to send me a part of it. Secondly, to march to the enemy, in which case you must abandon Bruges, leave a strong garrison in Ghent, if you mean to keep it, and advance by the other side of the Scheld. I will come up as far as Oudenard to meet you; after which you will determine how you are to proceed to relieve Ypres, and to attack the enemy. The third plan is, to march into Brabant, in order to take Brussels, Mechlin and Louvain; and at the same time to cause Huy and Liege to be besieged in your rear. The fourth plan, if the enemy should attack Ypres, is to attack Oudenard at the same time.

Whatever resolution you may take, there is not a moment to lose in making your dispositions, and ordering the necessary preparations. In expectation of being honoured with your orders, I shall collect all my troops about Douay; the last of which cannot come up before the 19th or 20th, &c.

LETTER.

L E T T E R

From the Marshal of BERWICK to the Duke de  
VENDOSME.

*Lisle, (the same day) 15th July.*

THE enemy marched this morning from Helchin, passed the Lys at Menin and near it, and are at present encamped, with their whole army, between Ypres and Commines. You may well imagine they found no great difficulty to force the lines, and to put themselves in possession of the posts of Commines and Warneton. I had, however, sent word to the officer who commanded this last to retire; but it appears by the letters I have received from him, that the express I sent has been either taken, or else has lost his way.

Fortunately I have kept near five thousand men of your army in Ypres; for that fortress, in case of a siege, would have been in great want of troops, as it is impossible to throw in any at present.

My troops are to rendezvous at Douay, but the last cannot be there till the 19th or 20th. I have sent a regiment of dragoons to Tournay, and tomorrow another will come here.

I write a long letter to the Duke of Burgundy, in which I take the liberty to acquaint him with the several plans it appears to me he may pursue. I send you the copy of it. I have nothing more to say, but, that there is not a moment to lose in determining, &c.



## L E T T E R

From the Duke de VENDOSME to the Marshal of  
BERWICK.

*Camp at Lovendeghem, 17th July, 1708.*

I HAVE received the letter you have done me the honour of writing to me, with the copy of that you wrote to the Duke of Burgundy, in which you acquaint him with the several plans we may pursue.

Your ideas are wonderfully just; however, it is certain that yesterday Prince Eugene's army was still on the other side of the Dender; and there is not the least probability that the enemy will be able to lay siege to Ypres, being obliged to fetch every thing from Brussels; so that as the siege of that fortress, and the junction of Prince Eugene, are the two principles upon which your reasoning is founded, it appears to me that we need not yet take any resolution.

For my part, I persist in thinking, that the enemy have no other intent but to dislodge us from here, in order to retake Ghent and Bruges, which they are very desirous of. I will moreover tell you, that the conquests they might make between the Lys and the sea, would be useless to them as long as we are in possession of Ghent and Bruges; for it is in our power to shut up the pass of Oudenard during the winter, and not only to retake Ypres, but also to make ourselves masters of Menin.

I will afterwards tell you that the siege of Ypres is of such great consequence, that it is impossible to undertake it without having all the provisions  
and

and artillery at Menin. After this, if you will have any cavalry, you have only to say how many you will have, we will send you some, &c.

L E T T E R

From the Marshal of BERWICK to the Duke of BURGUNDY.

*Courtray, 17th July.*

MOST of the advices we had received informed us that Prince Eugene's army had joined Marlborough's: that intelligence turns out to be false; for it is certain the Prince's infantry was, the 14th, at Louvain. That being the case, might not one prevent the junction of the enemy, and by that means render Marlborough's subsistence very difficult: For if we could find a proper situation in the interval between the Lys and the Scheld, Oudenard being in our rear, Marlborough would have no other place to furnish him with bread but Menin, and you would be sure of getting yours from Tour-nay, by making bridges upon the Scheld, below your left. I am not enough acquainted with the country to be able to say, whether, what I have the honour of proposing to you, can be carried into execution; but you have many people in your army who know perfectly well the ground in question, by which you will judge whether you can place your right to the Lys, and your left to the Scheld, with Oudenard behind you. I shall not stir from Douay till I know the resolution you may think proper to take, more especially as my last troops will not arrive till the 20th.

## N O T E S.

There is no time to be lost, if you think you can execute what I propose; the left at the rivulet of Espierres, and the right at the rivulet of S. Eloi. There is a large convoy coming from Brussels, which is to be escorted by Prince Eugene's troops, &c.

## L E T T E R

From the Marshal of BERWICK to the Duke de VENDOSME.

*Tournay, 17th July, 1708.*

PRINCE Eugene's infantry has certainly not joined; it was at Louvain the 14th. Might we not, by a forced march in the night, from Ghent and Tournay, place our left to the Scheld, and our right to the Lys, with Oudenard in the rear? By that manœuvre, we should keep Marlborough inclosed in our country; we should prevent the junction with Prince Eugene's army; and the large convoys that are preparing for him at Brussels, and which are to be escorted by Prince Eugene's troops, will not be able to join them. It is for you, Sir, who are perfectly well acquainted with the country, to judge, if what I propose be practicable, and whether it be right; it is one of those military plans, to which the least delay may be fatal, &c.

## L E T T E R

From the Duke de VENDOSME to the Marshal of BERWICK.

*Camp at Lovendeghem, 19th July, 1708.*

I HAVE this morning received the letter you have done me the honour to write to me, in which

I am

I am informed of the proposal you make me. I believe you will agree with me, that the best thing we can do is to remain here as long as we can. Our post is excellent, and we are making it stronger every day; so that we can do nothing better than to remain where we are, and by that means to preserve Ghent and Bruges. With regard to you, you have only to attend to the preservation of the frontier towns, although I do not believe the enemy are in condition to lay siege to them; if, however, they should determine upon any thing of this kind, we shall always be able to join and oppose their enterprizes.

L E T T E R

From the Duke of BURGUNDY to the Marshal of  
BERWICK.

S I R,

*The same Camp, the same day.*

I HAVE this morning received your letter and the duplicate; it appears to me, as well as to M. de Vendosme, that we are not able to execute what you propose, and that we must be contented, each of us on his side, with defending Ghent and Artois, to make the enemy lose the fruits of their advantage: I do not despair of our being able, between this and the end of the campaign, to obtain some advantage over them in our turn, &c.

LETTER



## N O T E S.

## L E T T E R

From the Duke de VENDOSME to the Marshal of  
BERWICK.

*Camp at Lovendeghem, 17th July, 1708.*

S I R,

WE are in the best situation possible, and are absolutely not in want of any thing. All the motions of the enemy have no other object than that of obliging us to abandon Ghent, but they will not succeed in this: we must let them fix themselves, after which we will come to a resolution, &c.

## L E T T E R.

The same, in answer to the letter from Lille of  
the 14th.

*The same Camp, 18th July.*

YOU are wise and good, and I hope you will remedy every thing; we have only a few days to wait, for I am persuaded that the difficulty of getting provisions, will, in a short time, oblige the enemy to draw near to the Scheld and the Dender, &c.

## L E T T E R

From the Marshal of BERWICK to the Duke of  
BURGUNDY.

*Camp under Douay, 18th July.*

THIS day at noon I received the letter you did  
me the honour of writing to me, dated the day before  
yesterday,

yesterday, at eleven o'clock in the morning, by which I find that the Count de Bergueick is in hopes of supplying the provisions we could not furnish you with from hence, considering the situation of the enemy. It also appears to me, by what the Duke de Vendosme writes, that you intend remaining where you are, being of opinion that the enemy will not be able to subsist a long time in our country: if that be the case, would not you think proper to send half your cavalry this way, the other half being more than sufficient behind the canal? I should then be enabled to extend myself all over Brabant, which would oblige the Duke of Marlborough to repass the Lys and the Scheld immediately; and I believe that, notwithstanding Prince Eugene's army, which the Duke de Vendosme says is encamped at Gramont, the cavalry you would have sent me, might come by the other side of the Scheld. If you send half the cavalry you have, I might also advance to meet them, if I were acquainted when they would come, &c.

## L E T T E R

From the Marshal of BERWICK to the Duke de  
VENDOSME.

*Camp under Douay, 18th July.*

IF you have provisions enough where you are, and that by remaining there, you think the enemy will soon be obliged to leave our country for want of subsistence, would you not think proper to send me half your cavalry, with which, and the troops I have here, I will advance into the heart of Brabant?

This

## N O T E S.

This would undoubtedly oblige the Duke of Marlborough to repass the Lys and the Scheld. In the mean time I think of marching from here the 21<sup>st</sup> to the Scheld, keeping myself always covered by the Scarpe, and afterwards posting myself on the other side of the Scheld, or at least foraging there. I shall then be equally at hand to assist you, if it be necessary, to cover the Cambresis, and shall be out of the reach of Marlborough's army; for as to that of Prince Eugene, we are not afraid of it, &c.

## L E T T E R

From the Duke de VENDOSME to the Marshal of  
BERWICK.

*Camp at Lovendeghem, 21<sup>st</sup> July, 1708.*

OUR intrenchments on the banks of the canal from Ghent to Bruges, are almost finished. I shall go to-morrow night to Bruges in order to visit them, and continue my excursion as far as Plaffendal. I hope the enemy will do us no essential hurt; they have levied some contributions in the country of Artois; we might very well, in a few days, do the same, from the greater part of Zeland, &c.

## L E T T E R

From the Marshal of BERWICK to the Duke of  
BURGUNDY.

*Camp under Douay, 19<sup>th</sup> July, 1708.*

THE difficulty and embarrassment which I found in your situation was only for your subsistence; from  
the

## N O T E S.

381

the moment that you do me the honour to write to me that it will not fail you, I am satisfied; but at the same time it confirms my opinion, that, as you do not want all your cavalry behind the Canal, half of it might be very useful here, as I proposed to you yesterday. I have no doubt, that as soon as I shall pass the Scheld with so large a corps, and shall advance towards Leuze or Chievre, that the Duke of Marlborough will immediately repass the Lys and the Scheld; at least, Prince Eugene's army will not venture to remain at Gramont, for fear of finding themselves between your army and me; if they should, one might find means to give them a blow. In that case, I would leave M. de Montagny at Bethune; the two regiments of dragoons which are at Lille would also remain there; and I should place four hundred horse here, with some infantry, along the Scarpe, &c.

## L E T T E R

From the Marshal of BERWICK to the Duke de  
VENDOSME.

S I R,

*Camp under Douay, 19th July.*

I YESTERDAY received the letter you did me the honour of writing to me on the 17th. The principal foundation of the reasonings I made use of to you, was the fear that you would not be able to get any provisions where you are, unless by means of convoys which might be sent to you; but from the moment you inform me that you are sure of your subsistence, I am easy, especially as you do not think the enemy have stores sufficient for a siege either in

Menin



## N O T E S.

Menin or Oudenard : that being the case, I believe that what I proposed to you yesterday concerning part of your cavalry, is the only thing to be done at present ; for besides that by my going to the other side of the Scheld with so large a body, the enemy will be obliged to come to the assistance of Brabant, such a diminution of your cavalry will enable you to subsist longer where you are, &c.

## L E T T E R

From the Marshal of BERWICK to the Duke of  
BURGUNDY.

*Camp at Douay, 22d July.*

I HAVE received advice to-night that Prince Eugene's army decamped yesterday morning from the neighbourhood of Brussels, pursuing its march towards Enghien ; a great convoy set out at the same time, proceeding by the same road. This agrees with the advices which I received on all sides, that the enemy are conveying heavy artillery from Brussels, to undertake some siege in these parts. It would be of the utmost importance to endeavour to beat this convoy ; this would not only render the enemy incapable of undertaking any thing, but would even oblige them to quit our country, and to repass the Scheld.

If I knew exactly what quantity of cavalry you intend to send me, together with the road they are to take, and the day of their setting out, I would take my measures for attacking the convoy, though my attention to Artois keeps me rather at too great a distance. This convoy must necessarily pass by Ou-

denard; I think there are no more than five leagues from Ghent to Oudenard; being well apprized of the rout of the convoy, could you not cause it to be attacked on the other side of the Scheld, before it arrives at Oudenard? If even it should be escorted by Prince Eugene's army, you might send a body of twice the strength, by which the affair would be concluded, and your troops would have re-entered Ghent before Marlborough could be apprized of it, and could come to the assistance of Prince Eugene. Upon this enterprize the success of the whole campaign depends; for I own to you, that I cannot be of the opinion of those who think that the preservation of Ghent, during the summer, can enable us to retake, in the winter, the places that might be taken from us; for Ghent would not blockade Oudenard, Menin, and the other places we should lose; on the contrary, those places would blockade Ghent; which cannot be prevented but by beating the convoy.

Since the letter I had the honour of writing to you this morning, I have received letters from Ch. de Saillan and Ch. de Varo, of which I send you copies: we know not whether there be any heavy artillery with the convoy; but however this may be, it would be a stroke of policy if one could beat it, &c.

L E T T E R

From the Marshal of BERWICK to the Duke de VENDOSME.

*Camp under Douay, 22d July.*

I HAVE received to-night a letter from Mons, by which I am informed of the departure of a very great  
convoy

convoy from Brussels yesterday, escorted by Prince Eugene's army; the whole takes its march towards Enghien, in order from thence to go to Oudenard. The success of this campaign depends upon the safe arrival of the convoy; if we can defeat it, the enemy will not be able to undertake any thing of consequence in these parts; if it should get up safe to them, they will make conquests that will perplex us infinitely. It appears to me, that from Ghent, by the other side of the Scheld, it might be attacked before Marlborough could have intelligence, and come to its assistance, &c.

## L E T T E R

From the Duke of BURGUNDY to the Marshal of  
BERWICK.

*Camp at Lovendeghem, 23<sup>d</sup> July.*

I HAVE just received your letter of yesterday morning, and have sent immediately for Count Bergueick. He had already informed me of the departure of the convoy, but he assures me that there is no heavy artillery with it; and it is said, that it would take the enemy a great deal of time to load carriages with all the artillery which would be necessary for such a siege as that of Lisle. Our situation, and the rout the enemy take by Renay, will scarcely permit us to think of attacking them, without risking a separation of the army; so that the troops that would be sent there, would afterwards be obliged to return by the road of Tournay; but the Duke de Vendosme, with whom I have consulted upon this matter, thinks, that in order more effectually to embarrass the enemy,

and

and render them more anxious for the convoys which are to follow, you should proceed to the Scarpe, near Mortagne, giving notice of your motions to Cheyladet, who should be to-day at Nieuport, and leaving upon the side of Artois such a body of cavalry as you shall think proper. As for me, I still believe that the enemy will find any enterprize upon our fortresses very difficult, and that their present intention is to draw us from hence, in order to fall upon Ghent, &c.

L E T T E R

From the Duke de VENDOSME to the Marshal of  
BERWICK.

*Camp at Lovendeghem, 24th July.*

THE Duke of Burgundy sent off his courier in such haste, that I had no time to answer your letter; I take the opportunity of answering it to-day by the person who brought me the duplicate, in order to acquaint you, agreeable to what the Duke of Burgundy wrote to you, that it appears to me, you cannot place yourself too soon in the neighbourhood of Condé, as you propose; I even think it is proper you should do it before Cheyladet's detachment joins you; that detachment lay last night at Nieuport, and will join you as easily at Condé as where you are at present.

The convoy the enemy sends from Brussels to their army, consists only of a part of their heavy baggage, and some meal, but in small quantity; it is not composed, in the whole, of more than eight hundred carriages; and there is not a single piece of cannon,



nor even any ammunition : what I tell you is certain ; the person who gave me the account has seen the whole. If the enemy should think of conducting more convoys, or bringing up their artillery, we can, when you are at Condé, act in concert, and oppose them. For this reason, I think you cannot be too expeditious in taking that position. You must, however, leave a body of cavalry at Bethune, and another at Douay, to oppose the enemy's parties, &c.

## L E T T E R

From the Duke of BURGUNDY to the Marshal of  
BERWICK.

*Camp at Lovendeghem, 24th July.*

YESTERDAY I received the duplicate of your letter of the day before. Since I wrote to you yesterday, we have been informed, that the convoy which comes to the enemy consists of nothing but meal. We have certain intelligence that they are embarking heavy cannon at Antwerp, to send by water to Brussels ; if you place yourself at Mortagne, you will be able not only to harrafs, but even to do them some mischief, when they think of transporting every thing necessary for a siege by land ; as for us, we are at a great distance ; we will, however, do what we can. We cannot risk the parting of our infantry, nor even of our cavalry, which we might want if we should be obliged to leave this place, &c.

L E T T E R

L E T T E R

From the Marshal of BERWICK to the Duke of  
BURGUNDY.

*Camp at Douay, 2d August.*

I HAVE received advice, that the large convoy was preparing to set out from Brussels to-morrow, the third of this month : give me leave to communicate to you my ideas upon this head : you will make what use you think proper of them ; for I shall always submit my judgment to superior authority and talents.

It is certain the enemy can undertake nothing without artillery, ammunition and provisions, which they mean to bring from Brussels : that being the case, it is clear, that if you can find a situation which will cut off their communication with Brussels, you will make all Marlborough's projects miscarry. I had taken the liberty to ask whether there were not some posts you might take between the Lys and the Scheld, putting Oudenard in your rear ; but I suppose there are none. I have enquired of M. de Cheydalet, what sort of ground there is on the other side the Scheld ; he has assured me that the high grounds have a very great command upon Oudenard, and stand very near it ; if this be so, could not you come in a day's march, and take post there, extending your left as far as the Ronne ? I would at the same time send part of my infantry, and about thirty squadrons, to join your left, in order to prevent Marlborough's army from making bridges at Pottes and Escanaffe. I could even, in that case, send likewise the field battalions that I have put in Lisle and Tour-

nay; because those places would be in no danger of being attacked while we could stop the passage of the convoy.

While M. de Tilly's corps remains at Lens, I cannot avoid keeping here, or near Arras, a body of cavalry equal to his, and some battalions for the security of Douay and Arras; as the King has ordered me, in preference to every thing else, to prevent any incursions into Picardy; but as soon as M. de Tilly marches to rejoin Marlborough, I will march to join you, and place myself at Pottes, or wherever you shall order me.

If you can once take your post with a hundred battalions and most of your cavalry, and can be joined by twenty battalions and thirty squadrons, which I will send to you, till such time as M. de Tilly takes his resolution, it appears to me that it will be difficult for Marlborough to force the passage of the Scheld, to join Prince Eugene's army, and consequently to get up his artillery; I don't even know how he will contrive to subsist. Ghent and Bruges will run no risks; for I suppose you will leave in those places M. de la Motte's corps, and such battalions of your army as you have not occasion for, with a few cavalry; and if Marlborough's army should move that way, you will always be in time to return there by your right, leaving me with an army only a little superior to that of Prince Eugene.

This plan seems to me the more proper, as the King does not approve what you at first had thought of; and therefore if the enemy were once enabled to form a siege, we should be obliged, in order to prevent their succeeding, to attack them, perhaps when they would be strongly posted; instead of which, by the method I propose, we may put an insurmountable obstacle



stacle in the way of their designs without striking a stroke.

I beg your Royal Highness a thousand pardons for the liberty I take; you have given me leave to tell you my thoughts; and you know better than any one how to distinguish the good from the bad, &c.

## L E T T E R

From the Duke of BURGUNDY to the Marshal of  
BERWICK.

*Camp at Lovendeghem, August the 4th.*

I HAVE received your two letters, of the first and second of this month; in the first I find, that the enemy have not succeeded in their designs against Picardy; and in the second, that M. de Tilly's corps has marched back towards their grand army. We had a consultation last night upon what you propose to us; it is certain that it would be an excellent scheme, if we could place ourselves in such a manner, that, having rivers before us, we might separate the enemy, and prevent the grand convoy from joining them; but the difficulty would be to arrive in time where you propose; you cannot go there from Douay in less than two day's march; we can scarcely get there in less than two ourselves, as our troops are very much separated; but the enemy can arrive on the Scheld in one day's march, and if they were to make that motion at the same time that we make ours, we should find ourselves very much embarrassed; besides, there are three leagues from the height of Oudenard to the Ronne; add to this, that if, after we have passed the Scheld, the enemy should, by a forced march,



go to Bruges, I do not know whether Count la Motte could prevent their making themselves masters of it; in which case, Ghent would not be able to hold out: but this is not the greatest difficulty; that of having each of us a march of ten leagues, at least, to make, while the enemy have but four or five, appears to me to be of more consequence. Our confidential advices do not yet mention when the convoy is to set out from Brussels; they say, on the contrary, that every thing is not yet taken out of the boats. I do not know, as I mentioned to you before, whether they have not rather a design upon Mons than Lisle or Tournay, on account of the convenience of the road there from Brussels. I will add also to what I have just told you, that it is probable the enemy's grand army will make a movement towards the Scheld as soon as Count de Tilly's corps has rejoined them, and therefore we should not be in time to make ours. I have received, while they were cyphering this letter, your last of the 2d in the evening. I think, that all the precautions you take are very necessary. You know already, that last night Count Tilly rejoined the grand army, which was on the point of marching; and you will also be acquainted with their destination sooner than we: I believe that we shall know their designs in a few days.

### L E T T E R

From the Marshal of BERWICK to the Duke of  
BURGUNDY.

*Camp at Chateau L'Abbaye, 11th August, 1708.*

AS there is no reason to doubt that the enemy intend laying siege to some place, it is necessary you should

should have the goodness to give me a general idea of the movements and marches you intend to make, that I may manœuvre accordingly, and be as near as possible to execute the orders you will be pleased to honour me with. There is no time to lose; for I have no doubt, that in less than two days, Lisle, Tournay, or Ypres, will be invested. If their designs are upon Lisle, my intention was to put the detachments of Mortagny and De Champfleur in Tournay, to bar the enemy's communication from Brussels to the Scheld, and to draw near to Douay with all my troops, as well cavalry as infantry, to streighten them on that side; and in case the Duke of Marlborough should remain separated from the siege, I will see if I cannot attack one of Prince Eugene's quarters; but I cannot form my ideas with propriety till I know your intentions, or till you send me your orders what situation I am to take, &c.

L E T T E R

From the Marshal of BERWICK to the Duke of BURGUNDY.

*Camp at Chateau L'Abbaye, 12. August, 1708.*

IT appears the enemy are determined to lay siege to Lisle, as the convoy, after having passed the Scheld, has taken the road to Menin; that being the case, give me leave to propose my idea to you; you will make what use you please of it, as it only comes from the extreme desire I have, that things should turn out to the advantage of the King's service, and your glory.

The enemy being once posted before Lille, I do not think it will be possible to make them raise the siege by force, for they will chuse their ground and intrench themselves, and our infantry is not the best in the world for attacking intrenchments, nor for disputing posts; I should therefore be very much afraid, that, after having lost a great number of men, we should receive a considerable check, which would put it out of our power to do any thing any where else, and perhaps even to preserve Ghent; I would therefore immediately think of rendering the conquest of Lille of no service to the enemy, and of putting it out of their power to keep it: perhaps even, if what I propose should succeed, they may find it difficult to preserve Oudenard and Menin.

It is necessary, before I open my plan, to state the forces of the two armies. The Duke of Marlborough's is composed of a hundred and twelve battalions, and about one hundred and fourscore squadrons; Prince Eugene's consists of thirty-six battalions and three-score squadrons, which makes in all a hundred and forty-eight battalions, and two hundred and forty squadrons; from which must be deducted eight battalions they have detached to Hulst, to join General Fagel; eight that are now encamped under Brussels, with nine squadrons; four battalions they have put in Antwerp, besides a small corps, the number of which I am not acquainted with, which is marching from near Ath, to go to Brussels: we may therefore safely strike off four or five and twenty battalions, and about twenty squadrons; so that there will remain no more than a hundred and twenty, or a hundred and twenty-five battalions, and two hundred and twenty squadrons.

You



You had a hundred and thirty four battalions; ten from Count la Mothe, thirty-four which I brought from Germany; which makes a hundred and seventy eight battalions. You had two hundred and five squadrons, M. de la Mothe seven, and I sixty-five; which makes in all two hundred and seventy-seven squadrons.

I would propose to leave count la Motte at Bruges and Ghent, with thirty of the battalions which have most suffered, and twenty squadrons that are in the worst order. You might pass the Scheld at Ghent with a hundred battalions, and two hundred squadrons, in order to post yourself with your right facing Oudenard, and your left towards the Ronne, placing near Pottes and Escanaffe, a corps sufficient to prevent the enemy from throwing bridges over at those places, and to give you time to march up there. The Duke of Marlborough will not be able to go there with a superior, nor even an equal force to yours, and to continue at the same time the siege of Lisle.

You will still have remaining forty-eight battalions and fifty-seven squadrons, nine battalions of which I suppose must be left in Ypres, Bethune, Aire, Arras, and Douay; so that I might march straight on to Brussels, in order to lay siege to it with thirty-nine battalions and fifty-seven squadrons. I would send to Namur for large cannon, and I don't think it is an affair of more than a week. I would afterwards make myself master of Mechlin, Lierre, and Louvain, and it will not be very difficult to take Lewes also, if I have time; the Count la Motte will, at the same time, occupy Alost, which must be fortified with all diligence, in order to put some battalions into it with safety.

What



What can the enemy do while we are executing this project? Marlborough, (as I have already mentioned) cannot come to us with superior or even equal forces, and at the same time continue the siege of Lisle: if he were even to do it, would he be able to pass the Scheld in your sight? If he were to raise the siege and to march with all his forces, it will always be in your power either to dispute with him the passage of the Scheld, or to retire towards Ghent; in which case you would have succeeded in your intention, as you would have prevented the enemy from taking Lisle; and as for my part, I should always be sure of a retreat towards Mons, Charleroi, or Namur.

If Marlborough does not trouble his head about us, but prefers the taking of Lisle to every other consideration; I ask, how will he be able to maintain himself in it during the winter, and how will he be able to move off from it? For if I succeed in my expedition, I shall be able to send you back twenty battalions and twenty squadrons, by means of which you will bar him the passage of the Scheld; the more so, as he will be obliged to leave some garrison in Lisle when he has taken it. Neither will he be able to undertake the siege of Ypres, not having any thing necessary for it, and the season being too much advanced. If he takes up his quarters at the other side, or along the Lys, you may do the same along the Dender, and in all Brabant, and it will always be in your power to assemble your troops if he should advance towards you; but we shall have time enough to discuss this last matter more fully; for I cannot reason very exactly upon it at present, not having the situation of the country entirely in my

my head; but it appears to me, from what I have heard say, that in case Marlborough should assemble his troops, you might always keep up a free communication from Alost to Ghent, and even from Brussels to Alost, by placing your left on the Dender, and spreading yourself upon the rivulet which comes from the Cocamber, and which enters the Scheld below Oudenard. Perhaps what I propose to you, will oblige you to a winter campaign; but it will be a point of necessity, and you will carry it on with a great deal more ease than the enemy, &c.

L E T T E R

From the Marshal of BERWICK to the Duke of BURGUNDY.

*Camp at Chateau L'Abbaye, 13th August.*

THOUGH the Duke of Marlborough is gone to Helchin, I don't think that it prevents the execution of the project I have taken the liberty of sending to you yesterday; the only difference will be, that, before I march to Brussels, I shall be obliged to advance towards Pottes and Eleanasse, as if I intended to join you, to facilitate your placing yourself; after which I shall be able to re-march speedily behind you, to execute the project, a duplicate of which I have the honour of sending you, for fear the one I sent you yesterday should be taken.

I shall remain here with my cavalry and some infantry till I receive your orders, &c.

LETTER

## N O T E S.

## L E T T E R

From the Duke of BURGUNDY to the Marshal of  
BERWICK.

*Camp at Lovendeghem, 14th August.*

I HAVE read with a great deal of pleasure the project you have sent me for making yourself master of Brussels, and of the rest of Brabant, while the enemy are employed about their siege. This plan would perhaps be as advantageous to us as that of trying to relieve the places, if we had every thing ready. But before we could get together all the things requisite for this enterprize, that of the enemy would be in great forwardness; and if, by the posts which we might take, we should prevent their crossing the Scheld, they might send a body of troops towards France, which, entering Picardy, would raise contributions, and be the occasion of your being soon recalled to guard the frontiers. But if they were not to do this, for fear of separating themselves, and lest we should be assembled sooner than they, you know that the King's orders are positive with regard to the succour of the place, and I believe we must conform to them; and think as soon as possible of assembling all our forces, which are very much dispersed, &c.

LETTER



L E T T E R

From the Duke of BURGUNDY to the Marshal of  
BERWICK.

*From the same Camp, 17th August.*

I HAVE just received the letter you wrote to me yesterday, in which I see the measures you have taken, according to what I wrote to you about joining as soon as it is proper. However, the enemy not being absolutely set down before Lisle, I am afraid it will be dangerous to take the troops out of Ypres so soon. You will see by a letter the Duke de Vendosme wrote yesterday to M. de Bernieres, that I have made some alterations in what I sent you word of; but they are of no great consequence, for the essential part of the affair is still the same. With regard to the plan I proposed to you, the King does not approve of it, as you will see by a letter which he writes to me, of which he has sent you a copy. The circumvallation of the enemy round Lisle is as Marshal Boufflers has described it. They cannot defend La Marque. I believe they will be greatly embarrassed in their intrenchments.

L E T T E R

From the Marshal of BERWICK to the Duke of  
BURGUNDY.

*Camp at Chateau L'Abbaye, 21 Aug. 1708.*

I RECEIVED last night the letter you did me the honour to write to me, dated yesterday. I will put myself in readiness to obey your orders, either

to



to assist you, or make some attempt on Prince Eugene's quarters, in case he should weaken his own army to put Marlborough in a condition of marching up to you. Your first march will determine the movements of the enemy; according to which you will regulate your own.

I received the copy of the letter written to you by the King, dated the 19th instant; and as I have received orders at the same time not to withdraw any companies from the garrisons, I have countermanded them. There is nothing new from Lille since the letter I had the honour to write to you yesterday morning: there is yet no advice received of the opening of the trenches, &c.

#### L E T T E R

From the Marshal of BERWICK to the Duke of BURGUNDY.

*Camp at Chateau L'Abbaye, 23d Aug. 1708.*

I HAVE put off till now doing myself the honour of acquainting you with Marlborough's march towards Forets, in hopes that I might be able, at the same time, to send you word exactly where he was encamped; but as I have no positive news about it, neither from Tournay nor from any of my parties, I thought it was necessary to acquaint you as soon as possible, (as M. Dolet sends me word) that Marlborough's army has certainly passed the Scheld. I should be glad to know what you chuse I should do, and whether you do not think proper to advance towards Gramont, before I pass the Scheld or the Hayne, that I may join you more securely.

Give

Give me leave to make a few reflections, which certainly have no other motive but the good of the service.

As Lille is besieged, we must fight the enemy, in order to succour it: that being the case, it will be more advantageous for us to fight them at a distance from the place they besiege, because they will not be so strong. Marlborough has at present about seventy battalions and a hundred and sixty squadrons. He will certainly wait for you if you march up to him: as you are obliged to fight, will you not do it with more advantage this way than you would even if I were to join you, by attacking him in the lines of circumvallation, where he will be joined by Prince Eugene? It is certain, that if you wait to march towards him till I have joined you, (a thing which will not perhaps be very easy, at least, in order to put it in execution, I should be obliged to make a great circuit), Marlborough will then repass the Scheld, in order to endeavour to dispute or retard our passage; and even when you have passed it, he will retire within his lines, where you will be obliged to attack all his united forces to a disadvantage, and with great uncertainty of success. This is what makes me imagine, that it would perhaps be better for you to march up to him, and place yourself so near, that he will not be able to retire before you, nor to pass the Scheld, and then I would join you directly, and you would attack him with all your forces. If he should himself attack you before my arrival, it would be with a body of infantry much inferior to yours. If he should wait till Prince Eugene sends him some reinforcement, this would also give me time to come up, and in the meanwhile the siege would go on but slowly: there would

be

be still another alternative remaining in case Prince Eugene should send a large reinforcement to Marlborough's army; this would be, for me to fall upon the troops left to carry on the siege.

These are thoughts your Royal Highness will make the use you think proper of. I shall still send my infantry the day after to-morrow to the neighbourhood of Mons, in order to be able to execute whatever you please to command me, &c.

**Extracts of several Letters from the KING,  
M. de CHAMILLART, and the Marshal of  
BERWICK.**

### L E T T E R

From the Marshal of BERWICK to M. de CHAMILLART.

S I R, *Camp at Douay, 18th July, 1708.*

I HAVE received, by a courier of the Duke de Vendosme, the letter you have done me the honour of writing to me the 16th. By the copy of that which I wrote to the Duke of Burgundy, dated the 16th, you have seen the several plans I have proposed to him: I add to this a copy of a letter I wrote to him yesterday. I have not been able since I am come here to learn the plan that is proposed in the present situation of affairs; I ought, however, to be



informed of it, that I might act accordingly; I therefore wait for the Duke of Burgundy's answer and orders; but if I don't hear any thing positive in three days time, I shall move behind the Scarpe, near Mortagne; and shall leave here about a thousand horse, to prevent the enemy's small parties (which are already making incursions into Artois) from penetrating further.

From Mortagne I might pass the Scheld, and approach Tournay, in order to have a nearer view of what may come from Brussels to Ath, and from Ath to Oudenard.

The advices I had received of the junction of Prince Eugene's army with Marlborough's are not true; for the Prince's infantry was at Louvain the 14th; so that in passing the Scheld, I shall be able to observe this army. I have never seen a frontier, upon which Governors and Commanders were so ill informed. I have written to them letter after letter; but it seems as if they were all asleep, for they never send me any thing but old, and very bad news.

## L E T T E R

From the Marshal of BERWICK to the KING.

*Denay, 18th July, 1708.*

I HAVE received the two letters your Majesty has done me the honour to write to me of the 14th and 16th, and I wait for an answer to several I have written to his Royal Highness the Duke of Burgundy, that I may be able to determine the movements I am to make in the present situation; for it is impossible I should manœuvre properly till I am acquainted with



the system and plan of operations proposed. As yet there is no time lost, more especially as my last troops cannot arrive till the day after to-morrow.

Your Majesty has seen, by the copy of the letter I have written to his Royal Highness the Duke of Burgundy on the 16th, the several plans I propose to him; you will likewise see that which I wrote to him yesterday, by the copy I send of it to M. de Chamillart: if I have no answer between this and the complete arrival of my troops, I shall extend my right to near the Scheld, that I may be able to interrupt the convoys which are to come from the other side of Brussels to Oudenard; but as long as the enemy shall remain on the other side of the Lys, at Commines, I must keep some cavalry here to prevent their incursions, &c.

### L E T T E R

From the Marshal of BERWICK to M. de CHAMILLART.

*Camp under Douay, 22d July, 1708.*

TO-NIGHT I have received advice, that Prince Eugene's army decamped yesterday from Brussels, escorting a very large convoy, and directing its march towards Halle and Enghien; upon which I immediately dispatched a courier to the Dukes of Burgundy and Vendosme. You will find inclosed the copy of the letters I wrote to them: I likewise send you a passage of a letter from the Duke de Vendosme of the 17th, that you may understand what I say in that which I write to the Duke of Burgundy, with regard to the conquests the enemy might make. I expect  
their

their answer, that I may come to a resolution; for if they will not try to intercept the communication between Marlborough's army and Brussels, I might encamp myself near Lens, or even at Bethune, the better to cover Artois, and be attentive to what passes towards the sea.

L E T T E R

From M. DE CHAMILLART to the Marshal of  
BERWICK.

*Fontainebleau, 25 July, 1708.*

I HAVE received your letter of the 22d instant, by which I see, with as much concern as you, that the convoy of large artillery which was assembled at Brussels, is gone from thence by Enghien, escorted by all Prince Eugene's army. I have even some reason to believe that the Duke of Marlborough has sent a detachment from his army of at least twelve thousand men to meet them. There is no doubt that this convoy, unless it be stopped, will arrive in four days at Courtray, and that, when it is there, it will easily pass on to Menin, or to any other place where the enemy may have most occasion for it. I cannot believe that the Duke of Burgundy can be informed of this time enough, nor that he can act in such a manner as to enable you to attack it with the assistance of what troops he would send to you from his army. When we cannot defeat the enemy's designs by force, we must have recourse to artifice. If some very enterprising people could be found that would run the risque of the danger there would be in hazarding the setting fire to the carriages of gunpowder, bombs,

grenades, and artillery; the King would, with pleasure, reward them very liberally, if they should be lucky enough to succeed. One must attempt all kinds of means, &c.

### L E T T E R

From M. DE CHAMILLART to the Marshal of  
BERWICK.

*Fontainebleau, 30th July, 1708.*

THOUGH the convoy deserves a very serious attention, his Majesty desires, nevertheless, you would give all your attention to the preservation of Artois and Picardy, preferably to every thing else, &c.

### L E T T E R

From M. DE CHAMILLART to the Marshal of  
BERWICK.

*Fontainebleau, (the same day) 30th July, 1708.*

S I R,

I HAVE received the letters you have done me the honour of writing to me the 24th and 26th inst. I send you a copy of that which I write to M. de Bernage, in which you will see the resolution the King has taken of permitting the States of Artois to treat with the enemy about contributions upon any tolerable terms. If they agree between them, and you take the resolution of going from thence, as it is very probable you will, in order to go to Mortagne, I can scarcely believe they will not advance a body of troops towards Picardy. This step would greatly alarm



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alarm the country as far as Paris. It will, however, be very difficult to prevent their making this movement, as long as the Duke of Burgundy's army remains behind the canal at Bruges, without making any. The King's intentions are, preferably to any thing, that you should take such care of the frontier towns which might be exposed to a surprize, particularly of those of Arras, St. Omer, Bethune, and Aire, that no inconvenience may happen from your absence.

## L E T T E R

From the KING to the Marshal of BERWICK.

*Fontainebleau, 1st August, 1708.*

C O U S I N,

I HAVE seen, by the letter you have written to me the 29th of last month, how far the enemy carry their demands of contributions. I see plainly, that in the state you are in, with the body of troops that are left you, you cannot cover all my frontiers in such a manner as to defend them from the enemy's incursions, and at the same time prevent the passage of their convoys from Brussels. I think I have already sent you word, that I would have you, before any thing else, take all the measures you can to cover Artois and Picardy as far as you are able; leaving it to you besides to act in concert with the Dukes of Burgundy and Vendosme, to whom I have written fully concerning the great convoy the enemy are to send from Brussels, that they may try to fall upon, and beat the escort, &c.



## L E T T E R

From M. de CHAMILLART to the Marshal of  
BERWICK.

S I R,

*Fontainebleau, 1st Aug. 1708.*

I HAVE received the letter you have done me the honour of writing to me the 29th of last month, with the one that was for the King; I have delivered it to his Majesty, who has given me orders to address the answer to you. It is evident that, the Duke of Burgundy's army being posted at the Canal, it is impossible for you to cover Artois and Picardy, to undertake any thing against the enemy, and to prevent their convoys from passing; though this last article is of the utmost importance, it is nevertheless certain, that, preferably to any thing, you must be very attentive to the motions the enemy may make with a considerable corps towards the Somme or Lauthis. If they should do this, it would be a sure way of ruining Picardy intirely, and of spreading terror throughout Normandy, and to the very gates of Paris. But without intirely changing your situation, the zeal and capacity of M. Dolet may supply the want of forces; and if he had a small quantity of infantry and cavalry, the country he is in being so full of defiles, he might do a deal of mischief, without exposing the troops he would employ for this expedition. If you are able to assist him, there is not a moment to lose, &c.

LETTER

L E T T E R

From the Marshal of BERWICK to M. de CHAMILLART.

*Camp at Chateau L'Abbaye, 21<sup>st</sup> Aug. 1708.*

IT appears to me that nothing can be more just than the reasoning contained in the last letter (of the 19<sup>th</sup> August) and that it is much better the Duke of Burgundy should take a great sweep on the other side of the Dender, to draw nearer to me, than to make me go to Gramont, to return afterwards by Leuse to Tournay. The Duke of Marlborough will scarcely advance upon the Dender, as long as he sees me with an army here; for in that case, one might perhaps make some manœuvres that would embarrass him, if I were to approach Tournay on this side of the Scheld, and place myself behind the river of Ere, from whence I might march in order of battle to La Marque. Moreover, the Duke of Marlborough's army not consisting of more than about seventy battalions, is not strong enough to think of attacking, nor even of stopping, that of the Duke of Burgundy, which will consist of one hundred and two battalions when it quits Ghent. If Marlborough sends for troops from Prince Eugene's army, to be nearly equal to the Duke of Burgundy, I might then (if the King approves of it) assemble my forces, and attempt to succour Lisle; more especially as I have ninety-eight squadrons, and could, if it were necessary, collect thirty-five battalions. Prince Eugene has, at present, sixty-four battalions, and as many squadrons, in his camp: if he should send fifteen or twenty battalions

to Marlborough, I should then become as strong as he, because he will be obliged to leave some troops for the guard of the batteries. The worst that can happen is, my not being able to force the lines; for, being superior in cavalry, I can never be beaten, &c.

## LETTER

From the Marshal of BERWICK to M. de CHAMILLART.

*Valenciennes, 25th Aug. 1708.*

I HAVE received your letter of the 23d inst. last night. I will freely own to you, that I am not without uneasiness about Marlborough's motion, for his intention is certainly to fight, and that, if it be possible, before my junction can be effected. I cannot pass the Haine before the Duke of Burgundy is posted on the Dender; and it is precisely while he is on his march there that Marlborough will attack his army, unless they march with great precaution, and in great order. If once the Duke of Burgundy shall have taken his post, I don't see how Marlborough will be able to prevent me from either joining the army, or relieving Lisle: for having the Duke of Burgundy in his front, he will no longer be able to assist the besiegers; and if Prince Eugene should send any considerable detachment to Marlborough, I shall be strong enough to attempt the relief; for in case of necessity, I can assemble forty battalions, including the scattered parts of the army, and three or four of the best battalions from the fortresses. I am of your opinion, a battle between the Dender and the Scheld is not a desirable thing; it is a very close

coun-



country, where it will be very difficult for our cavalry to act, and to produce a decisive action; so that we should be obliged to begin again, in order to relieve Lisse.

L E T T E R

From the KING to the Duke of BURGUNDY,

*Fontainebleau, 26th August, 1708.*

I SEE, by your letter of the 23d, that, upon the advices you have received that the Duke of Marlborough had passed the Scheld (not having yet any news of the opening of the trenches before Lisse) you had sent word to the Marshal of Berwick to suspend his march till he was certain of it, and till the enemy, being entirely attached to the siege, should not have forces enough in Marlborough's army to oppose your passage: you will have been informed since that time, by Marshal Boufflers' letter of the 23d, that the trenches had been opened the 22d, at ten o'clock at night, and that they attacked the place by the tenailles. They have since that continued; and we find by the signals which have been made, that the siege goes on as usual. The batteries had not yet begun to play yesterday, the 25th, in the morning. It is difficult to comprehend how they can pursue so many different objects at once; and more so, that they can succeed in them. It is highly probable, however, that the Duke of Marlborough has not passed the Scheld without having determined to attack the army you command, or that of the Marshal of Berwick, while they are on their march to join; and this junction has appeared to me so dange-



rous to attempt, that, after having considered of it, I believe it to be of no service, as the preservation, or taking of Lille, is the only object of all the motions that are made on both sides. One may succour this place without running the chance of a battle, which would be fought at too great a distance to oblige the enemy to forsake the enterprize; or at least, if any unforeseen event should happen, to prevent your junction or retard your march, the enemy during that time might make themselves masters of the town, the loss of which would be irreparable. To avoid this, I see but one step to be taken, which (though it hath its difficulties) appears to me the best of all, and that which I desire you would prepare yourselves to carry into execution, with all the precaution, secrecy, and good conduct, that an affair of such importance requires. For this purpose, all your motions must be well concerted with the Marshal of Berwick; and, instead of his advancing to join you, he must strengthen himself with as many troops as he can collect; and immediately after these troops have joined him where he is at present, or near Valenciennes, he must advance upon the enemy's lines by two forced marches. He must inform you, two or three days beforehand, of the motion he intends making. You must meet him, with the whole army under your command, on the side of Aloft; and you must take care to have bread for at least six days. If the Duke of Marlborough is joined by part of the troops that form the siege, in order to march towards you with an intention of giving you battle, your army being composed of a hundred and one battalions, and a hundred and forty squadrons, and the Dender being between you and him, he would find it very difficult

difficult to pass that river in your sight; and nothing  
 would prevent you from finding some posts sufficiently  
 advantageous to avoid coming to an action; but in  
 that case he would leave so few troops for the siege,  
 and for the defence of the lines, that it would not be  
 difficult for the Marshal of Berwick, by concerting  
 his measures with the Marshal de Boufflers, to enter  
 the lines, and to cause so much confusion in the  
 enemy's camp, as to disable them from continuing the  
 siege: you might then retire to Ghent, without ven-  
 turing an action. If Prince Eugene, on the contrary,  
 should fortify his army, and there should be, at least,  
 sixty battalions, and as many squadrons, within the  
 lines; though this would be but a small force in pro-  
 portion to what the Marshal of Berwick would be  
 able to carry with him, which might, at least, compose  
 an army of thirty-six battalions and a hundred squa-  
 drons, exclusive of the garrison, which would be able  
 to act at the same time; it seems, that the army the  
 Duke of Marlborough would then have with him  
 would not be sufficient to prevent your continuing  
 your march, and arriving at Mons. I don't even be-  
 lieve he would expose himself to it, and separate him-  
 self intirely from the army of Prince Eugene, by pas-  
 sing the Dender and the Scheld. You know that  
 the enemy's two armies cannot, at most, consist but  
 of a hundred and thirty-six battalions, and of two  
 hundred and thirty squadrons; yours and the Marshal  
 of Berwick's are, at least, as strong; for part of their  
 troops they are obliged to employ in guarding the  
 lines, the camp, and in the trench duty. This gives  
 me reason to believe, that, by conducting yourselves  
 on both sides with precaution, both Lisse and Ghent  
 may be preserved at the same time. If, in the event,

the

the enemy making the capture of Lille their principal business, you should find it more easy to go to Mons than you had reason to expect, &c. &c. &c.

### LETTER

From the Marshal of BERWICK to M. de CHAMILLART.

*Camp at Herrines, 28th August.*

WHILE I was on my march hither, I received your letters of the 25th and 26th; so I have continued my march for fear of causing some embarrassment in that of the Duke of Burgundy. I arrived here with the van of my cavalry at six o'clock at night; the rear and the infantry will not arrive till late. The enemy have not made any movement, so that as I am but two leagues from Ninove, you may take it for granted our junction is effected.

I have received an answer from the Duke of Burgundy, since he has received the King's packet; he sends me word to continue my march, which I will do at day-break. I will inform you of the resolutions he will take for succouring Lille.

### LETTER

From the Marshal of BERWICK to the Duke of BURGUNDY.

*Bruges, 25th Sept. 1708.*

ON my arrival here, Count la Mothe informed me, that the enemy had entered by the bridge of Lefinghe, into Camerlinback, in order to load their  
carriages



carriages at Ostend, by which we see that the inundation ordered at Nieuport, has not had the desired effect. Our object now is to prevent the return of the convoy. For this purpose Count la Mothe intends to go to-morrow and take post at Oudenburgh, that he may take possession of the only causeway that leads from Lessinghe, by which means they will be able to find no other way but by the north of the district of Bruges, which will be impossible for them to do, as they must afterwards pass the canal of Ostend in the face of M. la Mothe.

The only thing that is to be feared, is, that the Duke of Marlborough may send speedily a body of troops, considerable enough to attack Count la Mothe. That might easily be remedied by sending immediately to him a reinforcement of fifteen or twenty battalions, which would render him superior to any number of men the Duke of Marlborough could detach against him, and you would still have troops sufficient left with you to cover Oudenard and guard the Scheld. This would even be beginning to carry into execution the plan you conceived for the preservation of this country. You might also send to Count la Mothe a reinforcement of twenty squadrons. As the enemy have much less way to go to Oudenburgh, from their great army, than the detachments you could make would have, and as the success of this campaign depends upon the difficulties you can throw in the way of the passage of the convoy, I think you should not lose a moment in sending Count la Mothe such a number of troops as you think proper. The most expeditious method would be, to send the troops that are near Oudenard,



nard, which would be immediately replaced by those you have spread along the Scheld.

If I can, I will go as far as Plassendal to-day; but I am not sure of being able to return to-morrow, as I intend to make myself thoroughly acquainted with the country, that I may have the honour to send you a more exact account of it, but I shall certainly return on Friday, &c.

### L E T T E R

From the Marshal of BERWICK to the Duke of BURGUNDY.

*Bruges, 26th, Sept. 1708.*

I WENT yesterday to reconnoitre the canal of Ostend as far as Plassendal, and at the same time formed a tolerable idea of the rest of the country. I don't think Count la Mothe can take a better situation than Oudenburgh, placing his right, and intrenching himself, upon the Dyke that comes from Lessinghe along the canal of Nieuport: he will even be able, by means of the ditches and watergangs, to secure his front against any forces that might come from Marlborough's army, provided their numbers were not greatly superior. By his left, he must necessarily occupy the canal that goes from Bruges to Ostend, and have even bridges thrown over near Plassendal, that he may draw his subsistence from Bruges the more easily, and that he may go into the north of the district of Bruges, if it be necessary. The troops that are headed by M. de Puyguion will arrive here before noon: so that Count la Mothe may begin his march towards evening.

evening. If it had been possible to conceal the arrival of all these troops, it would have been better to suffer the convoy to get on this side of Lessinghe before we stirred from hence, that we might make ourselves masters of the whole; but as the march of an army cannot possibly be concealed for four-and-twenty hours, we must be contented with preventing the passage of the convoy, and for that reason go to Oudenburgh and intrench ourselves on all sides.

The news that came yesterday from Ostend, was, that they were loading in a great hurry seven hundred carriages come from Marlborough's army; that the troops were encamped at Mariquerque, and that there was a considerable post for the defence of the bridge of Lessinghe: they have also sent a detachment to the north of the district of Bruges, that they may have all the carriages from thence. There have been strict orders given here to prevent it, and the peasants make their escape with their horses, &c.

L E T T E R

From the Marshal of BERWICK to the Duke of BURGUNDY.

*Bruges, 27th Sept. 1708.*

UPON hearing yesterday of the Earl of Albemarle's arrival at Rousselaere, with a pretty large body of troops, Count la Mothe was this morning to have gone towards Dixmuyde, in order to meet and engage him on his march from Rousselaere to Lessinghe, as Count la Mothe has forty-four squadrons

drons and thirty-four battalions; and according to the report of all the country people, the Earl of Albemarle has not at most more than four thousand horse, and eight or ten thousand foot with him. Since this resolution has been taken, I have been informed by a man who set out from Menin yesterday in the afternoon, that the Duke of Marlborough had passed through there, as well as M. d'Auverquerque and all the enemy's army; that Marlborough's quarters were fixed at Rombecq, and Auverquerque's at Iseguem, near Rousselaere. Though we cannot depend entirely upon this report, nevertheless as the man is looked upon to be a person of veracity, and mentions a great many circumstances, I have thought it advisable to send Count la Mothe word not to advance too far, till we were sure of the truth of the report, lest he should fall in with a party much too strong for him; he therefore marched towards St. André to Vafnart, where he will halt with the main body of his troops, until he is informed of the enemy's motions by the parties he has dispatched to Thorout, to Rousselaere, and upon the road to Courtray. He has, at the same time, detached the greatest part of his grenadiers to occupy Oudenburgh, that they may be at hand to observe the arrival of the convoy from Lessinghe, and to attack it, or to march against the Earl of Albemarle's army if Marlborough does not follow him. We are assured that from Lessinghe the convoy must necessarily keep along the dyke that comes from Oudenburgh, on account of the overflowing of the waters in all the roads from fort Nieuwendan, as far as to this side of Inasquerque.

I shall remain here till I know for certain the

truth



truth of Marlborough's march, after which I will set out to join you.

The convoy is loading at Ostend, but we have as yet no intelligence of its being set off, &c.

L E T T E R.

From the Marshal of BERWICK to M. de CHAMILLART.

*Camp at Saulebois, 29th Sept. 1708.*

IT is time to think of the steps necessary to be taken to support Ghent and Bruges; for there is no doubt that as soon as the expedition against Lisle shall be finished, the enemy will do every thing in their power to deprive us of those two places, or at least of the last, in order to open to themselves a nearer communication with Menin and Lisle. I hope, that with the assistance of the corn that we have at present in Ghent and Bruges, and what is carrying there, the troops that will be put in those places, will have enough to subsist them till the next campaign, &c.

MEMORIAL of the 30th Sept. 1708.

ACCORDING to all appearances we are to expect that Lisle will be taken; but it is certain that nothing is more important for us than to prevent the enemy from having a short and easy communication with Courtray and Menin. For this purpose we must immediately begin to make our dispositions for the preservation of Ghent and Bruges, whose being the



only places by which the enemy can establish the above-mentioned communication; we must also, at the same time, make such an arrangement of the troops, that we may be able to cover France from any enterprizes or insults.

It is therefore proposed to make an immediate division of the forces of this army, to send fifty battalions and sixty squadrons behind the canal; which, with the addition of the troops that will be left in Ghent and Bruges, will be sufficient for the preservation of those two places. The person who may be charged with this business, will examine upon the spot the situation he is to take, whether to leave twenty battalions with twelve or fifteen squadrons in Ghent, and intrench himself under Bruges with the rest, or to fix himself behind the canal, in order to have a communication by the right and left with both these towns. The remainder of the army, composed of seventy-five battalions and a hundred and fifty squadrons, will remain behind the Scheld, and cover Oudenard until Lisle be either taken or the siege raised; after which it is imagined we must draw near to Mortagne, in order, by putting ourselves behind the Scarpe, to be in readiness to cover Douay, and prevent the enemy from making any incursions into France.

After this we shall see what resolution the enemy will take. If they should pass by Oudenard, to return into Brabant, it is what would be most desirable, as the campaign would then end as usual. If they should march towards Bruges or Ghent, the army which remains behind the Scarpe, will pass the Lys, to follow the enemy, and prevent their cutting off all communication between Bruges and France; for

it is certain that if one of our two armies is near Bruges, and the other near Ypres, the enemy will not be able to stop up the passage from Bruges to Ghent, and that from Bruges to Ypres; the one or the other must remain open. If the enemy should march towards the Scarpe, it is thought the seventy-five battalions and a hundred and fifty squadrons will be sufficient to stop them, especially if we set about it immediately. Moreover, in that case the army upon the canal of Bruges, would immediately come nearer the Lys, in order to harrafs the enemy's rear, and will always have it in its power to retreat behind the canal again, if the enemy should march that way.

The plan that is proposed is not only necessary for the support of Ghent and Bruges, but also to endeavour to prevent the passage of the other convoys the enemy certainly intend to bring from Ostend; but above all things there is not a moment to be lost in taking our resolution, for Lisle will soon be taken, and we shall have a great many manœuvres to make, and shall have missed the opportunity of settling them.

## L E T T E R

From the Marshal of BERWICK to M. de CHAMILLART.

*Camp at Saulebois, 1st October, 1708.*

THE Duke of Burgundy writes to the King concerning the dispositions and measures to be pursued for the rest of this campaign. It appears to me, that nothing else can be done than what is mentioned

in his letter, and there is not an instant to be lost in preparing ourselves to prevent being surprized or embarrassed in our movements.

I have forgotten to add, that if Lisle be taken, notwithstanding all we can do to prevent it, I do not think it at all an impracticable scheme to endeavour to retake it in the winter; I say further, that it is absolutely necessary to exert ourselves for that purpose; indeed, if the enemy should winter in the neighbourhood of Lisle, this enterprize would not be easy; but if the greatest part of the army should return into Brabant, it is possible to be done, by taking early arrangements for it, &c.

## L E T T E R

From M. de CHAMILLART to the Marshal of  
BERWICK.

*Versailles, 2d October, 1708.*

NOTHING is more distressing than to see Lisle taken from us, after all the hopes we had reason to have of its preservation. The King had scarcely heard of the Chevalier de Luxembourg's entrance into the place, than he was informed, by a letter from M. la Mothe to the Duke of Vendosme, that the convoy of seven hundred carriages from Ostend was passed by him to join the army, without his being able to prevent it, although he attacked them, because his infantry was not able to make an impression upon them.

You will see, by a copy of a letter from his Majesty to the Duke of Burgundy, that he will not wait to the last extremity to take the measures necessary for the  
remainder



remainder of the campaign, either to prevent the enemy's receiving any more convoys, or to embarrass their retreat, in case they should determine to send back part of their troops into Germany, or into Flanders and Holland. You will attend seriously to the plan his Majesty requires; he depends upon your zeal and attachment to his service: of my own accord I will add, for yourself merely, a thing that you will make no public use of. Nothing would be more dangerous than to give the enemy the idea I communicate to you in the utmost secrecy; I should be unwilling to trust it to any but yourself, though I am persuaded it can be of no use, yet I will explain it to you. I have taken it into my head, that in order to preserve Lisle, the enemy will make establishments at Armentieres, Warneton, Comines, Werwicke, Menin, Courtray, Oudenard, Rousselaere, Tourout, Oudenburg and Plaffendal, in order to keep up the communication by Ostend. The fruitfulness of this country, (though greatly destroyed) will still subsist them, and they may leave a sufficient number of troops there to prevent us from dislodging them. God send I may be mistaken, and that you may be able to take Courtray and Menin in the winter. Lisle would of itself return to the allegiance of its legitimate sovereign, &c.

L E T T E R

From M. de CHAMILLART to the Marshal of  
BERWICK.

*Versailles, the 3d of October, 1708.*

I CANNOT be of your opinion with respect to the retaking of Lisle, supposing it should be al-



ready lost. I assure you that it is much more easy to prevent its being taken, in the state it is in, than it would be to lay siege to it if it were once in the enemy's hands. Give me leave to tell you, that if the Duke of Burgundy will employ his army, he will still have a great many things to do before the enemy separates. Could you not contrive to have a correspondence at Oudenard? There is but a small garrison there, and still less ammunition. The army would be better employed in seconding the good will of the inhabitants than in remaining inactive behind the Scheld. It is a strange thing, that being masters of the places and the country, and having an army at least equal to the enemy's, you suffer all their convoys to pass, and let them take Lisle without the Duke of Burgundy's forming any obstacles against it. The uncharitable public attribute this to the little union there subsists between the Duke of Vendosme and yourself. I wish you had already found an opportunity to shew them they are mistaken,

## L E T T E R

From the Marshal of BERWICK to M. de CHAMILLART.

*Camp at Saulchoi, 5th October, 1708.*

I CANNOT answer your two letters of the 2d and 3d inst. better than by acquainting you with my thoughts about the views and dispositions for the remainder of the campaign. By your first, it appears to me that the King expected a plan from the Duke of Burgundy. He has anticipated his Majesty's expectations upon this point, by the letter he sent him

sent him the 2d instant, and he writes to him by this opportunity more fully. If the bad weather or the want of ammunition should oblige the enemy to raise the siege of Lille, I do not think we can do better than to place a sufficient body of troops behind the canal that goes from Ghent to Bruges, to be able to assist these two towns, and to prevent the Duke of Marlborough from undertaking any thing against them; then, leaving the passage of Oudenard open to him, we must, as soon as the enemy shall have retired into quarters, think of occupying Deynse and Dixmuyde, in order, during the winter, to block up Menin, and to be able to lay siege to it at the opening of the campaign, in covering with the main body of the army the passage into Oudenard on the other side of the Scheld. But if the enemy should take Lille, it appears to me that our principal object ought to be to preserve Bruges and Ghent, and prevent them from taking quarters on the frontiers of France, as you yourself seem to be afraid they will do.

The keeping of Bruges and Ghent is necessary for us, as well for the advantage we may draw from two of the most considerable towns in the Low Countries, as to impede that communication of the enemy with Oudenard, Menin and Lille. As long as the campaign lasts, these two places cannot be preserved but by a very considerable body of troops: when the enemy is retired, and the campaign is ended, we shall always be in time to send back into France what number of them we think proper, taking care however to occupy the posts of Dixmuyde, Deynse, and even Courtray, if we can find an opportunity to take it.

There are two things requisite to prevent the enemy from establishing themselves, in the winter, upon the frontiers of France; the one is, to take from them the free communication with their own country, by preserving Bruges and Ghent; by which means they will not be able, without the assistance of an army, to have any thing carried to Menin, or to Lisse; the other, to leave them an opening to return into their own country, for if all the passages are stopped up they will necessarily be obliged to stay here; and the step they will have been compelled to take, will perhaps make it easy for them to find subsistence there; and in that case, if even the road were left open to them, they would not think of quitting the place where they are; so that, considering Lisse as taken, it will be better not to stop the passage of the Scheld.

But besides that it would not be possible to remain all the winter behind the Scheld; as soon as any of the enemy's corps should be seen in Artois and Picardy, we should be obliged to return immediately, in order to save the neighbourhood of Paris from being put under contribution, and to prevent the enemy from living in plenty at our expence.

I think therefore, that, whether Lisse be taken or not, it would be proper to draw nearer to Mortagne, to be at hand to watch over France, and to subsist in the Castellany of Ath during the remainder of the campaign, in case the enemy should pass the Scheld.

But if, notwithstanding all that has been hitherto said, the enemy, after having taken the city of Lisse, with or without the citadel, should take the resolution of establishing themselves along the Lys, and in the environs of Lisse, we shall be obliged to put ourselves also into quarters, making a semicircle from Tournay  
to



to Ypres, in expectation of a proper opportunity of falling upon them.

These are almost all the cases that can happen: it is necessary to foresee them all, and to take measures from the present moment. The projects for surprising fortresses are not to be neglected; but we are not to depend upon them.

With regard to what you tell me of the uncharitable public attributing the occurrences here to the little union there is between the Duke de Vendosme and me, I cannot answer you any thing more than what you are already acquainted with as well as myself. I have nothing to reproach myself with, with regard to the steps I have taken to be upon good terms with the Duke de Vendosme; and there has been no altercation or dispute between us since your departure. If I don't agree with him in every particular, I must, before I alter my opinion, have good reasons given me, to which I will acquiesce; but I repeat it again, since you left us, there has been no difference of opinion, &c.

### L E T T E R

From the Marshal of BERWICK to the Count de BERGUEICK.

*Camp at Saulchoi, 5th October, 1708.*

I RECEIVED your two letters of the 3d and 4th at the same time. I am persuaded as well as you that it is the enemy's intention (after they have taken Lille) to intrench themselves against the citadel, and to endeavour to make themselves masters of Bruges and Ghent, that they may the more easily have whatever they



they want, and put their army into winter quarters along the Lys and in the environs of Lisle, pursuing always the idea of penetrating into France, and obliging the King, by that means, to make peace upon their own terms. This reason should also induce us to endeavour, by all means, to counteract their designs, and to make the preserving of Bruges and Ghent our grand object. The memorial I sent you turned chiefly upon this; and it appears to me, that we only differ in opinion with regard to the number of troops that should be left there. If, however, the dispute were only for ten battalions, I should be willing to give them up; there would still remain, in that case, sixty battalions, besides the garrisons; and I believe that might be sufficient; especially if we consider that Marlborough would not be able to march with all his forces, as he cannot avoid leaving a very large garrison in Lisle; besides that his army is greatly diminished, and will be still more so before the end of the campaign.

I cannot be of opinion that it will be right to continue stopping up the passage of the Scheld, because our army could not subsist there, and we should expose France to terrible incursions, which would throw the whole country into confusion as far as the gates of Paris.

Lisle, then, being taken (if Lisle is to be taken), I would leave the army intended for the security of Bruges and Ghent, behind the Canal, and with the rest I would place myself near Mortagne, to be in readiness to defend France. You can make but one objection to this scheme; to wit, that by uncovering Oudenard, we leave a free passage to Brussels. But I answer to this, that besides the difficulties that will

will be found in traversing a deep country at a late season of the year, the enemy would not be able to bring any convoys from Brussels, without marching their whole army on this side of the Scheld to escort them; and in that case perhaps we might be able to place ourselves on the other side of Oudenard, to prevent their returning; but if that could not be done, we should still preserve Bruges and Ghent, and cover our own country, till such time as we might find an opportunity of attempting some enterprizes not yet ripe for execution.

The orders you have sent to have magazines of forage at Ghent and Bruges, will be of great service to us, as well as the arms you intend sending there, &c.

## L E T T E R

From M. de CHAMILLART to the Marshal of  
BERWICK.

*Marli, 8th October, 1708.*

IN the letter you have done me the honour of writing to me the 5th instant, relative to the close of the campaign, and the dispositions you think should be made, whether Lisse be taken or not, it appears to me that there is a preliminary article which you do not take sufficient notice of; this is, the present state and situation of the armies, and what ought to be done to deprive the enemy of all opportunity of receiving convoys from Brussels or Ostend. If, as we are assured, it be true, that they have not ammunition enough to take Lisse, how could they manage to keep that, and to take the citadel, while you remain as you are, and do all you can, both you and M. de Vendosme,

dofme, to cut off their communication with Oftend and Bruffels. If those who write with a perfect knowledge of things, and who have very good intentions, are to be believed, the post of Leffinghe alone would remove all our apprehensions on the side of Oftend. The enemy are intrenching and fortifying themselves there; they will then go on to Slype, as they have been to Guiftele; and when their convoys are ready, they will fend such a confiderable number of troops, that the Duke of Vendofme's army will be fo much expofed, that, inftead of attacking the enemy, they will be obliged to act with fuch caution, as will give them an opportunity of paffing. If the forty-three battalions and fixty-four fquadrons which are under the Duke de Vendofme, were, refpecting their infantry, like the regiment of Piedmont, and the cavalry like the Gendarmerie, I fhould think the enemy more embarrassed than he, for with fo numerous a body, they would want half their army to be fuperior to him; and from the ftate Prince Eugene's army is in, they would endanger him if they were to advance too far towards Oftend, while the Duke of Burgundy is near them with forces fufficient to march directly to Lifle, if he could reach the place while the Duke of Marlborough was employed in facilitating the paffage of the convoy.

The fureft means to put a ftop to thefe movements would be, to throw bridges over the Scheld, to make the enemy afraid of the Duke of Burgundy's army falling upon them, and of his paffing that river every moment with all his army, to advance wherever he thought he could make the beft ufe of it; or, at leaft, to fufpend the enemy's motions, by obliging them to keep together near Lifle, which would preferve the Duke



Duke de Vendosme from any apprehensions, and take from the enemy all means of bringing their convoys. I do not mention the precautions you would be obliged to take for securing the bridges of communication, in case the Duke of Burgundy should resolve to have some thrown over the Scheld; for I make no doubt that he would cause some redoubts and intrenchments to be made to cover them, and that care would be taken to draw them up every night on the side of Brabant. There is even a great deal of probability that he would have them made at Pottes and Escanasse, and at a sufficient distance from Tournay, to give the enemy equal anxiety on the side of Rouffelaere, or of Lisle, according to the motions they should make. In a word, without intending to suggest a plan, I must say, that, absorbed as I am, and as I ought to be, with grief, at seeing Lisle fall into the hands of the enemy, who do just what they please in the face of an army of a hundred thousand men, I think the Duke of Burgundy might make a better use of his army than in guarding the Scheld; that it would be much preferable to think of saving Lisle, before it falls into the enemy's hands, than to retake it afterwards, when it will perhaps have furnished them with the means of wintering in the extent of country occupied by the armies of the two crowns, the greater part of which is in his Majesty's dominions. It will be time enough to talk of the Duke of Burgundy's project, when the fate of Lisle is more clearly ascertained. The enemy could make no use of it if they had taken it, unless they had provisions and ammunition sufficient to support and preserve it. Reflect upon this seriously; especially as, at the distance that the Duke of Vendosme is from you, part  
of



of the good or bad that may happen to the the Duke of Burgundy will be laid to your charge. I give you my opinion freely and naturally ; you know what is to be done better than I ; but my zeal obliges me to write this letter, of which you will make the use you think most proper for the good of his Majesty's service, and for the Duke of Burgundy's glory and your own, &c.

## L E T T E R

From M. de CHAMILLART to the Marshal of  
BERWICK.

*Marli, 9th Oct. 1708.*

COULD you remain behind the Scheld with fourscore battalions and a hundred and fifty squadrons, while the enemy were bringing another convoy from Sluys and Sas van Ghent, by the canal of Bruges to Ghent ? The glory of the Duke of Burgundy is at stake, and your honour is, in some degree, concerned to assist in preventing its arrival, or, at least, to make a movement which may extricate you from the desperate situation you are in. Do not forsake Lisse, nor Marshal Boufflers. He has acquitted himself too well of what might be expected from his zeal and courage, to be obliged at last to surrender the most important fortress belonging to his Majesty by a capitulation. Do not think you will be able to retake Lisse if it were once in the enemy's power. I foresee such fatal consequences if we be reduced to this last resource, that I shall have no comfort left but that of having nothing to reproach myself with. Act like a virtuous man, as you are. Ath is an ob-  
ject

ject of no consequence at such a conjuncture: as you have the means of saving Lisle; or rendering the conquest of it useless to the enemy, employ them speedily and successfully, &c.

## L E T T E R

From the Marshal of BERWICK to M. de CHAMILLART.

*Camp at Saulchoi, 10th Oct. 1708.*

IN the preceding letters I have written to you, when I proposed to you what was to be done, whether Lisle was taken or not, I did not mean that any thing was to be neglected from the present time which might embarrass the enemy in the execution of their enterprizes. I go further; for though Count la Mothe's affair does not give us any great confidence in part of the infantry, I am still of opinion that we ought not to lose any favourable opportunity of falling upon the enemy. But while we are doing every thing in our power to prevent the passage of the convoys, and to be in readiness to make use of any favourable opening that may present itself, prudence requires also that we should, without delay, form a plan for our future conduct, according to the different circumstances and situation of affairs; for if we are not prepared beforehand, we may find ourselves very much embarrassed in the execution of whatever may be thought proper to be done. You say that the enemy cannot make any use of Lisle, nor even keep possession of it, if they have neither provisions nor ammunition to put into it: I have always been of that opinion, and every thing that I have had the honour

honour of proposing to you had only that in view, to preserve Ghent and Bruges, which will either intirely cut off, or render the communication with Lisle and Menin very difficult, and will prevent them from drawing any subsistence from the provinces of France. The execution of these two projects will be easy, provided measures are taken immediately; if they be any longer delayed, I cannot answer for the event. The Duke of Burgundy, directly on his arrival here, caused bridges to be thrown over the Scheld, facing the left, at Herrines, Pottes, and Escanaffe, and our parties go out skirmishing by them every day. We have posts also at the castles of Helchin and Warcoin, by means of the same bridges. With regard to the apparent inactivity of the Duke of Burgundy's army, permit me to say, that if they did not remain fixed in the posts which they occupy, I do not know how they could intercept the passage of the convoys, as they have done, on the Scheld: if that has not been the case towards Ostend, it is neither the Duke of Burgundy's nor the Duke de Vendosme's fault; for as soon as we arrived in this camp, H. R. H. gave positive orders for laying the country under water; if these orders had been executed, no convoys could have passed, and Lisle would have been saved; besides, he sent twice the number of troops the enemy had, to stop and beat the convoy: this is all he could do; if they have not been employed with success, and no use has been made of them, it is a misfortune that ought certainly not to be laid to his charge.

You will have been informed that the Duke of Marlborough marched three days ago to Rousselaere, with great part of his army; upon which the Duke of Burgundy has resolved (in case he should proceed



to a greater distance from the siege) to march and attack Prince Eugene in his lines; but having learned yesterday morning that Marlborough had sent back a body of fourteen thousand men, and that he remained still encamped with the rest at Rouffelaere, having bridges over the Lys near Menin, H. R. H. thought proper to send M. de Vendosme a further reinforcement of fifteen battalions and ten squadrons, the more effectually to prevent the enemy from forcing the canal that runs from Bruges to Ghent, and bringing up the convoys, which are ready, by that way, from Sas van Ghent and Sluys; the more especially as, in the situation in which Marlborough is, he would be able to get back to Lille as soon as we could arrive there, because part of our troops are employed in covering Oudenard.

You will see by the Duke of Vendosme's letter to the Duke of Burgundy, that he assures him no more convoys will be able to pass; and the advices we have received say, that Marlborough intends returning to Ronques.

I hope you know me well enough to be persuaded, that, without paying any attention to the public, or to common report, I shall always give the Duke of Burgundy the best advice I am capable of, as I act from principles of zeal and attachment to the King, the state, and the personal glory of H. R. H. I do not pretend to infallibility, but to integrity and truth.



## L E T T E R

From the Marshal of BERWICK to M. de CHAMILLART.

*Camp at Saulchoi, 11th Oct. 1708.*

BESIDES, I do not think that any body here stands in need of being spurred up and awakened to a sense of his duty, and of the good of the state. We take what steps we think best; and we should be much obliged to those who would propose effectual means to do more.

I am of your opinion that Ath is not a very considerable object, nor an equivalent to Lisle; but I see no inconvenience in forming this enterprize, as it does not take us off from any thing else; and with regard to what you do me the honour of telling me, that we have the means of saving Lisle in our hands, be so good as to explain yourself; and I can take upon me to assure you beforehand, that the Dukes of Burgundy and Vendosme desire no better: on my part, I will contribute towards it as much as shall be in my power, without desiring either honour or fame for it, as I shall be sufficiently rewarded by the satisfaction I shall feel in seeing affairs take a favourable turn, &c.

LETTER

L E T T E R

From M. de CHAMILLART to the Marshal of  
BERWICK.

*Versailles, 14th Oct. 1708.*

MY answer to your two letters of the 11th will be very short. I am very far from laying any thing to your charge; but I could wish, as it hath been too late found by experience, that the first convoy ought not to have been suffered to pass: those who have so ill executed the orders they received, should be brought to punishment: this is the way to succeed. As for Lisle; I find it is reduced to great extremities; and I pity Marshal Boufflers, that he cannot fully enjoy the fruits of the finest defence that has ever been made.

I did not think that what I mentioned to you in my letter of the 9th, wanted any explanation. I do still believe that you have in your hands the means of saving Lisle, or of rendering the conquest of it useless; and to make myself understood, it appears to me, that supposing the enemy has ammunition sufficient to take the town, they will not have enough to keep it, if no more convoys get up to them: this is what I thought, and I hope your conduct will confirm me in my opinion.

I greatly fear Prince Eugene's obstinacy; a few days will clear up our doubts, but they will appear very long, &c.

## L E T T E R

From the Marshal of BERWICK to M. de CHAMILLART.

*Camp at Saulchoi, 17th Oct. 1708.*

THE enemy have found means, notwithstanding the inundation, to bring up some powder, part of which arrived yesterday at their camp before Lille; so that in a day or two we shall have the misfortune to hear of the loss of that important place; but however sensibly we may feel this, we must not suffer our grief to delay our determinations an instant. There is no doubt that Bruges and Ghent must be preserved, which cannot be done but by putting in them a body of troops sufficient to defend the passage of the canal. The Duke de Vendosme has already a considerable number, and with a very trifling reinforcement, all will be safe on that side. It remains to be known, whether, in order to prevent the enemy from receiving any convoys from Brussels, the army is to remain all the winter behind the Scheld, occupying the same posts, and covering Oudenard. If this be the plan, independent of the liberty you will leave the enemy of passing into Picardy, (for we cannot preserve Bruges and Ghent, cover the Scheld, and remain strong enough to prevent Prince Eugene's sending a hundred squadrons into France whenever he pleases); how will our cavalry subsist? It already suffers a great deal from the distance of the forage; which must be fetched every day from a greater distance: besides that, the roads will soon be very bad: moreover, when the enemy have joined, after the taking of Lille, they will certainly penetrate somewhere, the extent

extent of the country being too great to be well guarded; but supposing they should not, what are they in want of? They will find corn more than sufficient in Lisle; ammunition, if they want it, they will get from Ostend; or should they not, we should be obliged to lay siege to Lisle, in order to prevent their keeping it; for as you stop up the enemy's return, you oblige them to remain; and you will not drive them away but by force.

The question therefore is, whether the King chuses (supposing Lisle to be taken) that we should continue all the winter to guard the Scheld, or by drawing near the Scarpe, should enable ourselves to shut up, and cover, both Artois and Picardy: here is the alternative, for both cannot be done. I can tell you further, that many people affirm, it is Prince Eugene's intention to make his infantry winter round Lisle, and along the Lys, in Courtray, Menin, Werwicke, Comines, Warneton, Armentieres, Rontain, Lannoy, Turcoin, and perhaps in la Bassée. This would be another reason for taking our station on the side of Artois, (after the surrender of Lisle) for fear he should extend his quarters further.

L E T T E R

From M. de CHAMILLART to the Marshal of  
BERWICK.

*Versailles, 17th Oct. 1708.*

AT any rate it does not appear to his Majesty, that it would be proper for the Duke of Burgundy to join the Duke de Vendosme, in order to fight the Duke of Marlborough's army while at a distance from



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the siege of Lisle; it would even be very difficult, not to say impossible, for the Duke of Burgundy's army to pass the Lys at Deynse, as he had proposed, without any opposition from the Duke of Marlborough, &c.

## L E T T E R

From the Marshal of BERWICK to M. de CHAMILLART.

*Camp at Saulchoi, 19th Oct. 1678.*

I HAVE received your letter of the 17th, by which I find, that you think the Duke of Burgundy ought to pass the Scheld, to draw nearer to Lisle, without the Duke de Vendosme's joining him. I must tell you upon that, that the Duke of Marlborough, being at Rousselaere, is not more than five leagues distant from Prince Eugene's camp; that he has even already twenty battalions forming a chain towards Menin, and that he has bridges near the same place over the Lys; so that it would not be possible for us (having our troops to assemble, which are spread as far as to Oudenard), to steal a march, and get up to Prince Eugene before Marlborough; but if even that could be done, we cannot attack intrenchments without some preparation; and certainly the Duke of Marlborough will arrive while we are employed in them; who finding us quite exposed, and very inferior in number, will not fail to attack us; for though the Duke de Vendosme should march at the same time for Rousselaere, he could not assist us, nor consequently prevent our being beaten; so that, for the present, I see no other step to be taken, than to try to prevent

prevent (if possible) any convoy passing from Ostend, unless Marlborough should retire from the siege; for as to the proposal which M. de Vendosme now makes, (after having demonstrated the impropriety of it himself) it does not appear to me that it is practicable, nor even that it would answer any end; for this reason, that it is not possible for us to pass the Scheld and the Lys, to arrive at Rouffelaere, without Marlborough being apprized of it; and he will, in that case, place himself behind the Lys, which he will prevent us from passing, and will oblige us to go round by Ghent, in order to return to Oudenard; and if, in the mean time, Lisle should be taken, our communication with France would become very difficult by any other way than Ypres, &c.

L E T T E R

From the Marshal of BERWICK to M. de CHAMILLART.

*Camp at Saulchoi, 22d Oct. 1708.*

I SHALL have the honour to acquaint you, that I have not altered my opinion about M. de Vendosme's last proposal. When his Royal Highness was advised to march, I did not approve of the proposal; yet, as some persons insisted, I was of opinion that it should be mentioned to the Duke de Vendosme, in order to know his sentiments. He rejected it, assigning reasons, which appeared satisfactory to you as well as to me. He has since made the same proposal himself, without saying any thing further, than, that he does not know what steps to take to preserve Lisle; but as he has not removed, nor even alledged any thing in

opposition to the good reasons he had assigned before, I have not changed my opinion. This is the state of the case; and after this, I did not suppose that I had given any room for being thought capable of altering my sentiments merely from caprice, or, to speak more properly, to keep up an opposition to M. de Vendosme. I have already assured you, and I repeat it, that I have not the least rancour against him. The advances I have made to him are sufficient to obtain credit to this assertion. As to the rest, my inclination to live in peace and harmony may induce me to be silent, but will never make me give my approbation to what I think contrary to the good of the service, &c.

## L E T T E R

From the Marshal of BERWICK to M. de CHAMILLART.

*Camp at Saulchoi, 23d Oct. 1708.*

WE have just received the news that Lille is capitulating. The King's orders as to what H. R. H. is to do, should be dispatched without delay. You have my opinion in the several letters and memorials I have had the honour of sending to you. I think that our principal attention should be given to the preservation of Bruges and Ghent, till the enemy separates. For this purpose, I should think it would be right to reinforce M. de Vendosme, and place ourselves behind the Scarpe with the remainder of the army: but I refer you, upon all these things, to the letters I have had the honour of writing, wherein I have

have fully explained myself; I should only repeat to you the same things, for I have not altered my sentiments, &c.

L E T T E R

From the Marshal of BERWICK to M. de CHAMILLART.

*Camp at Saulchoi, 23d Oct. 1708.*

WE have again this afternoon received the confirmation that Lille capitulated yesterday: the Duke of Burgundy sends an account of it to the King, and asks his orders at the same time. I believe that every body agrees to the importance of preserving Ghent and Bruges. For this purpose, a reinforcement of some battalions must necessarily be sent to the Duke de Vendosme: it remains to consider what is to be done with the rest of the army. If we cover Oudenard, and guard the Scheld, it is certain that we take from the enemy the means of drawing any ammunition from their own country; but at the same time, we leave them at liberty to live at the expence of ours, and even to canton themselves in it. If we march up to them to prevent this, we shall uncover Oudenard, and they will encamp there, and will get every thing they want from Brabant. Moreover, if we persist in remaining upon the Scheld, our army will perish, especially our cavalry; while the enemy will live in plenty at our expence; besides, I do not doubt, that if the enemy should attempt to force a passage, they will succeed, as there is a great extent of ground from Condé to Gavre. My advice therefore would be, as I wrote you word a long time since,

that



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that we should place ourselves behind the Scarpe, as soon as the breaches of Lisle shall be a little repaired.

With regard to winter quarters, there is no thinking of them at present, nor of taking them till the enemy sets us the example, &c.

## L E T T E R

From M. DE CHAMILLART to the Marshal of  
BERWICK.

*Verfailles, 23d Oct. 1708.*

IF I can depend upon the advices I receive on all sides, there is no reason to doubt of the enemy's intentions to fix themselves near Lisle, to maintain themselves there during the winter, and to open a communication by sea and land with their own country. Nothing will be more easy for them, if the Duke of Burgundy arranges himself as he proposes. If he separates his army now, and is not able to make a good part of his troops winter in the places which may be near the enemy when their army shall be separated, and keep his own together till that time, there is no doubt, that which ever of the two armies obliges his enemy to separate first, will have a great advantage. You would render an important service to the King, and to France, if, by your application and care, you could contribute to preserve the horses of the cavalry, and enable them to find means to shelter themselves from the weather, at the same time concerting measures with M. de Bernieres for their subsistence; and you should immediately propose to the Duke of Burgundy to send back to France all the useless mouths, and even all the officers that are tired of so long a campaign: this will tend to quiet them, and

put a stop to the discourses which some of them hold, and which greatly prejudice the affairs and service of his Majesty. They will undoubtedly find, that it is better for them to spend some days at Tournay, than to remain in certain villages, where there are neither doors nor windows, and very often scarcely any wood for firing; but such is the state of affairs, that the resolution must be taken to force impossibilities; and if the Duke of Burgundy does not determine to do this, he will see the enemy establish themselves in the strongest part of the kingdom, and be ready to open the next campaign on the frontiers of Picardy. If you add to this, the terror that such an establishment will spread in the minds of the people, the inquietude of the financiers, who will lose the small degree of confidence they have remaining, and will take great care to secure their money, you will recover that courage and strength of mind which I have known in you, and which is become so necessary, that I am obliged to tell you, it is flattering one's self to have an idea of retaking Lisle this winter, after having given the enemy time to collect provisions of all sorts, to put the place in order, and to fortify all the posts that surround it, which must be attacked and taken before the place itself can be invested. You may judge whether a speedy and successful event can be expected under such an idea, since you see, that the post of Lessinghe, which is of no consequence in itself, cannot be penetrated by his Majesty's troops. Those people who are for putting off things, are only occupied about the present, and not at all about the future. I repeat to you again, that if the Duke of Burgundy does not immediately put as many obstacles as he can in the enemy's way, inconveniencies will happen  
which

## N O T E S.

which it will be too late to remedy. I write to M. de Bernieres to have a serious conference with you upon the subject of this letter; he will be able, by his capacity as well as by his good disposition, and the assistance he will get from M. le Blanc, to be useful to you in forming an arrangement capable of relieving the Duke of Burgundy, and of furnishing means to oblige the enemy to seek that of sending part of their troops into their own country at the risk of whatever may happen to them, by rendering impracticable all communication for the purpose of subsisting their cavalry during the winter.

## L E T T E R

From the Marshal of BERWICK to M. de CHAMILLART.

*Camp at Saulchoi, 25th Oct. 1708.*

I CANNOT answer exactly your letter of the 23d instant, because it contains many things that I have not well understood; I shall therefore only repeat to you my thoughts about the steps the Duke of Burgundy should take in the present situation of affairs, and I will afterwards ask you a clear and positive explanation of the King's intentions, that we may conform ourselves exactly to them, at least as far as may lie in our power.

If I am not mistaken, the principal object of your letter relates to the means of preventing the enemy from fixing themselves near Lisle. I will freely tell you, that if Prince Eugene wishes it, and the Allies consent, I don't know any means to prevent him; especially as, beside the quantity of grain they have  
got

got from Artois and elsewhere, they will find in Lisle more than enough to supply all their army: there are then provisions for the men. The cattle must also be provided for. According to all appearance, the environs of Lisle are very much eaten up; so that it would be difficult for all their cavalry to subsist if the passage into Artois were shut up; for they cannot bring forage from their country by land, (the distance being too great) nor by sea, while we keep Ghent. In order, then, to prevent their getting forage from Artois, we should place ourselves near it with a sufficient body of troops, or, more properly speaking, with an army, for small bodies may easily incommode an enemy's army, but cannot prevent them from executing their designs.

I conclude then, that the only means of attempting to hinder the enemy's wintering in the neighbourhood of Lisle, will be, to deprive them entirely of the conveniencies they might get from Artois, by placing there part of the army, and to leave a passage open for them to return into their own country; for if we persist in stopping up all the passages, we reduce them to the necessity of staying in our country, and of seeking some means to live there, I mean their cavalry, for their infantry will have provisions in abundance.

Moreover, I beg of you to consider, that in order entirely to bar the enemy's return into, or communication with, their own country, we must make a chain from Bruges to Condé, behind the Canal and the Scheld; and we shall want our whole army to guard such an extent of country: thus there will remain nothing on the side of France. I know very well that the enemy have not wherewithal to form any  
2 siege



siege there, that the season itself does not permit it; and that consequently we have nothing to fear for our towns but a surprize. I also know that the enemy will not venture their army, and penetrate into France, without magazines and places; but ours extending from Bruges to Condé, could not prevent their cavalry from taking up their quarters in the very heart of Artois; their infantry will remain upon the Lys, a country so broken that cavalry could not act there. You will tell me, that as soon as the enemy shall take that step, we may march to disturb them. My answer is, that if we unite all our forces, we leave an opening for the enemy to return home, either by the other side of the Lys, or on this side of the Scheld, our army not being able to guard both. I say further, that if we march straight on to the enemy, encamped with their right near Lisle, and their left at the Lys, with the Lower Deule before them, they will wait for us with only their infantry, and their cavalry will not stir from their cantonments in Artois. If we march into Artois and drive them away, it is doing exactly what I have proposed before, and the enemy will then be at liberty to return, and communicate with their own country by any way they please.

But if, notwithstanding all these reasons, the King should determine that his army shall remain behind the Canal and the Scheld, to bar the enemy's return; you will have the goodness to acquaint us how we are to subsist our cavalry; for you may depend upon it, that all is destroyed to the distance of six leagues from the Scheld: and yet, we must be encamped upon it, in order to defend the passage. Messieurs de Bernieres and le Blanc are very able men, zealous, and full of

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exped-

expedients ; but they cannot perform impossibilities. Our army would therefore entirely perish, while the enemy would be much more at their ease. I must also tell you, that notwithstanding all our precautions, the enemy will be able to send home what cavalry they will think proper by Cambray ; keeping with them only so much as they can provide subsistence for.

Here is a great deal of reasoning : to put an end to it, I shall have the honour of repeating to you, that the only means of preventing the enemy from making a firm establishment on the frontiers of France, is, to leave them a free passage home ; and as for the means of preventing their carrying the war next year upon the borders of Picardy, it appears to me that it can be done very easily, in taking early the necessary measures to recruit the army, and to fill the magazines ; for we shall then be in readiness to assemble, and to check or fight the enemy. You must prepare for this without delay, especially for getting recruits, remounting the cavalry, filling the arsenals in which you have not powder enough, repairing your fortresses which are in bad condition, making dépôts of flower for the subsistence of your army ; and the whole must be ready time enough to be beforehand with the enemy, and take the field first. There is, besides, an essential thing to be done, which is, to fortify Ghent and Bruges in such a manner, as not to be obliged to leave an army to guard them, &c.

## L E T T E R

From the Marshal of BERWICK to M. de CHAMILLART.

*Camp at Saulchoi, 26th Oct. 1768.*

THE Duke de Vendosme has just acquainted the Duke of Burgundy with the taking of Lessinghe. That post was absolutely necessary for us, to preserve a free communication between Bruges and France. We must therefore immediately erect works there, besides making redoubts along the canal of Nieuport, to secure the navigation of it; but at the same time we must keep a sufficient force behind the canal that leads from Bruges to Ghent, for fear Marlborough should attempt to force it; and as for us, we have nothing else to do than to be attentive to cover Artois and Picardy. The reasons for this I have given you more at length in the letter I had the honour of writing to you yesterday, and which is inclosed.

I suppose you know that the Prince of Hesse is at la Bassée, and that he is fortifying it: this deserves attention, and shews you, that when I sent you word that as soon as Lisle should be taken, we must think of covering France, I did not obtrude my opinion upon you unseasonably, nor with any view of putting ourselves into winter quarters; for I repeat to you, that we must remain encamped till the enemy think proper to close the campaign, and even after that; but we must take proper situations, and not destroy ourselves and country, while we fancy we are embarrassing our enemy.

Since

Since I began this letter, the Duke of Burgundy has shewn me that which you wrote to him yesterday. You will see by the answer, that if the enemy should increase in numbers at la Bassée, he will be obliged to take a resolution before your arrival, and march towards Douay with the troops which at present guard the Scheld, &c.

L E T T E R

From the Marshal of BÉRWICK to M. de CHAMILLART.

*Camp at Saulchoi, 28th Oct. 1708.*

YOU are, no doubt, informed that the Prince of Hesse is at la Bassée with thirteen battalions and thirty squadrons, Marlborough has sent to carry off all the grain that is to be found along, and on the other side of, the Lys; and it is said that the enemy intend to assemble in a few days, in order to force the passage of the Scheld, or of the canal that goes from Bruges to Ghent. I am still of the same opinion, that we have no other step to take than to leave what troops will be necessary for the defence of the canal from Bruges to Ghent, and to fall back towards Artois with the remainder of the army, to prevent the enemy drawing from our country their winter subsistence. As long as we stay behind the Scheld, we leave them to do what they please, while we are perishing; let us leave the passage of Oudenard open; they will not be able to receive from Brussels what they will be in want of but with a great deal of trouble and time, and large escorts. Moreover, I do not think it an easy matter to prevent their making an



opening somewhere. M. de Vendosme is of opinion, that it will be very difficult to hinder the enemy from forcing a passage on the canal between Bruges and Ghent; much less then can we hinder them on the Scheld, which is of much greater extent. With regard to what M. de Vendosme proposes, for us all to join on the other side of the Lys, I do not see what end it will answer. Marlborough will place himself on this side, and will not only subsist from Artois and France, but will also establish a communication with Brussels. Besides, we shall eat up Ghent and Bruges, when we ought rather to think of supplying them with provisions, as even the inhabitants begin to be in want: but if you come here, we will discourse more fully about all these things, supposing that the enemy will give us time to do it, for I will not answer that they do not make some movement in less than two days. I do not say more at present, as I can but repeat to you what I have had the honour of acquainting you with in several of my preceding letters.

I forgot to tell you, that the Duke of Burgundy sends to the Duke de Vendosme the six additional battalions he has asked for; and that, as we shall have no more remaining for the guard of the Scheld than sixty-nine battalions, he has given orders to M. de Hatifort to retire towards Escanasse, in case the enemy should advance with all their army to force a passage at Oudenard; it being impossible, if we mean to keep every thing, not to be penetrated in some part or other, and not to have some disaster happen to us. H. R. H. has likewise sent word to M. de Vendosme to send ten squadrons to Ypres, to harass and incommod the enemy on that side.

LETTER

L E T T E R

From the Marshal of BERWICK to the Count de  
BERGUEICK.

*Camp at Saulchoi, 29th Oct. 1708.*

IT is certain, that as we cannot shut up Artois and Picardy, cover Oudenard and the Scheld, and have, at the same time, a body of troops sufficient to preserve Bruges and Ghent, we must give up, of our three objects, that which will be of the least use to the enemy. I agree with you, that the principal point is the keeping of Bruges and Ghent; therefore I would place there seventy battalions and about as many squadrons, and with the remainder of the army would fall back on Artois, frightening the enemy in their quarters. I own, that if we do this, our forces will be separated; but of what use will that be to the enemy? It will be in vain for them to assemble theirs. They cannot penetrate into France, nor attempt taking any of our places, since you yourself say that they have no ammunition. They cannot take from us either Bruges or Ghent, since we have a sufficient army behind the canal to prevent their passage; which they cannot attempt but with all their forces; for, in short, while we are in Artois they cannot avoid leaving a large body of troops in Lille; and even if they are determined that we shall not succour the citadel, they must have an army to bar our approach to it, without which, we should find means, in spite of the inundation, not only to throw in every thing we should chuse, but also so large a body of troops, that we should be able to retake the

town by the Esplanade : if even this should not be practicable, we should be able to post ourselves so near the citadel, that the enemy could not drive us away ; and, in this case, I would willingly remain encamped all the winter : but this is no more than an idea, let us return to matter of fact. Ghent and Bruges are secure by means of the corps I mentioned before ; and as, when we are in Artois, the enemy can no longer get provisions except from Brussels, I leave you to judge whether it will be possible for them to think of passing the winter in our country with all their army. If they are obliged to repass the Scheld with part of their army, to quarter themselves elsewhere, I should then give my consent for our assembling upon the Scheld, and laying siege to Lille, (which is an object we ought not to lose sight of, and for which we ought to have been prepared a month ago).

I have but one thing to add, to make an end of my reasoning ; which is, that I cannot believe that we should be able to guard the canal and the Scheld against the united forces of the enemy ; we should be too weak in one or other of these places : that being the case, I can never be of opinion that we should all fall back towards Ghent, for then the enemy will not only receive convoys from Brussels, and collect as much grain as they think proper in Artois, but their parties will also make incursions into Picardy, and, if they chuse it, even to the gates of Paris.



No. II.

THIS is certainly a very singular anecdote; one cannot avoid being very much amazed that the King and his Council did suffer themselves to be so much guided in the answer M. de Chamillart was ordered to dictate to the Marshal of Berwick, by the idea that Marlborough had taken this step out of fear. If one could have imagined that the enemy's situation round Lille embarrassed them, and might give them some uneasiness, one could no longer suppose it after the capitulation of the town, though the citadel was not yet taken. It was the same man whom they would have bought six months after at any rate; who presented himself, of his own accord, to negotiate peace with all the appearances of sincerity. A man whose credit was so high at this time, that he could give either peace or war; and they deprived themselves of his good offices by an answer equally disgusting and ill conceived. It was however known, that although the Marshal of Berwick had re-established affairs in Spain, every where else misfortunes seemed to be accumulated since the battle of Hockster, at Ramillies, at Turin, &c.; that the Court had been so much disheartened by the first defeat, that ever since the year 1705 they had been tempted to begin a negotiation with the States-General. Helvetius, the physician, a Dutchman, (father to him who was first physician to the late Queen, and grandfather to the author of the *Treatise de l'Esprit*) and the Marquis d'Alegre, since Marshal of France, had been em-



## N O T E S.

ployed, one after another, for that purpose. (See Supplement to the Memoirs of M. de Torcy). In 1707, M. Helvetius having been invited by M. de Wenvoirden, of the illustrious house of Wassenaar, one of the principal members of the Privy Council, to go to Holland to give him his advice in a long fit of illness, advantage was taken of that opportunity to renew the negociation, which had been suspended by the operations of war. M. Helvetius sent word that the States-General were more than ever inclined to enter into negociations for peace, provided it was concluded with secrecy, and without the knowledge of their allies, with whom they appeared to be very much discontented. Upon this advice, the Court of France sent M. de Menager into Holland, to open a negotiation of a private treaty, which they did not despair of concluding with the Dutch, without the knowledge of their allies; but Prince Eugene and the Duke of Marlborough had acquired such an ascendancy over the States-General by the brilliancy of their victories and the extent of their conquests, that it was difficult for all these secret and particular negociations, which were made without their concurrence, to have any effect. Those two Generals had made themselves masters of the deliberations of the republic, and nothing was concluded without their consent: the Pensionary Heinsius lived in perfect intelligence with them. The members of the Privy Council who had listened to the proposals of Helvetius, the Marquis d'Alegre, and M. de Menager, were more than once afraid of having gone too far; and there was nothing they so much recommended to M. de Menager, when he set out from the Hague, as the keeping an inviolable secrecy upon what had

been said in their private conferences, and above all, not to expose the members of the Council by name; which was a plain proof that they did not think themselves authorized to treat without Prince Eugene and the Duke of Marlborough, who had credit enough to ruin them, if they had been informed of what had passed between them and the secret Envoys of the Court of France.

Such was the state of the negotiation with the Dutch, when the Duke of Marlborough made offers of his services, which appeared sincere. Only six months after, without France having received any other check, than the loss of Ghent and Bruges, which the allies retook at the end of the campaign, peace, which had been in some measure rejected, was looked upon as the only resource of the state. The ministers of the Court of Versailles, having lost all hopes of succeeding by a private negotiation with Holland, took the resolution of treating openly; and the President de Rouille was sent to the Hague, with the title of Plenipotentiary, to obtain peace. Louis XIV. that Monarch, who was till this time accustomed to vanquish and prescribe laws to every power, in vain offered the restitution of a great part of his conquests, that of the Spanish monarchy, the forsaking his allies, &c.

“The account of the last conferences between the President Rouille and the Dutch negotiators being read in Council, destroyed all hopes of peace, (says M. de Torcy): the necessity of it was felt the more, whatever it might cost.”

The King consented to more sacrifices; and accepted the offer M. de Torcy, his Minister for foreign affairs, made him, of going himself in person to solicit

the Pensionary of Holland. I do not mean to transcribe what may be read in M. de Torcy's memoirs, vol. I. page 337, and the following. One cannot help saying, that those who composed the King's Council did not appear sufficiently like Romans on this occasion. The consternation and weakness of the Court of France had the effect they ought to have, that of rendering an enemy of little generosity more insolent. Accordingly the good old man Foscarini said to the negociators, (Supplement to the Memoirs of M. de Torcy) "Would you forsake  
 "the Spanish monarchy when you can preserve it?  
 "Make peace or war; do not remain meanly thus  
 "in a place that suits your dignity so little; (at  
 "Gertruidenberg): you have to do with coarse  
 "people, that are unacquainted with generosity;  
 "this brings you nothing but shame without profit:  
 "you lose on all sides. If you are in so great want  
 "of peace as to make you resolve to act against  
 "Philip V. at least make your conditions, and you  
 "will certainly obtain Naples and Sicily. These  
 "people are proud, only because they see you in an  
 "unworthy humiliation; they think themselves  
 "strong, only because you shew yourselves weak;  
 "they esteem themselves rich, because you own you  
 "are beggars; and if you think seriously about it,  
 "you will find that you are not much worse than  
 "they." However M. de Torcy informs us, that  
 the Duke of Marlborough, who had offered his service in 1708, was the chief occasion, in 1709, of all that was done in Holland to counteract all the measures of the Court of France. His great successes had confirmed his authority in England to that degree, that, although Queen Anne was already very much  
 3  
 disgusted



disgusted with the Dutchess of Marlborough, Godolphin the Treasurer, and he, reigned there like Sovereigns. They gave all the places to their friends; they turned Harley out of the Council; formed a House of Commons that was entirely at their devotion, which without any debates granted all the subsidies required. They obtained seven millions sterling for the campaign, and an augmentation for the army of ten thousand men. The English General went over into Holland in the Spring, where he excited the Pensionary against France; and was the occasion of the harsh answers that Buys and Van den Dussen gave to M. de Rouillé. He returned into England at the end of the month of April, and did not wait till the wind was fair for his passage: this was done to maintain himself and support his friends; but his animosity was so notorious, that the common opinion was, that the principal motive of his journey could be no other than the settled design of breaking off all negotiation of peace. At his return into Holland, he said to M. de Torcy, "That he had taken a journey for his private affairs, which he would not have undertaken, but would have remained in Holland, if he had known the King's Minister was coming there. He obligingly complained of not having been apprized of it, as he might have been very easily, if the Duke of Berwick had been charged to inform him of it. Besides the affection in him of naming the Duke of Berwick, he testified a great share of affection for a nephew, who deserved the esteem and friendship of every body who knew him \*." Was not this reproaching the

\* Mem. de Torcy, vol. II. page 145.



Minister for the little notice the Court of Versailles had taken of the advances made on his part through that nephew a few months before?

### No. III.

THE Marshal of Berwick does not agree with the accounts of several historians, in what he says of the battle of Villaviciosa. Let us see what the King of Spain, who was there in person, says. That Prince had too much real greatness of mind and veracity to disguise the truth, with a view to hide circumstances that might diminish his glory. We shall give an extract of the letter which he wrote to the Queen of Spain; and it will be found, that what the Marshal of Berwick says, agrees perfectly with it.

*Extract of a Letter from the King of Spain. Written at the Camp of Fuentes the 11th of December, 1710.*

“A MOMENT after, both our lines moved forward to charge the enemy; and about half past three, the battle began by the right of the cavalry, which broke their left entirely, and routed them; fell upon some of their battalions, which they cut their way through, and handled them very roughly, and made themselves masters of a battery of cannon the enemy had upon their left.

“Ours

“ Ours charged a moment after; and after several  
 “ charges, and having driven them, and been re-  
 “ pulled, at different times, it got behind the enemy’s  
 “ infantry; and our cavalry of the right, which had  
 “ also defeated the enemy, joined them behind that  
 “ infantry, while they were fighting with ours with  
 “ a great deal of vigour, and were pushing them by  
 “ degrees, all but our Walloon guards, who made  
 “ their way through the two lines and the corps de  
 “ reserve of the enemy, and drove every thing in  
 “ their way far beyond the field of battle, making  
 “ a great slaughter. *M. de Vendosme* seeing that our  
 “ centre was giving way, and that our left wing of ca-  
 “ valry made no impression on their right, thought it time  
 “ to consider of retreating towards *Torija*, and gave or-  
 “ ders for that purpose; but as we were on our march  
 “ thither with best part of the troops, we learned that  
 “ the *Marquis de Val-de-Canas* and *Mahony* had charged  
 “ the enemy’s infantry with the cavalry \* under their  
 “ command, and had handled them very roughly.—This  
 “ made us immediately take the resolution of marching  
 “ back with the rest † of the army; and we advanced to  
 “ the heights of *Brihuega*, where we waited till day-  
 “ light to return to the field of battle,” &c. &c.

It is impossible not to admire the King of Spain’s  
 modesty in his account of this battle, to the success  
 of which he principally contributed; in as much, as,  
 the right wing which he commanded, was, with the  
 Walloon guards, the only part of the army which  
 put the enemy in disorder. It was certainly to his

\* A reserve of fifteen squadrons.

† It appears, that the rest of the army is the whole army,  
 excepting the fifteen squadrons under *Val-de-Canas*.

own firmness, heroic courage, and even activity, on this occasion, that Philip owed the re-establishment and forming a new army, which put him in a condition to recover the ill effects of the defeat and rout of his troops at the battle of Saragossa.

# THE END





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E R R A T A.

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 46, l. 6—the same—*read*—some  
 54, l. 10—Gentil homme—*read* Gentilhomme  
 64, l. 9—migt heafily—*read* might easily  
 66, l. 2—that it—*read*—that water  
 74, l. 19—Haverge } —*read*—Faverge  
 76, l. 2—Taverge }  
 77, l. 6—Aggebelle—*read*—Aiguebelle  
 93, l. 11—decſent—*read*—deſcent  
 113, l. 19—Lauret—*read*—Laurent  
 124, l. 7—near the Francin—*read*—near Francin  
 128, l. 24—Pragdelas—*read*—Pragelas  
 165, l. 4—wit hout—*read*—without  
 187, l. 6—only that—*read*—only one that  
 218, l. 24—legitimate—*read*—legitimated  
 252, l. 17—Malmaism—*read*—Malmaison  
 254, l. 8—interſt—*read*—interest  
 332, l. 6—under take—*read*—undertake  
 387, l. penult }  
 393, l. 15 } Eſcanaffe—*read*—Eſcanaffe  
 395, l. 21 }  
 417, l. 20 } dele the ſecond *that*  
 452, l. 16 }  
 443, l. 8—impoſibilities—*read*—impoſſibilities



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